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In 2005, Colorado generated more than eleven billion dollars in mineral 
production. That same year, the farmers and ranchers of the state contributed more 
than seven billion dollars to the state‘s economy. Although such figures speak to the 
importance of traditional resource extraction and production in the economy of 
western states like Colorado, over the past century another economic sector has 
increasingly challenged their dominance. During that same fiscal year, the Centennial 
State was the beneficiary of nearly nine billion dollars in economic activity directly 
related to tourism. Contributing significantly to that figure were the some three 
million people that visited Rocky Mountain National Park (RMNP). 
Tourism in Colorado has roots stretching at least as far back as the 1860s, 
when boosters of the territory touted its great fishing and health benefits. Over the 
past one-hundred and fifty years, tourism in Colorado—and indeed across much of 
the American West—has supplemented local and regional economies. Given the past 
and present importance of tourism in states like Colorado, it stands to reason that it 
would be the subject of historical study, and indeed it has. Although the 
historiography of tourism in the American West is broad and diverse, the works of 
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Earl Pomeroy, Marquerite Shaffer, Anne Hyde and Hal Rothman have been 
especially important.   
Marking the first in-depth investigation into the relationship between tourism 
and the American West was Pomeroy‘s 1957 In Search of the Golden West: The 
Tourist in Western America. To Pomeroy, the tourist ―is capital.‖ More than strangers 
in an unfamiliar land, they represent income as ―consumers of gasoline and ice-cream 
cones and real estate.‖1 Laying the foundation upon which Shaffer, Hyde, and others 
would later build, Pomeroy was one of the first to delineate the democratization of 
tourism in the West through a series of technological and sociological developments. 
Once the purview of only the wealthiest Americans (and Europeans), the American 
West steadily invited visitors of every social class to romp across the landscape as 




Pomeroy offers valuable insight into the complex processes through which the 
―toured upon‖ assume roles that reflect the sort of authentic Western experience 
tourists sought. According to Pomeroy, the West ―plays West,‖ as it ―acts out a kind 
of Easterners view of the West based more on the testimony of television than of 
history.‖3 Since tourism is an endeavor predicated on selling an experience, and since 
a goodly number of those traveling West were non-Westerners who came with 
specific preconceived notions about what exactly an authentic Western experience 
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entailed, westerners have often reshaped and repackaged themselves to conform to 
such expectations.  
 Pomeroy also makes mention of the impact of the tourist upon the places they 
trod. Given that the field of environmental history was yet to develop in 1957, this 
insight was especially prescient. According to Pomeroy, the touring aristocrat of the 
nineteenth century was content to stay separated from nature, admiring its beauty 
from afar. As such, their impact upon the natural West was limited. Not until hoards 
of ―American‖ tourists of the mid-twentieth century arrived with their desire to climb 
mountain peaks, breathe the bracing air, and the experience home with them was the 
natural world transformed. Pomeroy is right about the transformative power of 
tourism, but incorrect about the innocuous nature of nineteenth century tourism. As 
the following chapters will demonstrate, the mere act of accommodating and 
attracting Eastern tourists initiated more than a century of significant environmental 
change in the American West.  
  Historians have continued to build upon, refine, and expand many of the ideas 
first explored in Pomeroy‘s work.  Anne Farrar Hyde‘s An American Vision: Far 
Western Landscape and National Culture, 1820-1920 also marks an important 
contribution to the understanding the connections between national identity, the 
American West, and tourism. Of central concern to Hyde is the process through 
which Americans sought to make sense of and define the American West. Hyde 
discovers that Americans of the early 19
th
 century lacked the tools to define the 
region on its own terms. As such, they turned most frequently to European references 
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to explain and define it. As the nineteenth century progressed, however, Americans 
cast about for a source of national identity—indeed national greatness—that 
transcended European comparison. In this sense, the promotion of the American West 
became part and parcel of the creation of a distinct American identity.  
 In short order those who had a vested economic stake in the West, especially 
railroad companies, began creating a unique western architectural style that reflected 
the region‘s nascent identity. According to Hyde, railroad companies found that 
―American tourists responded with enthusiasm to the packaging of wilderness, 
deserts, and Indians in a luxurious yet rustic setting.‖4 Central to the development of 
an architectural style that was distinctly American was the creation of great Western 
national parks like Yellowstone and Yosemite, where the rustic Western American 
architectural style was embodied in its fullest form.  
 Reinforcing the findings of Pomeroy, Hyde also finds that over time tourism 
in the West has undergone a democratizing process. Hyde argues that railroad 
companies initially held sway over the earliest years of the development of western 
tourism both in their control of wealthy clientele and of how the West was presented 
to tourists. As the twentieth century approached, however, their control waned. 
Driving this democratizing impulse were national parks—great swaths of land that 
were to serve as playgrounds for all Americans, not just the well-to-do. The 
development of parks, argues Hyde, was in no small part driven by the recognition of 
the importance of great Western landscapes in shaping national identity, and the 
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subsequent understanding that they must be protected. The second democratizing tool 
in Western tourism was the arrival of the automobile, which ―signaled a defeat for the 
railroad in their quest to control access to the far western landscape.‖5  
Less interested in the West in the formation of national identity and more 
interested in the costs of tourism is Hal Rothman. Through his Devil’s Bargains: 
Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West, Rothman investigates the hidden 
costs associated with the growth of tourism. The most significant of Rothman‘s 
contributions is his contention that the transition to tourist-based economies comes 
with a slew of significant socioeconomic costs often paid by locals who lack access to 
capital. Although many communities like Sun Valley and Steamboat Springs turned 
to tourism to supplement their economic base or to escape the bonds of extractive 
industry, Rothman finds that the growth of modern commercial tourism resulted in 
the loss of local control of economic development and the dilution and diminution of 
local identity. In short, argues Rothman, ―Regions, communities, and locales 
welcome tourism as an economic boon, only to find that it irrevocably changes them 
in unanticipated and uncontrollable ways.‖ Moreover, contends Rothman, ―[t]ourism 
transforms culture into something new and foreign; it may or may not rescue 
economies.‖6  
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In this sense, a good deal of Rothman‘s book concerns itself with the aspect of 
tourism that was first struck upon by Pomeroy nearly fifty years prior. Specifically, 
through the process of attempting to attract tourists, westerners find themselves in the 
oftentimes odd business of not acting as authentic westerners, but rather dressing 
themselves and their businesses in the trappings that tourists associate with an 
authentic western experience. Played out over time, argues Rothman, this behavior 
results in the loss of western identity and its replacement with one that is essentially 
faux.  
Just as troubling as the loss of local and regional identity to Rothman is the 
loss of control over economic development concomitant with the development of 
tourism. Here, Rothman argues that ―tourism promises much but delivers only a 
little,‖ as ―[i]ts local beneficiaries come from a small segment of the population, ‗the 
growth coalition,‘ the landowners, developers, planners, builders‖ and others. In both 
of the above instances, Rothman‘s work stands as a major contribution to the field 
because it was one of the earliest works to challenge the widely accepted notion that 
tourism provides a way out of the boom and bust cycles of extractive economies.
7
   
An important corollary to those interested in the growth of tourism in the 
American West are those scholars dedicated to understanding the development and 
growth of national parks. In this regard, the works of Roderick Nash, Alfred Runte, 
and Richard West Sellars mark important developments in national park 
historiography. One of the first historians to think deeply about the creation of the 
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national park system—and by extension their deeper significance relative to the 
development of the United States—was Roderick Nash. Although he notes that 
national parks required vast tracts of land and a democratic tradition that viewed that 
domain as property of the people, Nash argues that urbanization and affluence were 
also significant contributing factors to the development of parks. The rapid 
urbanization of the nineteenth century separated many Americans from a harsh 
frontier existence. Once segregated from the hard-scrabble life tied to the land and 
resource extraction, Americans began looking at wild spaces differently. No longer 
savage wastelands in need of taming, wild places came to be seen by urban 
Americans as loci of inspiration, truth, and respite not often found in the nation‘s 
bustling urban settings.  
Just as important in the formation of the national park idea, argues Nash, was 
the rise in affluence of the late nineteenth century. It was, after all, only the wealthiest 
of Americans that had the means to travel to the mysterious Yellowstone or Yosemite 
prior to the democratization of tourism of the early twentieth century. Wealthy, 
eastern urbanites spearheaded much of the movement to create national parks.
8
  
Historian Alfred Runte has also added significantly to our understanding of 
national parks.
9
 At the heart of Runte‘s account is his contention that the widely 
accepted notion that parks are best understood as symbols of our nation‘s willingness 
to forgo economic development in order to protect our nation‘s natural heritage is 
                                               
8
 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 3
rd
 ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1982). 
9
 Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 2
nd
 ed. (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1987).  
 xi 
deeply flawed. Instead, Runte demonstrates that national parks have always been 
shaped by economic concerns. Specifically, he argues that central to the creation of 
our earliest parks—especially Yellowstone—was the fact that much of the land 
included within proposed parks had little or no immediate economic value. This so-
called ―useless lands hypothesis‖ challenged decades of writing on national parks that 
held them up as reflections of an especially forward looking, enlightened society.  
Also contributing greatly to our understanding of national parks is the work of 
Richard West Sellars. Through his Preserving Nature in National Parks, Sellars seeks 
to understand the forces shaping the management of flora and fauna within the 
highest ranks of the National Park Service (NPS).
10
 Stripping away layers of 
romanticization, Sellars clearly argues that parks were first and foremost a function of 
the national development of tourism. Nearly all of the Service‘s resources, personnel, 
and expertise during its formative years were put to work at promoting and 
facilitating tourism. Far from useless land, Sellars demonstrates that the NPS and its 
supporters recognized early that parks had an economic value all their own. 
Sellars‘s work offers more than an institutional history of tourism via the 
NPS; it also adeptly traces the impact of science in reshaping how the NPS 
envisioned its mission and subsequently sought to manage its resources. What 
emerges is a complicated story in which those interested in the growth and 
development of tourism through the NPS came to be challenged by a different way of 
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 xii 
managing park resources. While it is safe to say that the NPS of today is still 
predominantly a purveyor of tourism, it must also be said that the arrival of science 
has greatly complicated how they accommodate tourists. 
Pomeroy, Hyde, Rothman and many others have provided a great deal of 
information about the cultural aspects of tourism and its unique role in shaping the 
American West. Likewise, over the past three decades historians such as Nash, Runte, 
and Sellars have used national parks as avenues into the formation of national 
identity, the shifting place of nature in American culture, as well as the role of science 
in complicating and altering how public agencies function. Historians concerned with 
the growth and development of tourism and national parks have greatly expanded our 
understanding, but there is much yet to learn about both. 
Although hundreds of books have been written about the development of 
tourism and the history and meaning of national parks, no one has yet undertaken a 
truly environmental history of either, in which the emphasis is on material changes in 
the natural world caused by humans. Employing such an approach, I argue, has the 
power to greatly add to our understanding of both. Although we know a great deal 
about the cultural components of tourism, historians have written almost nothing 
about its relationship to the material world. The question is more than academic. 
Across the American West, indeed across a good portion of the globe, eco-tourism is 
a growing industry. Although many towns, cities, states, and even nations embrace 
tourism as a ―green‖ way out of intensive extractive industries, historians know little 
about its ability to alter those places where it predominates.  
 xiii 
This is not to say, however, that other fields have not concerned themselves 
with the current impact of tourism on the environment. Recreation ecology is growing 
field in which biologists and others apply modern scientific principles in their effort 
to gauge the impact of tourism and recreation upon the natural world.  The knowledge 
this field has generated regarding the power of tourism to transform the natural world, 
and the tools and practices needed to mitigate such changes, is substantial. The field 
has developed to the point where entire textbooks are dedicated to understanding the 
―mechanical wear‖ of bicycle tires upon plants, animals and the soil, as well as the 
impact of litter upon the soil, boating upon lakes, and the like.
 11
  What is lacking in 
this growing field, however, is the historian‘s voice. 
At present, tourism in Rocky Mountain National Park exerts a great deal of 
pressure upon its soil, plant, animal, and aquatic communities. About this there is no 
doubt. What is just as certain, however, is that decisions and processes of generations 
past continue to shape both the policy-making arena and the natural world of this 
place. Any full appreciation of all of the factors that contribute to tourism‘s ability to 
transform the natural world must include a historical dimension. The roads that bring 
humans in direct contact with the park, the non-native fishes that dominate park 
waters, and the overgrazed meadows and trampled riparian areas within RMNP are 
all developments that began many decades in the past, not necessarily functions of 
tourism today. More than five decades after the NPS stopped stocking non-native 
fish, and nearly one hundred years since they exterminated predators in their effort to 
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grow ungulate populations, the park still bears witness to such programs. Biologists 
have the tools and methodologies to tell us how the natural world has changed 
through tourism. Historians have the capacity to tell us why.  
One of the greatest challenges in structuring research that traces, measures, 
and analyzes the environmental impacts of tourism across the twentieth century is 
segregating tourist activities from those of non-tourists. To help overcome this hurdle, 
this study focuses on a particular landscape that has, for the better part of the past 
century, functioned almost exclusively as a space for the tourist—Rocky Mountain 
National Park. The reasons for this choice are many. Rocky Mountain is a logical 
choice because of its prominence as a leading western national park. Since its 
creation, it has often attracted more visitors than Yellowstone, Yosemite or the Grand 
Canyon. tens of millions of Americans have made the pilgrimage to this breathtaking 
landscape and experienced first hand the spender of the Rockies.  
Although RMNP is a major western park, historians have paid scant attention 
to it. In fact, over its nearly one-hundred year history only one monograph attempts to 
capture its rich and diverse history. In this basic sense, the time is nigh for another 
historical investigation into this park. Rocky Mountain is also a logical choice for 
such a study because Colorado and Denver both have deep historical connections to 
the growth of tourism in the American West. In fact, tourism—not ―preservation‖—
provided the main impetus for this park‘s creation. As such, the Estes Park region 
provides a window into the growth of tourism in Colorado while enabling the 
historian to trace its evolution across the twentieth century. Also making RMNP a 
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useful subject of study is the wealth of scientific data generated within the park. The 
park archive is stacked from wall to wall with scientific investigations into the park‘s 
soils, water, plants, and animals. To an environmental historian interested in 
understanding something about the interaction between humans and the natural 
world, the wealth of scientific information available on Rocky Mountain National 
Park is invaluable.  
National parks provide a good opportunity to study tourism for another reason 
as well. At their very core they represent examples of socially constructed spaces. 
Within their borders we codify, regulate, and encourage a very particular set of 
behaviors. Similarly, within parks a range of behaviors such as hunting, logging, and 
mining are typically forbidden. National parks represent places where environmental 
protections are relatively high, and profit incentives are relatively low. As such, they 
offer valuable laboratories to analyze the environmental impacts of tourism under the 
very best of circumstances. If tourism is going to function in an environmentally 
sustainable way, it ought to be able to do so within America‘s great national parks. 
Further narrowing the field of inquiry, the following chapters focus upon 
driving, fishing, and wildlife viewing within Rocky Mountain National Park. Each of 
these activities represent a significant reason tourists have come to the park, and 
managing for each has brought about widespread—in some cases irreversible—
environmental change. As Pomeroy, Hyde, Rothman and others have demonstrated, 
how Americans have defined the West has played a direct role in shaping the region 
itself. With this in mind, each section begins with analysis of advertisements used to 
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draw tourists to RMNP. More than a means to attract tourists, these advertisements 
have the ability to tell us something about what advertisers and tourists thought a trip 
out West should entail. On this point I am not interested as Rothman, Pomeroy, and 
others have been with how westerners transformed themselves and their communities 
to conform to the expectations of the tourists. Rather, I am interested in how locals, 
business owners, and the NPS transformed the natural world to conform to such 
expectations. Well before the state of Colorado was even a state, a handful of boosters 
promised great fishing, wildlife viewing, and later driving in and around Estes Park. 
Such advertisements, I argue, put specific pressure on locals, communities, and the 
NPS to meet those expectations. In part reacting to and fostering these expectations, 
the NPS and others built smooth and wide roads, planted desirable fish species in 
nearly every body of water within the park that would hold them, and took sometimes 
drastic measures to grow the park‘s elk herd. In meeting such expectations, however, 
the NPS unwittingly brought about significant environmental change in the very place 
they were charged with protecting—truly a devil‘s bargain. 
But the history of RMNP offers more than a story of tourism run amuck. As 
Sellars clearly demonstrates, ecology arrived within the NPS in the 1930s in a real 
way and began the process of challenging and changing how parks like Rocky were 
administered. Through decades of scientific study, the NPS became increasingly 
aware that managing solely for the pleasure of the tourist was, in fact, undermining 
the ecological integrity of the park. Although Sellars provides detailed analysis of 
how these changes took place within the management of the NPS, the reader gets 
 xvii 
very little sense of what the arrival of ecology meant to the plants and animals within 
parks, nor does the reader get a sense of how science impacted the interaction 
between tourists and the park itself. In Rocky Mountain I find that the arrival of more 
ecologically-based management provided a competing social definition of what this 
space was and how it should be administered. Reflecting the rise of ecology within 
the NPS and its redefinition of what constituted appropriate management, the NPS 
reduced its elk herd, stopped stocking non-native fish, and eventually embraced 
voluntary mass transit in a broader effort to restore portions of the park‘s plant and 
animal communities. In these and other ways, ecology brought change to the plants 
and animals of the park just as it altered how visitors came into contact with them.  
Rather than standing in judgment of the NPS for management decisions that 
brought about ecological degradation, this work attempts to understand how and why 
they managed the resource as they did. Doing so makes it clear that what parks have 
meant to Americans has changed greatly over the course of the past century. As 
Sellars and others argue, parks were first and foremost created as pleasure grounds for 
Americans. As such, both visitors and the NPS were primarily interested in protecting 
and enhancing the visual appeal of the parks. To blame the NPS for building roads, 
growing elk, and planting fish that satisfied park patrons because such activities 
eventually caused environmental damage is not historically fair or helpful. Rather, we 
must always work to place decisions within their historical context. Only when we 
begin to understand the complex factors that shaped policy decisions will we be able 
to apply the lessons of the past to the management challenges of the future.  
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Chapter One 




For millennia we have scratched, etched, stippled and chipped our stories on 
stone, painted them on animal hides, and written them in glorious and sanctified 
books. Storytelling offers us an opportunity to make sense of our worlds, our 
communities, and ourselves. Among the tales told over the past century are stories 
about the creation of America‘s national parks. These stories too, whether we know it 
or not, have shaped some portion of our individual and national identities by adding 
meaning and complexity to both.  
Many hail national parks as one of the chief accomplishments of a highly 
moral and civilized society. We have, so this version goes, evolved to a point where 
we recognize and take steps to protect forever sweeping and irreplaceable vistas, 
pristine waters, towering trees, and the like. Taken to heart, this rendering instills a 
sense of pride, accomplishment, and satisfaction in knowing that in a world where 
nearly everything is valued first and foremost by its economic utility, we have had the 
foresight and self-control to place portions of nature above our own economic self 
interest. 
For nearly a century, historians, newspaper reporters, and magazine editors 
have been telling the story of Rocky Mountain National Park (RMNP) in this fashion. 
And why not? It is a hell of a story, and it goes something like this: 
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At the age of fourteen, a sickly boy from a poor Kansas family worked his way 
to the salubrious mountains of the West in the hope of saving his own health, maybe 
his life. Once removed from the repressive heat of the Kansas prairie, the screaming 
cicadas still fresh in his mind, he settled almost naturally into the thin brittle air of 
the Colorado Rockies. With the sweat of his brow and the blood of his muscles, the 
boy built a cabin and began a life all his own. While tramping about the West, he met 
the Apostle of Nature, John Muir, and was forever touched by their stirring 
encounter. From that day on, the young Enos Mills dedicated himself to knowing, 
loving, and saving his natural world. This life of learning and loving nature yielded a 
bevy of books, scores of articles, a lecturing stint with the newly fashioned United 
States Forest Service, and national acclaim.  
Later, as he came to see the greed, corruption and collusion of that federal 
agency, the then middle-aged Mills turned his considerable energy to the creation of 
a national park, which would forever protect his beloved Longs Peak region. What he 
envisioned was a lofty sanctuary where the flowers, animals, and mountains about 
which he so lovingly wrote would forever be spared the grasp of greedy timber men, 
hopeful miners and raucous pioneers. Instead, what he got was a bureaucracy little 
interested in beauty or democracy, but rather fixated on tourism, concessions and the 
almighty dollar. In what would be the final years of his life, the indefatigable Mills 
battled mightily in his attempts to get the National Park Service to recognize and 
correct their mistakes, making trips all over the nation to convince others of the 
importance of his message. On what would be his last trip, Mills suffered a freak 
Longs Peak, circa 1910 
Courtesy National Archives II 
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accident on a subway and later died of his wounds. Headlines read, “Father of Rocky 
Mountain National Park has died today, of a Broken Heart.”  
Worthy of Frederick Jackson Turner or Joseph Campbell, this emotional and 
moral story contains at least as much fancy as it does fact. A more balanced reading 
of the sources and a less romantic view of Enos Mills will yield a complex, colorful, 
and satisfying history—one that offers insight into how and why a great park came 
into being, while also shedding some light upon why we have, for so long, clung to 
mythical rather than factual historical interpretations of this park‘s creation.1  
Over the past few decades historians have cast an increasingly critical eye 
toward the meaning and function of our ―national playgrounds.‖ Rather than 
cathedrals of natural beauty or symbols of a nation‘s grace, many have come to 
regard national parks as manifestations or reflections of our political and economic 
systems. Parks, these historians argue, have more to do with town, state and 
bureaucracy building and promoting tourism than we had thought. Taken to heart, 
these interpretations lead to dismay as we come to see that indeed nothing is sacred—
nothing has, or ever will escape the heavy hand of market incentive.  
                                               
1
 Three earlier works shed light upon the origins of the park. The earliest, Patricia Fazio‘s 
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indicate more clearly who and what was truly driving park creation. 
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One of the earliest departures from the laudatory interpretation of park history 
came with Alfred Runte‘s National Parks: The American Experience.2 Central to 
Runte‘s account is the claim that rather than an appreciation for the inherent value 
and beauty of wild places, economic concerns chiefly governed park creation. His so-
called ―useless lands hypothesis‖ holds that prior to the creation of any given park, 
promoters had to convince all relevant economic interests (mining, timber, grazing) 
that the creation of said park would in no way impinge upon their economic goals and 
opportunities. Far from symbols of the high and the good, parks were leftover land, 
odd curiosities with no realizable economic potential—a feather in the cap, maybe, 
but a crow‘s feather at best.  
Revising Runte, Chris Magoc has more recently argued that the creation of 
Yellowstone National Park in 1872 had less to do with the relative uselessness of the 
place and more to do with a growing awareness that it held a different kind of 
economic potential.
3
 Rather than users and abusers of the landscape begrudgingly 
stepping aside and ―giving up‖ some odd or useless tract of land, boosters, developers 
and corporations were awaking to the idea that tourism was a resource all its own. It 
was for this reason, Magoc argues, that the Northern Pacific Railroad so ardently 
supported and advertised Yellowstone. In the end, it was the interest and power of the 
railroad that made the difference between park and no park, and it was the railroad 
that began the tradition of selling the idea that parks were exalted places well above 
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the grime of daily life. This account gives little credit to aesthetic values and lofty 
ideals that the term ―national park‖ so often conjures.  
Which of the above interpretations holds promise for understanding the 
creation of Rocky Mountain National Park? Was it a single stalwart man filled with a 
love of nature and hope of a better tomorrow—a Muir of the Rockies who fought 
selflessly on behalf of nature? Was it merely the acquiescence of resource developers, 
the giving up of ―useless land‖ in a larger political process? Or was it the result of a 
self-interested, self-promoting corporation that created parks to make a profit? None 
of the above, I will argue, provides by itself an adequate explanation. What we need 
instead is a more complex, multi-causal history. There certainly were a few central 
actors in this process, though I would argue they are not those that historians have 
traditionally credited.  The ―useless lands‖ hypothesis also applies to RMNP. Initial 
proposals encompassed too much territory and threatened too many potentially 
enriching resources to be palatable to locals and national politicians. Only after its 
boundaries were significantly reduced to exclude areas of even marginal economic 
potential, did it come into being.  
Although the above do deserve a place within this narrative, their importance 
is secondary to the strong thread of economic self-interest and promotion that 
characterizes the birth of this crown jewel. Individuals, Chambers of Commerce, 
conglomerations of real estate developers, park officials, and politicians all saw in the 
park idea an opportunity to further economic growth through the promotion of 
tourism. Here, the geographic, economic and political nature of Denver was of crucial 
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importance. The Longs Peak region, though beautiful in its own right, lacked the sort 
of geological or cultural curiosities requisite of our longest standing parks. Instead, 
the idea of a park nestled at the foot of Longs Peak was attractive because it held the 
promise of drawing tourists, generating revenue, and providing respite and relaxation 
to a growing middle class of urbanites eager to momentarily escape the city‘s whirr. 
In the final analysis, the creation of Rocky Mountain Park offers a subtle reflection of 
the urbanization of the West and the nation—without Denver, without the swelling 
desire of millions of Americans to escape the harsh angular world of the city, Rocky 





First settled by whites as a series of isolated and competing gold camps in the 
late 1850s, east central Colorado was early on a rough place to be. In the late 1860s 
some twenty-seven freighting firms stretched across the Midwest, turning Denver into 
a sort of storage bin for westward-bound goods and eastward-bound natural 
resources. In 1870, the completion of the Denver Pacific and Kansas Pacific 
Railroads linked Denver to Cheyenne, Kansas City, and St. Louis, thereby making it 
easier yet to move resources from Denver‘s hinterlands through the city itself, and 
then to faraway urban centers. These rails and roads, argues geographer William 
Wyckoff, facilitated the flow of people, information, and capital to and from eastern 
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cities. The influx of capital, feeding off of and into the budding rail system, created an 
interconnected web of mines, smelters, and supporting industries, which brought 
alternating cycles of economic prosperity and desperation to the newly-formed state.
 5
   
Over the course of just a few decades, the flow of goods, money and people 
drastically altered Colorado‘s leading city. From a population of about 4,000 in 1870, 
Denver grew to some 130,000 residents by 1900 and more than 250,000 by 1920.  
Gone for good were the dusty mining shacks and musty canvas tents that once 
characterized the city. By 1920 Denver claimed about one fourth of the state‘s total 
population and ―was unchallenged in its urban dominance, not only in the Piedmont, 
but across the interior of the American West.‖ It had achieved the same sort of market 
―gravitational pull‖6 of Chicago, making it a natural location for ―eastern capitalists 
and nearby mining magnates to locate their offices and investment.‖  By the turn of 
the century it had become the unchallenged ―business center of the state.‖7  
Coinciding with Denver‘s demographic and economic growth were significant 
changes in its urban geography. The city grew more sophisticated as gas lamps and 
finely crafted buildings, such as the Tabor Opera House and Windsor Hotel, popped 
up around town. Just as the its urban landscape was becoming more sophisticated, it 
also became more expansive. Key to the suburbanization of Denver, argues Wyckoff, 
was a ―close and profitable working relationship between the city‘s real estate 
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developers and those who invested in and promoted the city‘s expanding street and 
cable car systems.‖8 Together, those interests altered the shape, size, and function of 
Denver, while making tidy profits for themselves. 
Through the process of pushing their city to the center of economic activity in 
the state, Denver businessmen had grown acutely aware of the potential value and 
importance of tourism. Americans had long believed that the cleansing air, crisp blue 
skies, and sulfurous bubbling hot springs of the Rocky Mountains provided cures for 
a wide variety of physical ailments. By the 1880s Colorado boosters and ―outside 
journalists could agree that, despite some overselling, the now familiar advantages of 
Colorado had proved the state to be a ‗great and beneficial sanitarium‘ for sufferers 
from pulmonary diseases.‖ Not only could a stint in the Rockies combat tuberculosis, 
it also promised to ―‗broaden the chest,‘‖ foster a ―‗cheerfulness and contented frame 
of mind,‘‖ and perhaps even ease the stress ―‗on the class of overworked brains, 
which, in the intensity of political, professional and business life is quiet numerous 
nowadays‘‖9 Although Colorado Springs and Glenwood Springs surpassed Denver as 
Mecca‘s for the unwell, the capital city nonetheless benefited mightily from the 
unhealthy multitudes.  
As towns and cities across Colorado sought to capitalize on their cool clean 
air by luring the unhealthy from across the nation, they also actively attracted healthy 
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and wealthy patrons: gold, businessmen found, was often easier to dislodge from the 
tourist‘s pocket than from the stubborn quartz of the nearby hills. Some 25,000 
tourists were spending time and money in Denver annually by the late 1870s.
10
  
But the trip across the plains in a Pullman Palace car was a spendy event, out 
of the reach of the common person. This changed, however, with the calamitous 
economic decline beginning in 1893. Especially hard hit by the downturn were 
Colorado‘s silver mines and the railroads that fed them. Seeking to replace lost 
revenue, several railroads began offering reduced rates while ramping up advertising 
campaigns to supplement their dwindling revenues. Reflective of this trend, the 
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad marketed an affordable four-day, one-thousand-mile 
tour through the most breathtaking portions of the Rockies for just twenty-eight 
dollars.
11
 Adding incentive for railroads to continue reduced railroad rates were the 
increasing numbers of the middle class, who craved affordable travel and adventure 
in the American West.
12
  
First drawn west by cheaper accommodations on transcontinental rails, the 
nascent middle class increasingly sought access to and through the West by way of 
automobile. As was earlier the case with rail travel, the automobile initially provided 
travel only for the wealthy. In 1908, however, things took a dramatic turn as the Ford  
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                                                    Intrepid auto tourists near Estes Park, circa 1913.  
(Courtesy of National Archives, College Park) 
 
Motor Company introduced its $850 Model T. Over the next couple of years Ford 
continued to streamline production techniques, and by 1914 the company could 
produce one car every hour and a half and sold more that 250,000 of them that year 
alone.
13
 Early realizing the economic potential of automobile tourism, the Denver 
Chamber of Commerce and Denver Automobile Club successfully lobbied for the 
creation of a State Highway Commission in 1909.
14
 A wide range of commercial 
interests in the area also actively sought to bolster the city‘s auto appeal by building a 
system of roads and parks to better serve and attract the driving public.  
                                               
13
 Marquerite S. Schafer, See America First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 137.  
14
 Abbot, Leonard and McComb, Colorado, 238.  
 28 
Such was the character of Colorado and its leading city on the eve of the 
creation of Rocky Mountain National Park. This park, as we shall see, required more 
than any single devoted and impassioned individual; it required a city with deep 
pockets and political clout, the very name of which had the power to conjure 
evocative images in the minds of American tourists. Indeed, this park required city 
folk with money to spend, and a desire to spend it in the wilds of Colorado.  
 
Muir of the Rockies 
Credit for the park idea usually goes to the sometimes quixotic, 
confrontational and fascinating Enos Mills. While I certainly do not question his zeal 
or his significance as a supporter of the park, I am less willing to accept him simply 
as an altruistic and enlightened preservationist. A brief reconstruction of his life in the 
years leading up to 1909 (when he first raised the idea of creating a park) will reveal a 
complex man passionate about nature, but also one who wrested his livelihood from 
it. Understanding Mills as both a lover and user of the natural world will open new 
doors to understanding the motivations and meaning behind his early support of a 
national park.  
In 1884, the state of Colorado not yet a decade old, the fourteen-year-old 
Mills began his journey westward. Upon arriving at Estes Park, a hamlet of only 150 
residents at the time, the plucky young man worked for two years building himself a 
―little log cabin on the slope of Longs Peak, and in this locality‖ he lived much of his 
adult life. Often, when the weather turned cold or work became scarce, the untethered 
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Mills packed his scant belongings and tramped about the West where he ―spent great 
days with the old prospector, the trapper, the capable cowboy and the Indian.‖ 15  
More often than not, Mills worked at least part of the year as a miner in Butte, 
Montana, or in Cripple Creek or Ward, Colorado.
16
 His mining experiences, which 
were ―full of red blood, excitement and real characters from every mining region of 
the earth,‖ also opened the door for his chance meeting with John Muir.17   
After underground fires at Butte‘s Anaconda mine halted production in the 
fall of 1889, the nineteen-year-old Mills set out for San Francisco.
18
 By Mills‘ 
recollection, he was walking aimlessly across a San Francisco beach December of 
1889, when he saw an older man surrounded by an interested crowd. As he drew near, 
the young Mills realized that ―the small gray bearded little man,‖ John Muir, was 
intensely describing the inner workings of the plant and animal world. Fascinated as 
much by the speaker as the message, Mills stuck around and eventually introduced 
himself to Muir. The two then embarked upon a ―four mile walk across the sand hills 
and through Golden Gate Park.‖19    
The chance meeting between the young man and the Apostle of Nature seems 
to have been a life-changing event for Mills. In Muir, he found a father figure (never 
having had an especially close relationship with his biological father), a mentor, and 
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an avenue to gain and sharpen his public image later in life. Muir apparently urged 
Mills to learn as much about the natural world as possible while sharpening his 
literary skills. Following that advice, Mills spent a semester at Heald‘s Business 
College in San Francisco, and then set out to see ―some of the wilder sections of 
America,‖ including the Yosemite, Kings Canyon, and various portions of Alaska. 
Before his death, Mills claimed to ―have been by a campfire alone and unarmed in 
every state in the Union and also in Mexico, Canada and Alaska.‖20  
Following his contact with Muir, Mills continued working in mines across the 
West while endeavoring to learn more about the natural world. By 1902, he had 
traveled across much of Europe, gained a new appreciation for the value of tourism, 
all while saving enough money to purchase Longs Peak House from his mother‘s 
brother, Carlyle Lamb. After changing its name to Longs Peak Inn in 1904, Mills 
intensified his efforts to hone his skills as a nature guide, writer, and speaker—all of 
which served nicely to draw guests to his rustic little inn.
21
   
In early June of 1906, while Mills was away at a speaking engagement, a fire 
ravaged the Longs Peak Inn, leaving little standing in its blackened wake. Determined 
not to let the fire get the better of him, he endeavored to rebuild his inn bigger and 
better than ever. Using fire-damaged trees, boulders, and stumps, Mills and his 
contractor rebuilt the Longs Peak Inn in a fashion that fit well with the enlightened 
naturalist persona he was laboring to create. Once completed, his new hotel boasted 
more than 100 rooms and was accompanied by a constellation of cabins, many of  
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Longs Peak Inn, 1918.                                                                                   
(Courtesy of the Denver Public Library, Western History Collection) 
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which could accommodate several families simultaneously.
22
 By 1906 Mills was 
more than emotionally invested in the Rocky Mountains.     
Through a combination of self-promotion, determination, and persistence, 
Mills had made himself familiar to many important people 1907. Among those 
acquainted with his reputation as a public speaker and nature writer were Chief 
Forester Gifford Pinchot and President Teddy Roosevelt. Seeing in Mills a man who 
might work well to publicize their conservation efforts, Pinchot offered, and Mills 
accepted, an appointment as an official lecturer for the United States Forest Service in 
1907.  
For nearly two years the relationship between Mills, Pinchot and the Forest 
Service benefited all parties. Mills received a steady wage, the opportunity to promote 
the ideals of the Forest Service, to which he had no objections at the time, and 
notoriety, all the while dropping hints to audiences that the Longs Peak region offered 
almost unparalleled opportunities to hear the call of the wild.
23
 For their part, Pinchot 
and the Forest Service found a tireless and effective speaker willing to travel untold 
miles to spread the gospel of conservation. Mills gave in the neighborhood of two 
hundred presentations in the months between October, 1908 and May, 1909 as he 
traveled to dozens of states across the nation. His message, though varying somewhat 
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according to his audience, emphasized the importance of science, education and 
governmental regulation in assuring healthy forests for future generations.
24
  
Mills used one of his most common presentations, entitled ―Our Friends the 
Trees,‖ to impress upon listeners the importance of enlightened silvaculture. Only 
through the tempered use of our woodlands, he said, could we hope to prevent the 
ravages of flooding, maintain year round irrigation water, and ―supply lumber for the 
cottage, good cheer for the hearthstone, beauty to the landscape, climate and health 
for everybody, and scenery for all.‖ There was a time, in the not so distant past, 
counseled Mills, that the ―[p]rimitive people and pioneers could depend upon wild 
products for a living,‖ but ―civilized people cannot depend upon the scanty and 
unreliable wild sources, but must sow if they are to reap. Civilized people must 
domesticate and improve the plants and animals which they need. A complete 
domestication of both birds and trees is now necessary.‖25   
In another version of the same address, Mills defined forestry as a method of 
―harvesting your woodland without destroying the forest. It means using the annual 
increase of the forest and no more…Scientific forestry and scientific bee keeping,‖ he 
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claimed, ―are simply good business methods.‖26 Practicing these methods would 
ensure ―the perpetuation of the forests‖ while at the same time ―having more timber 
to use.‖ To Mills, proper forest management involved not only ―the planting and 
protecting of the tree,‖ but also working to ―improve the production of trees [for] 
their cutting and using.‖27  
In a circular earlier published under the title ―An Arbor Day Souvenir,‖ Mills 
clearly laid out the role of America‘s forests, stating that a forest ―reserve is not to be 
simply looked at. It invites the camper, prospector, miner, forester and the 
lumberman. It calls for a fireman, the forest ranger. A reserve means a place where 
one forest is harvested and another planted and protected. A forest reserve means the 
end of anarchy in the forest.‖28  To Mills at least, science, management and 
regulation—not preservation—ensured a happy and prosperous future for all. 
 By April of 1909, Pinchot and the United States Forest Service no longer 
required Mills‘ services. He had broadcast Pinchot‘s brand of conservation across the 
nation, giving a friendly, weather worn face to the Chief Forester‘s environmental 
policy. In his last lecture for the Forest Service, which he delivered on April 28, 1909, 
Mills said nothing derogatory about either Pinchot or the Forest Service. Both of 
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Making a National Park 
In September of that same year, the Estes Park Improvement Association was 
searching for ways to bolster tourism in its area. To aid them in their investigation, 
they called upon Herbert N. Wheeler of the Forest Service to offer an opinion. 
Wheeler proposed the creation of a game preserve, which would improve and 
increase wildlife in the area and thereby, he thought, strengthen Estes Park‘s appeal to 
the cash-laden tourist. The Estes Park Improvement Association thought Wheeler‘s 
idea a good one and just days later, Mills broadened Wheeler‘s plan calling instead 
for the creation of Estes National Park. Agreeing that a national park would better 
serve to make popular and profitable the Estes Park region, the Association threw its 
support behind Mills‘ idea.30 
Initially, Mills proposed a swath of territory stretching more than forty-two 
miles east to west and twenty four miles north to south be set aside as Estes National 
Park. This territory, which included more than sixty peaks over 12,000 feet, dozens of 
glacial lakes, and majestic stands of douglas fir, ponderosa pine and aspen, had long 
been used to support hunting, mining and cattle enterprises. Coinciding with, and 
driven by, the growth of Denver, many sought early to cash in on the area‘s bountiful 
elk populations. Decades of market hunting for Denver‘s hungry masses, however, 
had so devastated the elk population that they had become scarce by the turn of the 
century. In part as an attempt to bolster tourism in the area, elk were later shipped in 
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from Montana in 1913 with the hopes that increased patrols and hunting regulation 
enforcement would allow them to repopulate.
31
   
As many strove to capitalize on the area‘s abundant wildlife, others tried to 
squeeze their livelihoods from the elusive ore-bearing stone of the Rockies. Although 
prospectors unearthed many valuable deposits of gold and silver in Colorado, the 
territory around Longs Peak held little in the way of precious metals. Forever 
optimists, many locals firmly believed that the riches had only yet to be discovered. 
This optimism, perhaps combined with interminable winter days in solitary cabins, 
bred countless tales of treasures found, and lost. Most locals were familiar with 
harrowing stories of prospectors stumbling into assayers‘ offices, packs filled with 
rich ore, only later to be unable to re-locate the deposit. Despite the lore, and the 
hundreds of mineral claims in the region, prospecting in the Longs Peak region often 
failed to repay the prospector‘s optimism.32   
Where some sought their future in hunting—either for elk or for gold—others 
hoped that wandering herds of bovine would put bread on the table and money in the 
bank. For decades some, like the Earl of Dunraven and the Abner Sprauge family, 
grazed thousands of head of cattle in the picturesque valleys near Estes Park. Over 
time, many of these operations sought to draw more aggressively tourists to their 
pastures with the promise of experiencing an authentic western ranch. 
33
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Decades of unchecked, largely unregulated resource use came to an end in 
1905 with the expansion of Wyoming‘s Medicine Bow National Forest deep into the 
heart of Colorado‘s Rockies, renamed the Colorado National Forest in 1910. 
Stewardship of this national forest, out of which Mills hoped to carve ―his‖ park, fell 
to forester Herbert Wheeler. Using a handful of range policemen, Wheeler set about 
the difficult task of regulating the use of the area‘s natural resources, often in the face 
of local opposition.  
With a national park plan stirring in his mind and heart, Mills worked to 
muster as much local and public support as possible. In this endeavor, his relationship 
with J. Horace McFarland, president of the American Civic Association and devoted 
preservationist, was of crucial importance. From 1910 to 1916 McFarland proved to 
be a steadfast and loyal supporter, more than willing to use his strong public voice 
and deep political connections to help ensure creation of the park. Although his 
relationship with Mills later soured, McFarland wrote Mills often, offering moral and 
political support while attempting to stay Mills‘ frequent public and private tirades 
against all those who showed even the slightest disagreement with his ―vision.‖  
 Mills‘ fluid mix of progressive optimism, love of nature, and commercial self-
interest together explain his support of Estes National Park. Understanding 
McFarland‘s willingness to participate in its creation, however, is a bit more difficult.  
Based on the correspondence between the two, McFarland was clearly interested in 
protecting worthy ―pleasure grounds‖ for future generations of Americans. He wrote 
often of nature‘s ability to revive the spirit and purify the mind, but he was also 
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acutely aware of the economic potential of a park at Estes. In a letter to Secretary of 
the Interior Richard Ballinger in 1910, McFarland anticipated a crucial chord in the 
movement‘s eventual success. ―Having gone directly from Estes Park to Yellowstone 
National Park,‖ he stated, ―I am in a position to say that while it in no sense compares 
with the Yellowstone in respect of natural wonders, it does compare most favorable 
[sic] in respect of its availability as a great accessible and beneficent pleasure 
ground.‖ At the time there was ―no available national park in the large sense east of 
the Yellowstone,‖ and ―Estes Park has long been known as a sort of summer resort, 
available in four hours by train and automobile from Denver.‖34 By McFarland‘s 
reckoning, a national park near Estes was needed, not because of its inherent 
wilderness or aesthetic value, but rather because of its prime location and potential as 
a resort for traveling Americans.
35
 
 Mills and McFarland were not alone in early recognizing the economic 
potential of a park in the region. In December of 1910, the Denver Chamber of 
Commerce gave its wholehearted endorsement to the plan and ―appointed a live 
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national park committee‖ to aid in the process.36 Led by Frederick Ross, a local real 
estate mogul, the Denver Chamber of Commerce, more than Mills or McFarland, was 
primarily responsible for the final passage of the bill. Shortly following the formation 
of the Chamber‘s National Park Committee another wing of the same group threw its 
support behind the plan. Representing ―some two hundred …retail firms of the City 
of Denver,‖ the Retail Association of the Denver Chamber emphatically urge[d] that 
Estes Park be thus set aside‖ as a national park.37 The ―retail merchants and the other 
business men of Denver [were] extremely anxious‖ to see a park created because such 
―would be of incalculable benefit to the business interests of the city and state, 
besides assuring the control and preservation of one of the most beautiful spots in the 




As details of the plan crystallized, so too did opposition to it. Initially, Boulder 
and Grand Counties, both of which stood to lose a large portion of their territory if the 
initial proposal went through, heartily opposed the plan, claiming that it threatened 
―many thousands of acres of undeveloped agricultural land‖ and several active 
mining projects, including the ―finest grade of Gilsonite known.‖ Furthermore, 
county commissioners ―confidently believed‖ that ―every one familiar with this 
territory‖ knew ―that it is liable at any time to become one of the greatest mining 
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Districts yet known.‖40 Echoing similar concerns, the Boulder County Metal Mining 
Association objected to taking ―119 square miles of the 440 square miles of our 
mountain and mineral bearing area...and making a play-ground…out of what we 
believe will become one of our most highly productive mineral sections in the near 
future.‖ 41  
By the summer of 1911, several concerned citizens had banded together under 
the auspices of the Front Range Settler‘s League (FRSL) to demonstrate their 
opposition to the park idea. Comprised mainly of citizens of Estes Park and 
neighbors, relatives, and former employees of Mills, the FRSL fought tooth and nail 
to the end, writing sheaves of oppositional letters to state and federal politicians, 
Department of Interior administrators, and two sitting presidents.  Although the 
reasons for their opposition were many, a few chief complaints regularly surfaced. 
Mills, they charged, was not only a man of questionable character (he had earlier been 
convicted of assault and perjury), but worse yet he was ―not sincere in his pretended 
love of nature.‖ According to the FRSL, Mills was interested in little more than 
―making a nature faking shrine out of his summer hotel.‖ The League also claimed 
that many of his ―hair-raising personal reminiscences‖ were written while 
―destroying, pioneer fashion, the scenic beauty about him by cutting the finest trees 
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and otherwise using the best of everything in the public domain.‖42 Lastly, League 
members believed the land in question to be ―imperishable‖ and thought United 
States Forest Service management more than adequate to protect and manage the 
region.‖43 
Whereas the FRSL lauded the Forest Service for the fine job they had done 
managing and protecting these public lands, Mills had come to believe that the Forest 
Service, and its many representatives, posed a threat. Although three short years 
earlier Mills had been a spokesmen and champion of the USFS, he turned his pen 
most viciously upon his former employer making a wide array of fantastic and 
sometimes shameful claims.
44
  When local forester Herbert Wheeler failed to 
demonstrate the sort of zeal for the plan Mills thought appropriate, he concluded that 
―higher ups‖ in DC directed Wheeler to fight him on the matter.45  More and more he 
grew paranoid about the Forest Service, intimating to J. Horace McFarland that the 
agency‘s opposition was ―largely under cover‖ and would be ―difficult to absolutely 
prove.‖46  Nonetheless, Mills was confident that if you ―[s]cratch[ed] any old Forest 
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Service man…you will find a Traitor who is opposed to all National Parks.‖47 
Although he offered no evidence to support his claims, he stood poised to ―attack 
them before the public at any moment.‖48   
The last two months of 1911 turned out to be crucial ones for the national park 
idea at Estes. After months of cordial but insistent letters, the Denver Chamber of 
Commerce and the Real Estate Exchange were finally reaching and convincing the 
right people in Washington.
49
 Central to their message was the claim that all they 
needed to make the park a success was ―the proper sort of publicity, coming from 
reliable sources to attract the tourist.‖50  Soon, the Department of the Interior 
awakened to their case, concluding that  
apparently there will be a strong effort made by the people interested in this 
proposed park to have it created during the coming session of Congress, and 
we had probably just as well prepare therefore. I suggest that we send these 
papers to the General Land Office with instructions to prepare a map, using 





The following day, the above memorandum was forwarded to the General Land 
Office with a letter from the Chamber, claiming that ―all of the best and most 
                                               
47
 Enos Mills to Horace McFarland, 20 March 1911,  MF Collection. 
48
 Enos Mills to Horace McFarland, 19 February 1911, MF Collection, 2. 
49
 Frederick Ross to Fisher, 1 November 1911, NARG 79 Box 159, ff ―Estes‖; Robert Speer 
to Fisher, 2 November 1911, NARG 79, Box 159, ff ―Estes‖; Denver Chamber of Commerce 
to Fisher, 3 November 1911, NARG 79 Box 159, ff ―Estes‖; Denver Real Estate Exchange to 
Fisher, 25 November 1911, NARG 79, Box 159, ff ―Estes‖;  Crescent Realty and Investment 
Co. to Fisher, 25 November 1911, NARG 79, Entry 6, Box 161, ff ―Miscellaneous.‖ 
50
 Denver Chamber of Commerce to Fisher, 7 September 1911, NARG 79, Box 159, ff 
―Estes.‖ 
51
 Memorandum GEO Ward, 27 November 1911, NARG 79, Box 159, ff ―Estes,‖ 2.  
 43 
influential citizens of our state are heartily in favor of the park.‖52  Concluding that it 
seemed ―probable that an effort will be made by the persons interested to have the 
proposed park created during the coming session of Congress,‖ the General Land 
Office took steps to prepare a map of the area.
53
 It is worth pointing out that the 
Department of the Interior and the General Land Office eventually sent Chief U.S. 
Geographer Robert Marshall to prepare the crucial map not because of the pleas of an 
impassioned preservationist, but rather because they heard, understood and agreed 
with the economic argument of Denver‘s business class.  
 As word got out that Marshall would soon visit the area, those opposed to the 
plan redoubled their efforts. Senator Simon Guggenheim cautioned Secretary of the 
Interior Walter Fisher about the park proposal. Not only had he ―received a number of 
letters and telegrams from Colorado protesting against the establishment of Estes 
Park as a National Park,‖ but he also believed that much ―of the land said to be 
included in the contemplated change is mineral land‖ where ―extensive mining 
operations have been conducted in the territory for many years.‖ Reflecting the 
sentiments of Grand and Boulder counties, the Metal Mining Association and many 
of the FRSL, Guggenheim also ―feared that such a proclamation or order would work 
irreparable injury to the mining industry, as well as to the agricultural settlement of 
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the country.‖ For these reasons he urged that a ―full investigation of conditions in that 
section be made and full hearing accorded before final action‖ was taken.54  
Not to be left out, the Front Range Settlers League planned and executed ―an 
aggressive campaign against the Denver Chamber of Commerce‖ and against Mills, 
both of whom constituted their chief opposition.
55
 In an attempt to demonstrate that 
Mills was playing the ―Department of the Interior against the Forestry Bureau,‖ the 
FRSL prophetically argued that they had ―no satisfactory assurance, but that Mr. 
Mills will in due course of time, if the proposed Bureau of National Parks is 
established, be declaring, just as he now is of the Forest Service, that they were 
abusing their powers in an effort to strengthen their bureaucratic prowess.‖56 
Although the Department of Interior proceeded with extreme caution, proponents 
were rapidly gaining the upper hand, and the opposition knew it.  
Much to the chagrin of those laboring to stem the tide of park support, the 
formation of the Colorado Mountain Club in April, 1912 heralded yet another major 
victory for park supporters. The organization, whose founding members dedicated 
themselves to raising local awareness and support for a park in Colorado‘s Rocky 
Mountains, played an important part in the political process of park creation. Almost 
immediately, the club began ―a series of public lectures on mountain themes, 
published and circulated bibliographies of Colorado alpine literature, pamphlets on 
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birds and such.‖ Perhaps just as important as the club‘s community activism was the 
fact that it boasted some well-connected members, including ―a young  lawyer named 
Morrison Shafroth whose father was a leading Democratic senator in the Wilson 
administration and who was ready to travel to Washington with boxes of lantern 
slides and portfolios of photographs‖ to sell the park idea.57 Early leadership of the 
organization fell to James Grafton Rogers, a handsome young attorney whose legal 
and political acumen were of incalculable benefit to the cause of park creation. Not 
only would Rogers craft and redraft numerous iterations of park proposals, but he also 
understood the value of working with—not against—interested parties.  
As Geographer Marshall‘s visit drew nearer, the Chamber, Mills, and the 
Front Range Settler‘s League each insisted that he meet, stay, and tour the area with 
them. Realizing the potential volatility of the offers, especially prior to his surveys, 
Marshall wisely demurred. In his reply to Mills‘ offer of assistance, we see yet 
another indication that even though Mills may have raised significant local support, 
policy makers and administrators in Washington, D.C. were listening more to the 
Chamber of Commerce and Real Estate Exchange. Marshall stated that he would be 
―very glad indeed to confer with the Chamber of Commerce, the Real Estate 
Exchange, etc., or anyone interested in the Estes Park proposition, provided they do 
not take too much of my time.‖ It appears that Marshall was under the impression that 
both the Chamber and the Real Estate Exchange represented the heart of the 
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movement, while a visit with Mills would have fallen under the category of ―anyone 
interested in the Estes Park proposition.‖ 58  
As park supporters had hoped, Marshall‘s visit went swimmingly. Following 
his survey, he willingly and openly listened to the concerns of the Front Range 
Settler‘s League, Mills, Senator John Shafroth, Governor-elect Elias Ammons, 
Frederick Ross and former Senator Thomas Patterson. To Marshall‘s ears, the crux of 
the opposition‘s argument lay less with the creation of the park and more with 
concerns over its size. In an early effort to quiet opposition, he proposed boundaries 
that encompassed far less land than initial suggestions, omitting as many private 
holdings as possible without violating the integrity of the park.   
Park supporters later read with delight Marshall‘s official report, which 
claimed that, although there were no ―commanding natural feature[s]‖ as was the case 
in other national parks, the ―region as a whole is as beautiful as any to be found in the 
United States, or, indeed in the world.‖ Although Marshall lauded the area‘s beauty, 
he found it of secondary importance to what was ―[p]erhaps the most attractive 
feature of the plan to create this park...from both the National and State standpoints,‖ 
which was the ―accessibility of the area.‖ Apparently won over by the words of the 
Denver Chamber of Commerce, Marshall repeated their refrain that ―Estes Park can 
be reached from Chicago in about 30 hours and from Denver by automobile in about 
3 hours.‖  Moreover, the effusive Marshall believed that since Denver was ―the center 
of practically all the railroad systems west of the Mississippi River, the number of 
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visitors that may be expected annually in the proposed park will add enormous 
revenues to the State of Colorado and will make this one of its most productive 
sections.‖59 Making the park idea even more palatable was the paucity of other 
realizable resources in the area. Although the proposed area was flush with sweeping 
vistas, ―spread[ing] before the eye a gorgeous assemblage of wonderful mountain 
sculpture[s],‖ it contained ―little merchantable timber‖ and ―no well-developed 
mines.‖ Thus, those who feared the park would forever ―sew up‖ valuable resources 
could rest assured that the park would do no harm to their bank accounts.
60
  
From a purely business standpoint, a park at Estes had many things going for 
it, including a solid reputation as a great vacation destination, a potentially profitable 
location, and relatively few other usable natural resources. Still it lacked something. 
Where was Estes Park? Did the name ―Estes National Park‖ have the same sort of 
curb appeal as the ―Grand Canyon‖ or the ―Grand Tetons,‖ both of which send the 
mind on a fantastic journey to faraway places? Not really. Realizing this, Marshall 
proposed changing the park‘s name to something more evocative and marketable. By 
his reckoning, this national park ―should bear a name of broader significance. 
This striking section of the Rocky Mountains—the backbone of the country,‖ should 
be named Rocky Mountain National Park.
61
  
On the heels of Marshall‘s visit, and upon his recommendation, the Denver 
Chamber of Commerce cast about for someone to draft a bill for the proposed park. 
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To both Marshall and the Chamber, James Grafton Rogers seemed the perfect 
candidate for the task. The young Yale graduate was enthusiastic, a skilled negotiator, 
and well-connected. Willing to provide his services, Rogers began the arduous task of 
collecting and synthesizing the legal details of previously created parks.
62
 Over the 
next three years, he diligently shaped a bill that satisfied the demands of most parties 
involved. 
Rogers‘ first stab at legislative glory came with the introduction of his bill in 
February of 1913. Much to his dismay, Senate Bill 8403 and House Resolution 28649 
―An Act to Establish Rocky Mountain National Park,‖ made little progress in the 62nd 
Congress. Undeterred, Rogers sought to isolate and to negotiate with those who 
opposed it. At the center of the debate lay Section Two of the document, which 
essentially sought to protect private holdings within the park, reserve the water within 
the park to the state of Colorado, and preserve limited rights for mineral exploration.  
Not only was this section of the bill raising eyebrows in Washington, but also many 
individuals and organizations of the Centennial State held reservations.
63
  In a partial 
defense of the section, Rogers explained that he hoped it would ―still local opposition 
in Colorado,‖ stating that the section was ―not really of very much importance.‖ 
Candidly, Rogers admitted that he simply ―desired to get a bill through, even if it 
contain[ed] some awkward minor clauses. When the wedge is once started,‖ he 
added, ―no one will be readier that I to urge the most complete restrictions in the 
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park.‖ 64 By October of 1913, after countless exhaustive conferences ―between the 
members of the joint committee of the Denver Chamber of Commerce and the 
Denver Real Estate Exchange…Governor Ammons, Senator Patterson,‖65 and local 
mining, grazing, and timber interests, Rogers again held in his hand a new park bill.  
His willingness to work with a wide array of interests produced a bill that won the 
support of those listed above—a harbinger, hoped Rogers, of things to come.‖66  
Although Rogers successfully mollified much of the plan‘s opposition within 
Colorado, many in Washington were still concerned that as much as one-eighth of the 
land within the proposed park would remain as private holdings. Making matters 
worse, many within the Interior Department were ill-at-ease with the language 
regarding water rights and mining claims within the proposed park. Assistant 
Secretary to the Secretary of the Interior Adolph Miller curtly informed Rogers that 
―if the region out of which it is proposed to create the Rocky Mountain National Park 
is of great value for mineral development, than it is not a suitable recreation 
reservation.‖ 67  
Over the next seven months Rogers patiently worked to isolate and placate 
opposition while making minor adjustments to his proposal. His patience and skill 
began paying real dividends by the summer of 1914 as Senator Charles Thomas of 
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Colorado introduced S 6007 and Representative Edward Taylor introduced HR 17614 
to establish Rocky Mountain National Park. As passage of a bill seemed closer than 
ever, local opposition to the plan again emerged. A portion of the attacks came from 
the beleaguered Front Range Settler‘s League, to whom Rogers and others had long 
grown accustomed. Rogers was less prepared, however, for a vicious personal attack 
from within the ranks of park supporters.  
Although he had never marshaled any evidence to support his claim that the 
USFS opposed the park, and though he received several letters clearly stating their 
support, Mills steadily defamed the Forest Service and most of their associates. For 
months, Rogers had been holding conferences with the Forest Service to work out an 
equitable and passable proposal. Soon, Mills began suspecting that Rogers was not 
the man he had thought, and by the summer of 1914 Mills could not hold his tongue. 
With clenched jaw and balled fist, Mills could no ―longer remain silent while the 
President of the Colorado Mountain Club exhibits the Forest Service on one shoulder 
and the Park on the other.‖ Although Mills rightly claimed that the ―overwhelming 
majority of the Colorado Mountain Club desire to see the Rocky Mountain National 
Park established,‖ he contended that Rogers had not ―given adequate expression to 
this opinion.‖  Mills went on to demand that Rogers cease ―further conniving with the 
Forest Service in this connection.‖ Misinterpreting the situation, Mills closed his letter 
stating that it represented ―a last effort to arouse you with the hope that you will see 
your way clear to frankly cooperate with us in securing the Rocky Mountain National 
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Park.‖ 68 Six months later, in a candid letter to Horace McFarland, Mills admitted that 
―I went after Mr. Rogers directly and vigorously‖ in part to ―prevent my work being 
discounted.‖ 69 Although this tirade doubtless set Rogers on his heels, less surprising 
was a last ditch effort on the part of the Front Range Settler‘s League to stall the bill.  
Not willing to relent, the Front Range Settler‘s League launched one final 
campaign in the hopes of again torpedoing the bill. This time, however, their efforts 
only worked to solidify the bill‘s support. Grasping at straws, the FRSL claimed that 
a new park would cost the federal government twice as much to administer as the 
Forest Service was spending there. Moreover, they pleaded, the park would be only a 
―great advertisement,‖ drawing tens of thousands of visitors from places far and near, 
at the taxpayer‘s expense. The FRSL concluded that this plan was little more than a 
―selfish scheme concocted for the benefit of certain parties, in which it is proposed 
that Uncle Sam shall act as an advertising and press agent.‖70  
Whereas the FRSL cast the bill as an economic burden to the federal 
government, officials within the Department of Interior saw things differently. Mark 
Daniels, general superintendent and landscape engineer, found in the pleas of the 
FRSL ―not a single good argument.‖ What‘s more, Daniels felt that Rocky Mountain 
National Park need not in any way create an extra charge upon the federal 
government. Quite the contrary, he argued that if the parks were ―administered along 
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the lines now being outlined, they will produce revenue rather than be a charge upon 
the Government.‖ 71  At a time when many, both within and without the Department 
of Interior, were working to create a separate and self-sustaining National Park 
Service, Rocky Mountain National Park took on new significance. What better way to 
bolster the bottom line of a blooming agency than with a park that had the potential to 
draw 100,000 or more tourists annually?
72
  
As the cold winter winds swirled tightly around the nation‘s capital in January 
of 1915, passage of the bill was finally at hand. Representative Edward Taylor, 
standing staunch and proud before Congress on January 18, 1915, announced that it 
was through the good works of himself, Senator Thomas, Frederick Ross of the 
Denver Chamber of Commerce, the Denver Real Estate Exchange, and a handful of 
interested politicians that Rocky Mountain National Park had Congressional approval. 
Although Taylor was quick to point out the physical beauty of the place, citing its  
more than sixty peaks above 12,000 feet, a ―thousand varieties of wildflowers,‖ and 
countless other interesting life forms, the park‘s value transcended its physical 
beauty. According to Taylor, the Estes Park region already attracted some 10,000 
automobiles from outside the state, but with the moniker of National Park attached, it 
could pull in more than 125,000 annually. Believing that ―the American people have 
never yet capitalized our scenery and climate, as we should,‖ he felt the time was ripe 
to ―cultivate the ‗See America First‘ movement.‖ Providing well-publicized, easily 
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accessed parks would compel Americans, now largely unable to travel Europe due to 
World War I, to spend their hundreds of millions of dollars not in Switzerland, but 
here at home.
73
 In the end, that economic argument carried the day as President 
Woodrow Wilson signed into existence Rocky Mountain National Park on January 
26, 1915. 
On a glorious afternoon in early September, 1915, hundreds of Colorado 
residents and other honored guests gathered at the newly created Rocky Mountain 
National Park to offer thanks to its supporters and to enjoy the fruits of their labor. 
The day‘s events included coffee at twelve noon followed promptly by the fine 
musical stylings of the Fort Collins Band.  With bellies full of coffee and hearts filled 
with patriotic songs, Enos Mills, Steven T. Mather, Governor George Carlson, Mrs. 
John D. Sherman (President of the Conservation Department of the General 
Federation of Women‘s Clubs, and F.O. Stanley (inventor of the ―Stanley Steamer‖  
and local hotel owner) all gave brief speeches in praise of the new park.
74
 The words 
they offered, however, were more than speeches. They were attempts to understand 
how and why the park came to be—attempts to understand its meaning through the 
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Americans have long had a choice in the stories we have told about the 
creation of Rocky Mountain National Park. Rather than rallying around Edward 
Taylor‘s account—one of politicians, tourists and revenue—we have instead chosen 
to tell, retell and accept the more heroic, romantic, and altruistic tale of a single man 
successful in his crusade to protect his beloved mountains. The latter certainly leaves 
the reader with a sense of pride in knowing that a devout and principled individual 
can, against nearly all odds, make the world a better place. Although it swells the 
chest with pride, it is little more than a good story.  
 
 
                                      Rocky Mountain National Park Dedication, September 4, 1915.                           




Admittedly, it is tempting to read past his work for the Forest Service, and the 
fact that he was more than a little economically invested in the Longs Peak region, 
and interpret Mills later ―crusade‖ for RMNP as a reflection of an impassioned and 
moralistic preservationist. Rather than forcing Mills into one of two distinct, concrete 
and rather superficial categories, however, perhaps we would do better to understand 
him as a man who did love and care for the natural world, but who also became 
tangled in the alluring material riches it held. If Mills defies easy categorization as 
either a preservationist or as a utilitarian conservationist, how should we attempt to 
understand the primary motivation behind the man who first proposed a national park 
near Longs Peak?  
Most useful in clarifying this point are the words of Mills himself.  While 
serving as a committeeman for the Estes Park Improvement Association in July of 
1910, he drafted a circular stating clearly that within the proposed park, ―[t]imber 
cutting and grazing on public land should be allowed to continue for local use, and 
mining and prospecting allowed to go on, but all these should be under Federal 
control.‖75 If the Forest Service, an agency Mills once steadfastly supported, was 
already charged with regulating the timber cutting, grazing, and mining in the area, 
what did he hope to achieve by transferring jurisdiction to the Park Service? If Mills 
believed, as many have since claimed, that National Park status would bring an end to 
extractive endeavors, why did he early condone such practices?  It is apparent that 
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Mills‘ desire to preserve the natural world was more fluid, more easily permeated by 
development, than historians have yet been willing to admit. They also indicate that 
from its very inception, the idea for Estes National Park contained strong elements of 
economic use, not only because its ―father‖ was vested in the economic vitality of the 
area, but also because he early supported commercial enterprises far beyond his own.    
Although Mills rightfully and naturally deserves a place within the history of 
Rocky Mountain National Park, we must move beyond him if we are to truly 
understand the forces and principles behind its creation. The fact that Denver was, by 
the turn of the century, a well-connected, well-known health resort in a nation itching 
and able to travel was crucial to the park‘s creation. In this regard, Rocky Mountain 
National Park was partially a product of the urbanization of the American West. At a 
time when city life often dehumanized, rationalized and sterilized the human 
experience, this park held the promise of peace, solitude, and rapture that so many 
urban Americans craved.  
Enos Mills, Horace McFarland, James Grafton Rogers, Robert Marshall and 
several politicians and government employees all experienced and responded to this 
sentiment. Though their personalities and professions varied widely, they all agreed 
upon one simple fact. This park, if created, had the potential to draw a crowd, and that 
was a very good thing for everybody. Yes, parks protect sweeping vistas; yes, they 
protect fragile plants and animals; yes, they protect vital watersheds; but in this case 
protection was not granted solely, or even primarily, for such purposes.  
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Understood thus, the history of this crown jewel takes on a new meaning. 
More than a reflection of a nation‘s willingness to rise above money to forever save 
our irreplaceable natural wonders, Rocky Mountain National Park is a monument to a 
specific time and place in America‘s history—a time, not so different from our own, 
when tourism and revenue drove environmental policy only to be draped later with 








More than one hundred million travelers have crossed the gates into RMNP 
over the past century. For many, perhaps even most of these millions, RMNP would 
first and primarily be a sensory experience had from the seat of an automobile—truly 
a ―windshield wilderness.‖1 The deep connections between RMNP and driving, 
however, are not the product of historical accident. Rather, they are the result of 
specific and direct efforts by a range of individuals and organizations seeking to make 
it so. The creation of RMNP in 1915 intensified the promotional efforts already afoot 
as the NPS sought to grow its constituency in its bid to build a large and stable 
bureaucracy. In this sense, linking driving to the park experience was a complete 
success. With each passing year park superintendents witnessed a strong correlation 
between road building and rising annual visitation.  
But as the Service has always known, roads offer more than a simple means to 
move people from place to place. In the hands of landscape architects roads became 
powerful tools in shaping and mediating the park experience. In other words, roads 
provided park planners and managers an opportunity to present the park as they 
thought it should be presented. More than just building roads through the park, the 
NPS built roads to sites they deemed important. They built these roads in a manner 
that amplified what one landscape architect called the ―crescendo of natural features‖ 
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that characterized the park. They conducted roadside cleanup to improve the view 
from the road, selectively thinned trees to create views that did not naturally exist, 
and razed historic structures all in an effort to shape a particular experience. The 
landscape architects that spearheaded the design, construction and maintenance of 
roads in parks saw themselves as artists of a sort. Through their understanding of 
human psychology and their clear sense of what constituted natural beauty, landscape 
architects played a significant role in shaping how visitors interacted with, and 
understood, Rocky Mountain.  
As the landscape architects of the NPS demonstrate, roads stand as something 
more than a means to move people from point A to point B; they offer primary 
sources that reflect and reveal much about American society and the discourse that 
this country has had with, and about, the natural world. They reveal our hopes, 
anxiety, and the vast power of intention to shape the natural world. Before addressing 
the ―history‖ of roads in the park, however, it is instructive to know something about 
how and why roads have come to play such a central role in this park‘s history.  
 
Logic of Good Roads 
In Rocky Mountain National Park, as we have seen, the desire to promote 
tourism provided the fulcrum in creating the park. Promoters knew from the very 
beginning that for the park to realize its full potential, rails and roads would serve as 
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the arteries delivering throngs of nature-hungry visitors to the park.
2
 The National 
Park Service, local businessmen, and larger corporate entities like the Union Pacific 
Railroad all had business interests in promoting the construction of a good and 
popular road system.  
 Since its creation in 1916, the NPS has striven to demonstrate to the American 
public and Congress that national parks matter. The desire to do so, however, was 
more than a bureaucratic attempt to pat itself on the back. In fact, demonstrating tight 
connections between the NPS and the broader American public held the keys to the 
very existence of the Service, not to mention any hopes of future expansion it 
harbored. Over the life of the NPS, directors and individual park staff have worked 
diligently to demonstrate that Americans value their ―living museums‖ by facilitating 
the highest visitation possible, and by publicizing high visitation in annual reports, 
local and national newspapers, and official Park Service publications.  
 The NPS‘s desire to build and maintain a broad coalition of public support 
was partially a function of their desire to protect parks from future development. To 
the directorate of the NPS, the construction of dams in places like Hetch Hetchy and 
Glacier were violations of the spirit of national parks.
3
 To protect them from such 
development in the future, the NPS needed to generate as many public allies as 
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possible. This, in turn, put the NPS in a position to ―sell‖ vigorously the national park 
experience to the public. 
As part of its strategy to build a broad and growing clientele, the NPS used 
roads and ease of access to promote parks, thereby initiating the institutional practice 
of connecting roads to the national park ―experience.‖4 In this sense, the early policy 
direction of the NPS showed great foresight. Standing on the cusp of what would 
become an automobile revolution, Horace Albright, Steven T. Mather and others 
rightly gauged that the NPS‘s institutional success and longevity would greatly 
increase if they could link parks and automobiles in their patrons‘ minds. Of course, 
diverting a rising tide of humanity to Rocky Mountain required higher and more 
regular budget appropriations, and more and better roads. To a nation first enamored 
with the automobile—and later beholden to it—roads meant a stronger, more stable 
bureaucracy. For these and many other reasons, the NPS has understood roads, both 
within and without the park, as essential to its mission statement and existence.
5
  
 Corporate entities like the Union Pacific Railroad saw a network of smooth 
and interconnected roads to and through the park as a prime opportunity to generate 
revenue. Although Rocky Mountain National Park never received a railroad terminus, 
the neighboring communities of Lyons and Fort Collins did. From these depots, 
especially in the earliest years of the park, tens of thousands of tourists stacked their 
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grips in rented cars and headed toward Estes Park. Without smooth and reliable roads 
to the park, and without good roads throughout, the Union Pacific faced a difficult 
task in convincing tourists to use its rails to visit the region.  
 Local businessmen—as much as the NPS and Union Pacific—also looked to a 
good road system as essential for their future prosperity. Although some percentage 
of visitors to the park did not mind bumpy roads or a ride atop a sweating steed to 
reach the Fall River Lodge or Stead‘s Guest Ranch, many did. To local businessmen, 
better roads meant more people. More people meant more business. The history of 
roads in the park and the exponential increases in park visitation between 1915 and 
the present bear out the lucidity of this simple equation. 
 So why does it matter that a coalition of interests existed to build and promote 
roads through the park? The reasons are threefold. First, this coalition of local, 
national, and governmental entities fostered a broad and sustained publicity effort 
aimed at introducing the traveling public to the many ―motoring‖ opportunities to be 
had in RMNP. Second, their efforts fostered certain expectations about what people 
could and should be doing while in this national park. Third, these expectations, over 
the course of the last century of management, have brought sometimes vast ecological 
changes to the very region the park was created to protect. In short, a century of 
promotion and management intended to draw tourists from around the world to 
RMNP have succeeded in doing so, but also succeeded in promoting a behavior and 
activity that altered the very nature of the park and brought forth a host of 
management conundrums.  
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 The history of two of the park‘s most popular roads, Bear Lake Road and 
Trail Ridge Road, offer the best opportunities to examine the historic relationship 
between tourist expectations, park management, and the park‘s ecosystems. Bear 
Lake Road existed in a rudimentary state even before the park was created. Beginning 
in 1916 and accelerating rapidly thereafter, the NPS built, extended, and refined the 
road to facilitate a higher volume of traffic to Bear Lake. The NPS was successful in 
this endeavor, and by the 1950s Bear Lake‘s only vehicular artery was clogged with 
cars, trucks, and camper trailers. The problem was eventually addressed through the 
implementation of a busing system, which has, in turn, created a host of management 
and ecological problems of its own. 
 The NPS initiated construction of Trail Ridge Road in 1929 and opened it in 
1932. Unlike Bear Lake Road, which delivers tourists to a single point, Trail Ridge 
Road was designed so driver and passenger could ascend to the heavens, breathe in 
crisp cool air high atop the Continental Divide, and plunge down the other side. Trail 
Ridge came to symbolize man‘s triumph over nature and offered a pleasurable means 
to take part in this triumph, not to mention a matchless unfolding panorama of 
mountain majesty.  
Simply building great roads, however, would not be enough to draw sufficient 
numbers to the park. The public needed to associate Rocky Mountain National Park 
with the freedom, excitement, and convenience of the open road.  The co-evolution of 
a ―driving park‖ and the rise of the automobile nation is no coincidence. The two are 
bound together in complex ways. Building a bridge between them—linking 
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America‘s love affair with driving to the natural world—required advertising, and lots 
of it.  
 
Selling Good Roads 
Even prior to the park‘s official creation in 1915, the Union Pacific (UP) 
relied upon accessibility and good roads to entice travelers to use its rails. Take, for 
example, a Union Pacific brochure published in 1911 entitled Colorado: For the 
Tourist. Under the heading ―Colorado is the Playground of America,‖ the UP claimed 
that ―[t]he higher altitudes of Colorado are more easily accessible than in any other 
mountainous country,‖ and that ―Colorado is awakening to her possibilities as a 
tourist state. The great city of Denver and nearly every other city and county in the 
state are building fine roads to make the glorious mountains, with their natural parks 
and their unmatched hunting and camping grounds, still more easily reached.‖ The 
Union Pacific wanted to make it clear that they were catering to more than those 
wishing to send freight to distant markets. Railroads were also being built ―to places 
from which points most attractive to the tourist can be found with least trouble,‖ the 
best example of which was the ―Union Pacific from Denver to Fort Collins.‖ From 
here it was ―but a 30 mile ride into the heart of Estes Park, acknowledged to be the 
most rugged region of the Rocky Mountains.‖ 6 
                                               
6
 Union Pacific Railroad, Colorado for the Tourist (n.p., 1911). Estes Park Museum, Box 
Railroad Advertisements and Souvineers.  
 65 
 More than a trip aboard a comfortable train or an exciting jaunt in an open air 
car, an excursion to the Rockies of Colorado offered travelers the opportunity to see 
the commingling of past and present. Here, according to the publication, the  
Old West of romance rubs elbows intimately with the great West of power 
and conquest in Colorado today. Here are still to be seen the Indian and 
cowboy, the prospector and the plainsman, but here also are great electric 
power transmission lines, the highest railroads and the greatest gold producing 
mines of the United States.‖7  
 
The West, according to the Union Pacific, offered access to both a heroic past and an 
exciting technological future.  
In addition to the laudatory prose used to drive home the region‘s ease of 
access, the Union Pacific also relied on a wide range of photos in Colorado: For the 
Tourist to achieve the same end. Of the 53 photos of non-urban areas that appear in 
the pamphlet, twenty contain one or more roads. The pervasiveness of roads in the 
brochure is a curious matter. Perhaps the UP was doing their part to balance their 
depiction of the West as a wild place of gunfighters and savages with a West replete 
with all the amenities of the modern era.  The line that the UP attempted to walk was 
razor thin. The exciting West of yesteryear, that place of wild women and roughhewn 
men, was so because it lacked modern contrivances. Rails, roads and all they bring 
with them, however, threatened the very existence of the romantic West that drew 
millions to the region to begin with. The dilemma the UP faced in balancing the wild 
with the modern was little different from that the NPS later faced in creating a 




parkscape where the human imprint was nearly imperceptible, but where tens of 
millions would trod.  
 As the park movement gained momentum in Estes Park in 1913, the Union 
Pacific created a travel brochure solely for the little hamlet. Where the Rockies Reign 
Supreme again boasted the fine hotels, great fishing, hiking and viewing around Estes 
Park, but paid particular attention to the ―motoring‖ opportunities in the region. The 
traveler, assured the Union Pacific, would find the ride from Fort Collins to Estes 
Park most enjoyable. The scenery was unparalleled, the roads were wide and smooth, 
and only expert drivers were allowed to operate automobiles. Here again, the UP 
made good use of photos to get its point across.  Of the 21 photos that appear in the 
brochure, 11 of them either contain or feature a road. The UP, however, was not alone 
in recognizing and amplifying the ―motoring opportunities‖ in and around Estes Park. 
The Estes Park Trail, which was a steadfast booster of the region, carried articles that 
looked to automobile tourism as the future. According to the paper: 
A vacation trip in an automobile is no longer a fad, but 
everything considered, is a cheap and enjoyable way of taking 
the whole family and having a good time. Year by year this 
way of seeing the country is growing, and once a successful 
trip has been made, never again the stuffy Pullman for the man 




It was true that Colorado had long been known as a state containing vast natural 
resources, but according to the Trail, ―its greatest asset, the one thing that will yearly 
add to it (sic) permanent wealth, is good roads.‖9 To promote the region and draw the  
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driving public to the park, the Estes Park Business Association published ten 




Focusing upon the availability of good roads in and around RMNP was no 
fleeting phenomenon. In a 1925 New York Times article entitled ―Curtain Rises on 
Nation‘s Park Show,‖ columnist William Du Puy rightly stated that some significant 
changes were afoot in National Parks. In the heady 1920s, accurately penned Du Puy, 
America‘s natural wonders had become accessible to ―a vast moving caravan.‖ The 
seemingly endless line of autos heading to and through national parks was indeed 
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Image of car motoring near Estes Park. 
(From Colorado: For the Tourist)  
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―something new under the sun‖ and of vast importance to the future of parks. No 
longer forced to choose between lengthy and expensive railroad vacations or no 
vacation at all, evermore people toured National Parks in automobiles. According to 
Du Puy, total National Park visitation jumped from 100,000 in 1910 to 1.1 million by 
1924. In Rocky Mountain alone, more than 250,000 passed beneath its entrance gates 
in 1924, up from an estimated 31,000 during its first year of operation.
11
 ―The 
automobile,‖ concluded Du Puy, ―having brought so many parks to the door of the 
citizen, now goes in search of offerings for its devotees.‖12 
 Another organization seeking devotees for its offerings was the Rocky 
Mountain Transportation Company (RMTC). Whereas the businessmen of Estes Park 
and the Union Pacific Railroad viewed motoring opportunities in and around the park 
as a means to supplement their income, the RMTC‘s entire business derived from 
shuffling curious onlookers from point to point around Estes Park. Roe Emery, who 
had operated a successful touring company in Glacier National Park since 1914, 
consolidated the Stanley and Osborn transportation lines in 1916 with his own and 
began offering service to and through Rocky Mountain National Park.
13
 By 1918, 
Emery operated one of three official companies moving people to the park. His 
competition included Denver Herdic Transportation and Boulder Transportation. 
During 1918 alone, the three companies delivered more than 600 car-loads of tourists 
to RMNP. Of the three, however, the RMTC was by far the most successful, driving 
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more than 400 tours through the park.
14
 In addition to experience and capital, Emery 
also enjoyed close connections to Director Stephen Mather and key railroads, which 
served several stops in Denver and across the Front Range.
15
 
 The volume of Emery‘s business in RMNP, his close personal relationships 
with Stephen T. Mather, and his experience and success in Glacier made him a 
frontrunner to receive an exclusive franchise to operate a touring company in the 
park.
16
 Emery‘s savvy decision to work closely with the thinly-manned park staff in 
times of need only strengthened his bid for the franchise.  In 1918, for example, 
RMNP staff responded to eleven fires, and according to Superintendent Way, they 
―received the heaviest cooperation from the Rocky Mountain Parks Transportation 
Company,‖ whose assistance ―prevented disastrous fires, the largest area burned by 
any one fire being seven acres.‖17 More than aiding in times of distress, the RMTC, 
held Superintendent Way, offered steadfast service in a variety of adverse conditions, 
including times when roads between railroad terminuses and Estes Park had washed 
out, and never turned a customer away.
18
 To an agency looking to build a stellar 
public image, associating itself with a private business was a risky proposition. The 
consistency, courtesy, and capability of the RMTC, however, made the marriage 
more palatable.  
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By the summer of 1919 the RMTC was well-positioned to receive exclusive 
franchise rights to bring tourists to the park. In a move that shocked and appalled 
many locals (including the ever-vocal Enos Mills), Rocky Mountain National Park 
offered the transportation franchise to Emery‘s company in May of 1919, thereby 
excluding all others  from taking paying customers by automobile through the park.
19
 
The partnership between the RMTC and the park benefited both parties. From the 
park‘s perspective, having a relationship with a reliable business dedicated to 
bringing as many visitors to the park as possible meant only good things. Not only 
was the skeletal crew of the park not responsible for offering such services, but 
through the work of the Transportation Company, thousands of Americans who may 
not have had the opportunity to visit the park, contact its personnel, and come to 
understand the importance of the nascent agency, did.  For their part, the RMTC was 
permitted to operate a business sans competition—a mere dream to most 
entrepreneurs—and was allowed to advertise their business within official national 
park publications. Doing so trimmed advertising costs and lent weight and credibility 
to the business. As was the case with the Union Pacific, the businessmen of Estes 
Park, and the National Park Service, the RMTC also had a vested interest in drawing 
explicit linkages between the park and driving. 




In an effort to further introduce the public to motoring opportunities in the 
park, the Rocky Mountain Transportation Company published a series of 
informational brochures on the subject. More than offering rate and schedule 
information, these brochures went out of their way to extol the many driving 
opportunities in and around the park. One the most popular—and expensive—trips 
promoted by the RMTC was the so-called circle tour. Prior to the construction of 
Trail Ridge Road, the circle tour began in Denver, slid northward along the front 
range to Loveland, snaked along the Big Thompson to Estes Park, ascended the Fall 
River Road to the continental divide, slipped southward between Grand Lake and 
Georgetown, and finally coasted east to Denver. The entire 240 mile trip cost $25.50 
and spanned two days. For those not willing or able to spend the time or money to 
 
 
String of cars on ―circle tour.‖  
(Rocky Mountain Transportation Company Pamphlet) 
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experience the circle tour, the company offered shorter, more economical routes as 
well. Such routes included a simple trip between Denver and Estes Park at a price of 
$10.50, a $6.00  High Drive tour, a drive to Long‘s Peak for a mere $2.50, and a Bear 
Lake trip for $3.00.
20
   
Beyond designing and disseminating their own advertisements, the RMTC 
benefited greatly from their connections to the Union Pacific and the National Park 
Service, as both often sold space for the services the RMTC offered in their 
promotional brochures. For example, the Union Pacific‘s 1924 Colorado Mountain 
Playgrounds devotes three full pages to a description of Emery‘s circle tour, 
describing in detail the steady stream of breathtaking scenery that awaits the paying 
customer.
21
 Likewise, a NPS pamphlet entitled Colorado: Rocky Mountain National 
Park also offers the RMTC as the only means to reach the park by rented car, 
regardless if one left from Fort Collins, Longmont, or Loveland. The brochure was 
quick to point out that in addition to ―splendid trout fishing,‖ golf and tennis, RMNP 
also offered over ―150 miles of good roads radiating in all directions, winding 
through canyons, over mountain passes, to beautiful mountain lakes and roaring 
waterfalls. The motorist,‖ boasted the pamphlet, would find ―this a pleasant way to 
see nature in all its grandeur and splendor.‖22 
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As was the case with the Union Pacific, Estes Park businessmen, and the 
Rocky Mountain Transportation Company, the National Park Service also had a 
vested interest in drawing connections between driving and the park. Through its 
brochure Rocky Mountain National Park, Colorado, for example, the National Park 
Service sought to inform prospective visitors of the rules and regulations of the park 
(that was the official intent of the forty-seven page document) and entice them with 
the great variety of activities the park offered. After a brief primer on the region‘s 
natural history, the booklet again echoed the chorus of the park‘s founders under a 
section entitled ―Accessibility.‖ Here, states the NPS, ―One of the most striking 
features of the Rocky Mountain National Park is the easy accessibility of these 
mountaintops.‖ Not only was it a mere 30 hours from Chicago and St. Louis, but 
upon arriving at the park, one could ―motor‖ from one side of the Continental Divide 
to the other in just four hours.
23
 
In addition to touting the park‘s great location, the publication also offered 
detailed information on how to best experience the park under the section entitled, 
―Seeing Rocky Mountain.‖ Although this section offers information on hiking and 
horseback riding in the park, the section opens with a detailed description of the roads 
connecting the park to the Front Range, and then follows with four pages offering 
detailed descriptions of automobile travel through the park. Here again, the NPS, like 
those mentioned before, had specific motivations for promoting the ―motoring 
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opportunities‖ in and around the park. Doing so, hoped the NPS, would increase 
annual visitation and strengthen its pleas for higher and more stable congressional 
appropriations, thereby resulting in institutional stability and longevity.  
More was at work here, however, than the NPS‘s desire to build a solid and 
reliable constituency. According to Marquerite Shaffer, the national parks were used 
to build a sense of patriotism through the promotion of the unique landscapes of the 
United States.
24
 The formation of the NPS itself, argues Shaffer, stands as a reflection 
of the growth of the state through a rapid period of urban and industrial growth. 
Moreover, contends Shaffer, tourism ―embodied a unique and symbolically powerful 
double-edged sword: it represented a from of consumption that depended on and 
supported the growing infrastructure of the nation state, and it offered a means of 
generation patriotism, thus reinforcing the democratic ideal of the nation.‖25 Although 
the NPS had specific institutional motivations for promoting tourism, Shaffer reminds 
us that their behavior must also be understood within the broader social, economic, 
and political atmosphere of the early 20
th
 century. 
Without knowing it, however, the NPS was also constructing expectations 
about how best to interact with the natural world within the park. Certainly visitors 
were offered information on hiking, fishing, and horseback riding, but the NPS 
clearly encouraged visitors to drive through the park. Such efforts, combined with 
those of the Union Pacific, Estes Park businessmen, and the Rocky Mountain 
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Transportation Company, did more than raise awareness about the newly created 
national park.  Through photographs, maps, and detailed descriptions, each of the 
above made it clear that driving in this national park was not just possible, but 
recommended.
26
 These expectations, in turn, brought further pressure to bear upon 
park management to build and maintain a first class system of roads.    
Regardless of the words of the Union Pacific, Estes Park Trail, or any other 
booster, however, Rocky Mountain National Park did not have much in the way of 
roads—either to or through the park—upon its creation. These would have to be built. 
How, where, and when they were built tells us much about what park officials 
thought ―worthy‖ of a jaunt through the woods.  
 
Building Good Roads 
Bear Lake Road has historically been one of the most heavily-used roads in 
Rocky Mountain National Park. Winding its way from the Beaver Meadows entrance 
on the Park‘s east side, the road now skirts Moraine Park and then meanders along the 
picturesque Glacier Creek before reaching its final destination. Along the way 
motorists may look upon grazing elk, a roiling brook, and a towering crescent of 
majestic peaks. Today, the road is wide, smooth, and expeditious, delivering visitors 
to a range of destinations including Sprague Lake, the Glacier Gorge Trailhead, and 
Bierstadt Lake Trailhead. Traffic during the summer months can be intense as bikes, 
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cars, and the park‘s many shuttle-buses pulse toward one of the Park‘s most popular 
destinations—Bear Lake. Although park managers and visitors have long appreciated 
the physical beauty of the little lake, delivering oneself to its shores was not always as 
effortless as it is today.  
Upon the Park‘s creation in 1915, no reliable road existed to deliver visitors to 
Bear Lake. Instead, there stood a patchwork of privately constructed roads and trails, 
which under the best of circumstances could deliver one to within a mile of its shores 
but not in the comfort of an automobile. Abner Sprague likely built the first leg of the 
road, which ran parallel to Glacier Creek for 1.5 miles and brought patrons to his 
―summer resort.‖ West of Sprague‘s Lodge, a rudimentary ―road‖ climbed an 
additional two miles toward the lake. By the estimation of the Park‘s first 
Superintendent Charles R. Trowbridge, an allocation of one hundred dollars was 
needed to repair the road to Sprague‘s, and another three hundred dollars to construct 
a bridge at the resort and make the two miles of road between it and the resort 
―passable for automobiles.‖27 Although such sums seem almost laughable today, the 
park‘s skeletal budget and staff made such improvements nearly impossible. In his 
first annual report to the Director of the NPS, Trowbridge stated flatly that upon 
assuming ―charge of the Rocky Mountain National Park as acting Supervisor on July 
1st, 1915, I was unable to accomplish as much as I desired owing to the fact that I 
was unassisted, no appointments of employees being made until August 10th, when 
one ranger was appointed, consequently there has been little progress made this 
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season toward improvements in the Park.‖28  In short, send more money and men, and 
then we‘ll get to work. 
 As resources began flowing toward the park in the years following 1916, park 
staff earnestly worked to make the park accessible to the driving public. Rightly 
realizing that ―a great number of tourists[…]would not undergo the hardship of a 
horseback trip‖ to Bear Lake, Trowbridge continued allocating resources for 
improving the condition of the road. Although much work remained to be done, the 
summer‘s improvements brought ―considerable automobile traffic‖ toward the 
destination. In its first real season of roadwork the park staff learned two important 
lessons.  First, they linked the existence of good roads to the tourist‘s ability to see the 




 Of course, much work remained to shape Bear Lake Road into thoroughfare 
capable of carrying thousands of automobiles daily. Between 1917 and 1919 more 
resources were earmarked for the road, and by the close of the 1918 season it was 
raised one foot, crowned, graded and ―placed in first class condition.‖30 Recognizing 
the surge of automobile use in the parks, Superintendent L. Claude Way implored the 
director of the NPS to be ―prepared to supply the needs of the people‖ as travel by 
automobile was ―increasing by leaps and bounds.‖31 To meet the demands and 
expectations of a rapidly growing clientele, road crews added and improved 13 scenic 
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turnouts, and built an additional 600 feet of road to the newly built Glacier Gorge 
Campground in 1919 alone.
32
  
As the road stretched its way toward Bear Lake, annual visitation to the park 
continued to grow. During the 1919 season an estimated 169,492 people in 33,638 
cars came to Rocky Mountain National Park. Of that number, the RMTC brought 
nearly one fourth through the park‘s gates in more than one thousand individual 
tours.
33
 To meet growing demand for their services, RMTC enlarged its operations 
and boasted a fleet of thirty five ten-passenger cars, eighteen seven-passenger cars, 
eighteen seven-passenger touring cars, two 3.5 ton trucks, and four two-ton trucks by 
1920.  
Superintendent Way, cognizant of the rising importance of Bear Lake to the 
park experience, reported to the Washington, D.C. office that Bear Lake Road was 
―destined to be one of the most traveled roads in the National Park‖ and directed 
crews to dedicate the bulk of their efforts to placing it in ―good condition‖ for the 
1920 season.
34
 Adding to the road‘s popularity was the construction of a makeshift 
wagon road from Glacier Basin to within a half mile of Bear Lake. Although the road 
was not intended for automobile use, many brazen drivers nervously perched atop 
their machines as they reached the ―heart of some of the wildest and most beautiful 
country in the Park.‖35 The arrival of the first automobiles at Bear Lake stands a 
watershed in its history and the history of the park.  For the first time since the 










mountains thrust themselves skyward, humans would come to dominate the landscape 
and reshape many of its natural processes. A continual program of road improvement 
was central to this process. 
 Roger Toll, who took the reins of superintendecy from Way in 1921, also 
recognized the importance of good roads to the future of national parks. Astutely 
realizing that the automobile was changing how visitors experienced the park, Toll 
commented that a ―[c]ertain proportion of visitors seem to be interested primarily in 
the opportunities for automobiling,‖ and their ―stay in this park is usually brief.‖ To 
Toll, the shift toward more cars heading to and through the park was troubling, 
especially given that the ―total length of roads in the park is 68 miles. Aside from the 
Fall River road,‖ lamented Toll, ―there are less than thirty miles of road within the 
National Park and all of these are within ten or twelve miles of Estes Park.‖ In 
addition to relatively few miles of road in the park, ―several of these roads [were] not 
such as to tempt a motorist who is not trying to reach a definite point, but is out for a 
pleasure ride.‖36 In short, to meet the growing desire and expectation to drive through 
national parks, RMNP would have to dedicate more resources to building and 
maintaining roads. 
Looking back over the progress made on the Bear Lake Road in 1924, Toll 
reported that just ―two years ago, sufficient work was done on the road to Bear Lake 
to make it barely passable for automobiles. This year additional work has been done, 
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and the road is now being used very extensively.‖37 Responding to the public demand 
to visit the lake and to use it as a jumping-off point for hikes to a wide variety of 
breathtaking (both literally and figuratively) locales, Toll projected that ―there is no 
question that the region around Bear Lake will receive an increasing number of 
visitors each year, because of the many attractive trips that can be taken from that 
point.‖ To open fully the region to tourists, Toll believed that ―the road must be 
further improved, a camp ground developed, more parking space provided, and 
additional trails constructed[…]in order to keep pace with the demand.‖38  
The Rocky Mountain Transportation Company played a significant role in 
generating the rising demand that Toll mentioned. By 1924 the company‘s fleet had 
grown to include ―76 eleven-passenger buses‖ and ―25 seven-passenger touring cars.‖  
In that year alone they carried nearly 6000 visitors over the perilous Fall River Road, 
1,200 on the short loop between the High Drive and fall river, and 1,500 people on 
special ―service trips‖ through the park. Capitalizing on a rebounding national 




By 1926 Congress was becoming increasingly aware of the rising popularity 
of national parks and dedicated more money to support and expand them. Beginning 
in 1926, Congress allotted Rocky Mountain National Park, which had a road budget 
of $3000 for its first fiscal year, a three year sum of $445,000. Toll, who had long 
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harbored the desire to bring the Bear Lake Road up to the highest of standards, 
earmarked the 1926 allocation of $140,500 for the Bear Lake project.
40
 Hoping to 
make it one of the premier destinations in the park, RMNP quickly advertised for 
construction bids, and by fall the firm of Shields and Flat had earned the $122,000 
contract to rebuild and relocate 6.9 miles of the road, primarily between Sprague‘s 
resort and the lake.
 41
   Here again, park managers knew that building ever-better 
roads through the park would generate more visitation. The new road, hoped Toll, 
would make Bear Lake ―accessible by an excellent road,‖ and thereby ensure that 
―the travel in that portion of the park will be very greatly increased.‖42  
 As the Shields and Flat steam shovel rent the earth and churned its way 
toward Bear Lake, park staff did witness a sharp increase in the number of cars 
ambling toward the lake. As crews neared completion of the road in 1928, an 
estimated 21,593 made their way to the Glacier Gorge campground.
43
 Due to the 
newly finished road, 1929 witnessed still more visitors upon the shores of Bear Lake. 
Although total park visitation increased by 20% over the previous year, and though 
all ―gateways report increased motor travel,‖ the ―most noticeable gain,‖ said 
superintendent Toll, ―has been counted at the Bear Lake entrance where an increase 
of 72.3 %‖ had occurred. In the first full season of use the road delivered more than 
37,000 people to Bear Lake in more than 10,000 automobiles. Rightly interpreting the 
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situation, Toll commented that the incredible increase in visitation to the Lake was 
―due to the completion of the new primary road from the park boundary to Bear Lake, 
which makes it possible for the motorist to drive to the high, rugged country over a 
standard 18 foot, graveled road on which the maximum grade is 7 percent.‖44 
Although visitation to Bear Lake would never again be so low, it is important to note 
that only nine years had passed since the first automobile chugged its way to the 
destination. Through greater and more reliable appropriations, the NPS was able to 
build itself a premier destination. In doing so, however, they began to face the 
management consequences of that decision.  
 Higher annual visitation demanded more upkeep, and the expansion of 
facilities to handle the crowds. Primary to the care and maintenance of the new road 
was managing the contrails of dust produced by the churning wheels of thousands of 
automobiles. To treat the problem and to ensure the smoothest possible roads for the 
summer season, the NPS initiated a program of regular road maintenance in 1929, 
which included applying an estimated .3 gallons of oil per square yard to the road‘s 
surface. Given that the width of the road was contracted at eighteen feet, and that the 
portion treated was seven miles in length, the NPS spread roughly 66,528 gallons of 
oil atop Bear Lake Road each time crews oiled it.
45
  
Through the application of money, technology, and sweat, the NPS had 
transformed the Bear Lake Road from a dusty horse trail into ―decidedly the best road 
in the park,‖ but in doing so they created yet another problem for themselves. More 
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people—and more cars—demanded more parking. To further accommodate the 
driving public, the NPS built parking areas at Glacier Gorge and Bear Lake to 
accommodate 100 and 350 automobiles respectively.
46
 As early as 1929, then, the 
staff at RMNP began to witness and experience a recurrent management theme—
better facilities bring more people, but more people require more resources and place 
a greater demand on the park itself. For the better part of the twentieth century the 
park staff would implement a variety of management strategies to deal with this 
conundrum, often with little or no success. By 1932 visitation to the lake had 
surpassed 80,000 with no end in sight.
47
  
As RMNP poured money into the construction and refinement of Bear Lake 
Road, it launched a more public—and in some ways more important—road building 
campaign. Unlike Bear Lake Road, which was built to deliver drivers to a primary 
destination, Trail Ridge Road was conceived, designed, and built to bring drivers to a 
variety of destinations as they motored through the park. The appeal of the road has 
always laid in its breathtaking views, the variety of ecosystems it made accessible, 
and the sheer novelty of commanding an automobile to elevations in excess of 12,000 
feet.  
Responding to popular demand to drive to the spine of the Continental Divide, 
Grand County began construction of Fall River Road in 1913. Although Fall River 
offered motorists a harrowing drive and an opportunity to stand where the nation‘s 
waters divide east and west, it suffered from a variety of shortcomings. In general, the 
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road was not designed with the same sensitivity to ―vistas‖ that the National Park 
Service would later find so important. Instead, as one climbs Fall River Road, lodge 
pole pine and spruce often obstruct the view, and most of the trip is spent traversing 
the north side of the Fall River Canyon. Although the drive offers striking views of 
the south side of the canyon, opportunities to behold the mountain majesty of RMNP 
are limited primarily to the portion of the road near the Continental Divide itself. 
Given that park managers have always placed a great deal of emphasis on making the 
park experience an evocative visual experience, Fall River Road left much to be 
desired. 
The road suffered in other regards as well. Its engineers built many sections 
too steep and several of its corners required backing to and fro to make them. This, 
coupled with steep grades and often precipitous drop offs, provided too much 
stimulation for many drivers. To address the problem of drivers too frightened to 
continue, the NPS posted a permanent patrol on the road to assist the overwhelmed to 
lower ground. In addition to Fall River‘s lack of ―great vistas‖ and rugged 
construction, it suffered perennial land and snow slides, which required great effort 
and expenditure to remedy. In short, after several years of management experience, 
the staff of RMNP knew well the deficiencies of the road by the mid-1920s.  
Hoping to strengthen their ability to build good and appealing roads, the NPS 
partnered with the Bureau of Public Roads in 1926. Through this cooperative 
agreement the NPS undertook construction of some of its most heroic roads. For their 
part, the Bureau of Public roads provided technical and engineering advice while the 
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National Park Service and its many landscape architects concerned themselves 
primarily with the aesthetic aspects of road construction.
48
   
More than simply building roads through parks, the NPS labored to construct 
roads that amplified, illuminated, and made accessible spectacular natural scenery.  
Employing techniques that originated in a tradition of landscape architecture and 
gardening stretching well into the nineteenth century, the NPS employed rigorous 
theory and years of practical experience to build the most spectacular roads 
possible.
49
 The Blue Ridge Parkway, Going to the Sun Highway, and Trail Ridge 
Road all reflect their ability to do so. Beginning in 1927, when Director Stephen T. 
Mather established a new headquarters in San Francisco to advise the NPS on matters 
of engineering, education, forestry, and landscape architecture, the NPS devoted 
increasing resources to building parks that were especially appealing to the eye. 
Central to these efforts lay the talents and ambitions of Thomas Vint.
50
  
Vint, who was trained in a variety of fields including landscape architecture, 
took control of the landscape division at the new field office in 1927 and earned the 
official title of Chief Landscape Architect in October of 1928.
51
 Beyond assembling a 
talented and energetic staff, Vint also helped craft construction standards and 
practices to minimize disruption and damage to natural areas adjacent to roads. The 
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new standards, for example, stated that all ―holes left by the removal of stumps and 
roots were to be backfilled. Borrow pits were to be located in areas not visible from 
the completed road.‖  Further, contractors were not allowed to use longstanding 
blasting practices that marred the landscape.
52
 Following Vint‘s lead, and employing 
his new road construction standards, the NPS and Bureau of Public Roads turned their 
attention to Trail Ridge Road.  
Although preliminary investigations into the feasibility of a road over Trail 
Ridge began in 1926, construction did not begin in earnest until 1929. Over the 
course of that summer a cadre of engineers and landscape architects from the 
National Park Service and officials from the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) worked 
in RMNP to plan the new road.  In June of 1929, Merel S. Sanger, Assistant 
Landscape Architect from the San Francisco office, spent three weeks in the park and 
―made a study of the Trail Ridge Road construction project.‖53 Later that summer, 
Highway Engineer L.A. Hamilton from the Bureau of Public Roads also spent several 
days going over the Trail Ridge road project with Superintendent Rogers and 
Resident Engineer Lafferty of the Bureau of Public Roads.
54
 After this preliminary 
planning period, Chief Landscape Architect of the NPS Thomas Vint also visited the 
park and consulted with Chief Engineer Frank Kittredge and Charles V. Dunn, 
Assistant Engineer of the NPS.
55
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By summer‘s end, the NPS had a vision of what the new road would look like. 
Careful not to repeat the mistakes of the Fall River Road, the new Trail Ridge Road 
would wind its way from Deer Ridge to the Continental Divide along a new route that 
broke frequently upon incredible views of the park‘s many mountain ranges and 
peaceful valleys. Along the way the motorist would not face grades in excess of seven 
percent nor would they be forced to see-saw around dangerous hairpin curves. The 
new road would be wider, smoother, and allow for faster automobile travel. 
Central to NPS efforts lay the desire to build a road that helped the visitor 
―understand and enjoy a crescendo of carefully composed pictures.‖  In the capable 
hands of a trained landscape architect, properly conceived roads enhanced the driving 
experience by allowing the viewer to evaluate the natural features ―in relation to each 
other,‖ and revealed them ―as parts of larger compositions to preserve and enhance 
the relative scale of near and distant objects.‖ More than quotidian components of 
engineering grades, bar ditches, and curvets, these were ―matters involving 
knowledge of human psychology, of natural history, and appreciation of harmony, 
sequence, line, and color.‖56 After months of striving to lay out a road that offered the 
―proper‖ panoramas to drivers, the NPS was poised to initiate construction of its 
iconic Trail Ridge Road.  
A little more than a month prior to the stock market crash of 1929, the NPS 
advertised bids for the construction of a 17.2 mile highway, 18 feet in width, from 
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Deer Ridge to Fall River Pass.
57
  The new road would feature ―more scenic qualities, 
in that it follows the crest of the ridge while the present road follows the valley.‖58  In 
short, the new road was designed and built to meet the expectations of the ―vast 
moving caravan‖ of tourists who demanded both good roads and evocative scenery. 
By year‘s end, W.A. Colt and Son, who had earlier worked on surfacing the newly 
built Bear Lake Road, had earned the contract with a bid of $393,747 and began 
clearing the right of way for the new road.
59
  
 Through the first months of the endeavor, Colt had enlarged his workforce 
and added two steam shovels to the project. In all, the work proceeded apace and by 
January of 1930, crews had completed a great amount of work.
60
  For the first time 
since initiating the project, poor weather conditions halted the crews for 22 days in 
late March and early April. Determined not to lose ground, Colt brought in yet 
another steam shovel and let it loose upon the earth.
61
  
 As winter gave way to spring, W.A. Colt and Son operated at capacity. 
Drawing from the muscle and expertise of a growing crew, the company operated two 
1.4 yard gas shovels, one 5/8 gas shovel, five compressors, twelve trucks, and boasted 
an average crew of about one hundred men by June. Laboring through the hot, dry 
mountain summer of 1930, W.A. Colt and Son made substantial progress, completing 
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some 55% of the project by summer‘s end.62  Although early snowfall in September 
briefly halted construction, the crews had finished clearing most timber and 
undergrowth to the end of the road, fine grading between Stations 820 and 994, and 
installing the majority of the hand-laid embankment.  By the close of September, the 
average crew dedicated to the project included one superintendent, five shovel 
operators, five oilers, five cooks, three blacksmiths, two mechanics, and 125 
laborers.
63
 With completion of the east side of Trial Ridge proceeding on schedule, 
the NPS advertised for the reconstruction of the road west of the Continental Divide. 
In the end, L.T. Lawler of Butte, Montana, earned the contract and ―took immediate 
steps to establish camp near Phantom Valley Ranch.‖64  
The winter of 1930-1931 provided challenges for both Lawler and Colt, as 
each struggled to meet his construction schedule. On November 15, poor weather 
forced Colt to sideline three of the steam shovels laboring at higher altitudes. 
Resuming work on the 25
th, however, Colt‘s men pushed ahead, aided by two shovels 
and an average crew of seventy-five until the end of the month, when persistently 
poor weather further slowed operations and the crew was cut to just 35. Meanwhile, 
adverse weather also presented difficulties to Lawler and his workers. Adjusting to 
the situation, Lawler halted operation of two of the gas shovels working near stations 
354 and 547 on the 18th, and transferred all men ―except shovel crews and truck 
drivers,‖ to the clearing crew, who burned and cleared brush. Further bad weather 
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forced eventual cessation of all work on November 26, not to be resumed until May 
of the following year.
65
 
 After waiting for fair weather for more than four months, crews on both sides 
of the divide eagerly resumed work in April of 1931.
66
 As the weather warmed across 
the park and the summer season advanced, both Lawler and Colt again expanded their 
crews. By June, Colt and Son had steadily employed a crew of seventy men as they 
rapidly approached the end of their project, while a larger force of about one-hundred 
men labored on the west side.
67
 Increasing his force throughout the summer, Colt 
hoped to complete his contract before the cold winter winds and drifting snow again 
halted work.
68
 Although his crews were closing rapidly upon completion of their 
project, poor weather again retarded progress in September. By that month, however, 
the east side project was complete all the way to Forest Canyon Pass, leaving only the 
highest portions of the contract remaining. By year‘s end, Colt and Son had 
completed 90 percent of their contracted work, and Lawler approximately 55% of his. 
Given that only 35% of Lawler‘s contracted time had passed, his progress was 
especially pleasing to park officials.
69
 
 Also pleased with the progress on the new road was the Estes Park Trail. As 
the 1931 season drew to a close, the EPT looked ahead to the great benefits this 
―eighth wonder of the modern world‖ would bring to the region. According to the 
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paper, ―Beautiful big country that has been absolutely inaccessible to the motor 
traveler is opened up now making possible of more majestic vistas than any other 
road in the world.‖ Hoping to further lather reader imaginations, the paper exclaimed 
that any  
oldtimer (sic) in the region will tell you that it takes plenty of intestinal 
fortification to attempt the trip up Forest canon (sic). Probably fewer persons 
have made this trip than any other in this area. Yet Forest canon with all its 
mystery is opened to the traveler though the region via the Trail ridge road 
(sic) with no effort other than a slight pressure of the right foot on the throttle 




Here, the paper put its finger squarely upon much of what is important and interesting 
about roads through national parks. Not only would such roads throw open vast 
reaches of the park that only the most devoted outdoor enthusiasts had known, but 
would do so to such a degree that all seeing them now entailed was a ―slight pressure 
of the right foot on the throttle.‖ Such a radical shift in how people interacted with the 
natural world, coupled with steady and persuasive advertising, indeed held the 
promise that the completion of the ―monumental engineering feat will bring  
thousands of tourists‖ to the park.71 In the end, the NPS and a host of business 
interests could hope for no more.  
The summer of 1932 brought renewed excitement in the steadily unfolding 
Trail Ridge Road. Although poor weather further delayed resumption of construction 
on the west side, Colt and Son resumed work in late June on the uppermost reaches of 
the road. By July, construction on the east side was complete.  Excited,  
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superintendent Edmund Rogers commented in his monthly report that the 
―outstanding event of the month was the opening of the Trail Ridge Road (East Side) 
to travel on the 16
th.‖ To further expedite the flow of traffic to the continental divide, 
travel on Fall River Road was routed one way.
72
  
 Ecstatic about the 16 July opening of the fresh two-million-dollar road, the 
Estes Park Trail hailed the achievement as a ―culmination of almost three years of 
hard work performed under adverse conditions.‖ Ebullient, the paper stated that ―at 
no point is there a steeper grade than 7 percent and many cars make the trip from the 
village to the ‗top‘ without changing gears.‖ Hoping to allay fears that the new road 
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View of newly constructed Trail Ridge Road and surrounding mountains.                             
(Photo by Charles V. Dunn, 1932)  
 
 93 
would present narrow passages and hairpin corners that characterized the Fall River 
Road, the paper claimed that Trail Ridge Road is ―amply wide for four lanes of 
traffic.‖  In addition to a speedy ascent into the heavens, the new road offered views 
of ―range after range of the high, rugged peaks of the Rockies,‖ which are ―spread in 
wonderful panorama before the driver.‖ The paper was also quick to point out that 
―everything possible has been done to preserve the beauty of the terrain through 
which the road leads. After each blast of dynamite, workmen have cleaned up all 
‗country rock‘ thrown over the landscape so that there would be no unsightly white 
rock among the lichen covered boulders that contribute to the scenery.‖73 
Park managers also wasted little time in extolling the virtues of the newly 
opened section of the Trail Ridge Road. In an October press release, Superintendent 
Edmund Rogers stated that the ―spectacular Trail Ridge Road which was opened late 
in 1932 was the lodestone for many visitors.‖ Again hammering home the park‘s 
great location, and perhaps hoping to attract cash-strapped tourists, Rogers continued, 
arguing that the ―accessibility of the park and the comparatively small financial 
outlay required to reach it‖ were also attractive features of the region and explained 
its continued popularity.
74
 In his annual report to the Director of the NPS, Rogers also 
drew linkages between the new road and unusually high annual visitation, stating that 
―despite a general decrease in visitors to other recreational centers through the 
country, travel to Rocky Mountain was greater than in previous years. The opening of 
the east side of the Trail Ridge road,‖ opined Rogers, was one of the contributing 
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factors drawing people to the park.  As was the case earlier with Bear Lake, NPS 
managers seemed to have solid evidence that good roads almost automatically 
translated into higher annual visitation. Supporting this claim were the some 282,980 
visitors and 81,359 automobiles that filed through the park in 1932 alone.
75
  
  By the conclusion of the 1933 season, the construction, promotion, and 
refinement of the new road continued drawing visitors to the park, and enabled the 
Fall River entrance to surpass the Bear Lake entrance as the park‘s most popular 
gateway.
76
 Again, the coincidence of high visitation rates and road construction and 
promotion compelled Superintendent Rogers to conclude:  
the steady increase of travel to the Park during the last three years is 
regarded as remarkable and it is certainly one of the very few 
recreational areas that can boast of such a record during the worst of 
the depression. Such figures are the most conclusive arguments for the 
bringing of all the Park roads and trails up to high park standards just 
as rapidly as the work can be pressed.
77
         
 
Throughout the remainder of the 1930s, Civilian Conservation Corps and others 
continued refining the park‘s roads and building spur or connecting roads, but never 
again would Rocky Mountain National Park witness the expansion of roads it did 
during its first eighteen years in existence. But the work was largely complete. 
Between 1915 and 1933 the National Park Service, Union Pacific Railroad, Rocky 
Mountain Transportation Company, and a host of local business interests had 
succeeded in connecting the national park experience with driving. By the close of the 
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1930s—the nation‘s economy still very much on uneven ground—more than 650,000 
people found their way to RMNP in more than 200,000 cars. Both numbers all the 
more impressive when compared to the 31,000 people who came to the park in 1915.  
 
Framing the View From the Road 
More than building fine roads and expanding parking facilities to 
accommodate drivers, RMNP officials also dedicated significant time, effort, and 
financial resources to shaping the roadside into a more pleasing visual experience. 
Although the reasons for such projects were many, at their heart lay the desire to 
shape the parkscape into something that mirrored the NPS‘s understanding of what 
constituted ―natural.‖ In the hands of properly trained landscape architects, roads 
enabled the NPS to act as artists of the natural as they framed views, painted over 
unsightly abandoned roads, and erased evidence of heavy human resource use.  
As early as 1921, crews worked to erase older portions of the Bear Lake Road 
no longer in use. Certainly, thickly planting those portions where the old road left 
―unsightly[…]open swaths‖ did much to refine the visual appeal to the park. But 
more here is at work than simply replanting cutover areas so as to better blend them 
with their surroundings.
78
 As would later be the case along Trail Ridge Road, efforts 
directed at replanting old roads reveal an inclination toward creating a space that 
reflected a certain aesthetic. For the millions who have traveled through the park, 
casting a gaze upon a ―pristine‖ nature is of primary importance. Visible remnants of 
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old roads mar the landscape and raise obvious questions about just how pristine the 
landscape actually is.  
 Following completion of the new road to Bear Lake in 1928, park staff 
redoubled their efforts to enhance the aesthetic appeal of the roadside. During the 
summer and fall of 1930, for example, a crew of some twenty men conducted 
―roadside cleanup‖ along Fall River Road, Bear Lake Road, and between the 
Phantom Valley Lake Road and between the Phantom Valley Ranch and the Grand 
Lake Ranger Station.
79
 By season‘s end, the efforts of the crew produced what 
Superintendent Rogers called a ―very desirable effect in the appearance‖ of the 
roads.
80
 The clearing of underbrush and dead and dying trees no doubt provided park 
officials with a tool to reduce available fire fuels along the roadside—a perennial 
concern to park staff. In addition to safety, however, park managers were also keenly 
interested in making the roadside more aesthetically pleasing. Following an especially 
successful season of roadside cleanup in 1933, superintendent Rogers candidly  
admitted that the ―limits of the cleanup is more or less determined by visibility‖ of the 
detritus.
81
 If fire fuel management provided the sole logic for roadside cleanup, the 
―visibility‖ of debris would be of little or no concern.  
As crews continued with fine grading and other finish work on the west side 
of Trail Ridge Road in 1933, the NPS directed significant resources to shaping the 
view of the park from the new road.  For instance, twelve men working under the 
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supervision of landscape architect Benson began ―vista work‖ to open views of 
Horseshoe Park from Trail Ridge Road. This ―vista‖ enhancement, which was part of 
the original construction plan for the road, consisted mainly of selectively thinning 
trees that obstructed the panoramic views. By July, the crew was done with its work 
and created ―a good view of Horseshoe Park.‖82  
To Landscape Architect Charles Eliot, opening views of serene mountain 
meadows was of primary importance to shaping the ―proper‖ parkscape. ―[V]alleys 
are enormously important to the scenic and recreational values of the area,‖ claimed 
Eliot, as ―they constitute the ideal foil to the mountains and therefore constitute the 
ideal foreground for mountain views.‖ If a trained and loving human hand was  
needed to reveal such beauty, so be it.
83
 Here again, it is important to bear in mind 
that the sweeping vistas one experiences along Trail Ridge Road have to some degree 
been manufactured. Certainly the valleys, mountains and streams one sees on a drive 
up Trail Ridge are ―natural‖ in the popular sense, but what most drivers are not aware 
of as they ascend the heavens via this engineering miracle is the degree to which NPS 
officials shaped the experience with their own hands—a feat that is a credit to both 
their skill and desire. 
Beyond the selective thinning of trees and general roadside cleanup, the NPS 
undertook other projects to further amplify the visual appeal of the park as seen from 
the road. For example, a plot of land in Hidden Valley visible from Trail Ridge Road  
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Before and after roadside cleanup in beaver pond area near Hidden Valley. 




revealed the previous handiwork of timber crews who had left some ten acres of 
stumpage and other debris. Following park superintendent orders, crews set about the 
laborious task of removing the stumps and backfilling the holes the lumbermen left 
behind.
84
 The stumpage did not present a fire hazard, nor did it interfere in any 
material way with the construction of the road. Rather the presence of ten acres of 
stumpage raised the same sort of questions about ―nature‖ in the park as did evidence 
of old roads and visible borrow pits. Sensitive that remnants of such activities would 
contradict and challenge the pristine, human free landscape the park tended to favor, 
the NPS did what it could to conceal the stumps.  
As the work of shaping the view from the road continued, the NPS turned its 
attention to another matter that had long given pause to park managers. Since its 
creation in 1915, superintendents at RMNP had grown increasingly concerned over 
the patchwork of privately-owned land that dotted the park.  Beginning under the 
superintendency of Roger Toll in the 1920s, RMNP initiated a decades-long program 
of purchasing plots of privately owned land that lay within park boundaries. This  
program, which provided a means to unify, rationalize, and simplify park 
management, also reveals a substantial bias toward fashioning a park that obscured 
the region‘s human history and amplified its pristine qualities.   
In 1932, for example, after the NPS acquired a number of properties within 
the park, crews ―immediately‖ set about ―obliterating‖ all evidences of ―development  
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on private property purchased during the past year,‖ which included the removal of 
all buildings and barbed wire. ―After the buildings have been wrecked and fences 
removed,‖ recounted Toll, the ―region certainly present[ed] a different picture (one 
we have all been wishing for).‖85 Here, Toll‘s language is insightful. Not only were 
crews ―immediately‖ directed toward the work, but their efforts rectified a situation 
that had been an obvious bother to park management. A similar scenario played out in 
1933, as park crews again set about ―wrecking several of the old buildings‖ that the 
park purchased in 1931 as part of the Moraine Lodge property. Superintendent 
Rogers was confident that ―[w]hen complete this obliteration will greatly improve the 
lower Moraine Park Valley.‖86 Here again, demolition of any and all signs of a 
permanent human presence in the park marked, as Rogers put it, an ―improvement. 
The selective thinning of trees along the roadside, the removal of dead and 
dying trees, stump removal, and the demolition of human settlements within the park 
boundaries all speak to the efforts to present the park in a manner that matched well 
what both the NPS and the American public defined as natural. The construction of 
roads themselves—perhaps the most obvious reflection of human presence in the 
park—presented managers with a host of decisions about how and where they should 
be built. Employing the skills of a team of landscape architects, the NPS 
demonstrated that they had the capacity and desire to blend roads into the natural. 
More than that, they also demonstrated their belief that roads, if harnessed as a 
medium for generating certain emotions, could actually enhance the ―natural‖ appeal  
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Before and after stump removal in Hidden Valley.                                                                  
(Superintendent‘s  Monthly Reports, September 1932 ) 
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of a park. The management of roads also offered managers an opportunity to 
participate in a broader discourse about the meaning of ―natural‖ and the place of 
humans relative to it.  
 
Conclusion  
The completion of Trail Ridge Road marked the end of the first major period 
of road construction in Rocky Mountain National Park. Between 1915 and 1933 the 
NPS steadily expanded and refined a system of roads that nearly guaranteed ever-
higher annual visitation. The promotion, construction, and refinement of Bear Lake 
Road and Trail Ridge Road, however, offer more than simple tales of heroic and 
stalwart men applying muscle and technology to conquer the natural world. A drive 
along the Bear Lake or Trail Ridge Road offers an opportunity to investigate the 
intricate and interesting relationships between tourism, national parks, and the natural 
world.  
 It would be an overstatement to claim that national parks, particularly Rocky 
Mountain, played a significant role in the development of our automobile nation. That 
said, the combined efforts of the NPS, Union Pacific Railroad, Rocky Mountain 
Transportation Company, and local businesses certainly amplified the possibility and 
desirability of driving through Rocky Mountain National Park. To each of those 
named above, the presence of a good and well publicized road system was of central 
importance to future success and stability. Other national parks bear witness to the 
same process. National Park Service historian David Louter found that Mount Rainer 
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National Park, established in 1899, reflects the early optimism that many felt about 
the ability of automobiles and roads to enhance the human interaction with nature. 
According to Louter, park managers initially believed that roads and automobiles 
could make ―nature seem real; they afforded many the closest contact with the natural 
world they had known, and perhaps would ever know.‖87  
But simply building roads was not enough to make ―nature seem real.‖ Once 
new roads were built to premier destinations, the NPS endeavored to cover up 
abandoned roads, selectively thin trees to amplify the views, conduct roadside 
cleanup, remove stumps and ―obliterated‖ historic structures all in an effort to fashion 
a pristine parkscape not complicated by its human history. By the close of the 1930s 
the work of linking the park with ―motoring opportunities‖ was largely complete. 
Through their persistent advertising campaign and the road building it prompted, the 
National Park Service and others fostered and encouraged a behavior that would later 
threaten the pristine parkscape they worked so hard to create. Following World War 
II—the nation‘s economy rebounding from more than a decade of slumber—RMNP 
would have to face the consequences of their success as millions of Americans 
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By the close of the 1930s, the NPS, Union Pacific Railroad, RMTC and others 
had successfully connected driving and Rocky Mountain National Park. The 
promotion, construction and maintenance of roads all encouraged a specific means of 
experiencing the park.  As long as demand for the park was held in check by limited 
numbers of privately owned automobiles (as it was during the 1920s), or economic 
depression (as it was during much of the 1930s), or the demands of world war, 
facilitating driving in the park seemed to produce only positive results. Beginning in 
1915, park superintendents witnessed a close correlation between advertising, road 
building, growing visitation, and larger budgets. Larger appropriations, in turn, 
enabled the NPS to dedicate evermore resources to expanding the infrastructure so 
that the cycle could continue.  
The successful conclusion of World War II, however, removed each of the 
above checks upon visitation and greatly expanded the desirability and ability to visit 
parks. Almost immediately the NPS found itself in a precarious situation. Historically 
low wartime budgets and a long maintenance backlog combined with a renewed 
ability to drive to and through national parks produced nearly disastrous results. By 
the early 1950s, visitation was increasing dramatically and the National Park Service 
confronted the consequences of their previous efforts to encourage high park 
visitation via the promotion of driving.  
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To Director Conrad Wirth, who led the NPS through much of this tumultuous 
era, more visitation—not less—held the keys to future survival for the parks. To a 
nation deep in the throes of a consumer revolution and still lacking the environmental 
sensitivity that characterized later decades, the answer seemed clear: build more roads 
and make room for more people. This response reflects a longtime institutional 
behavior of the NPS. From its earliest days and spanning a good deal of the twentieth 
century, the NPS sought to make many of its parks accessible to the driving public. It 
is not surprising then that, following World War II, the NPS turned once again to the 
expansion of infrastructure to meet the demands of the day. Unveiled in 1956 as a 
ten-year program of park infrastructure rebuilding and rejuvenation, Mission 66 
provided the funds, motivation, and institutional direction needed to save the parks 
for the people.  
The history of roads in Rocky Mountain, however, offers more than insight 
into the institutional responses of the NPS to the demands of rapid growth. As 
landscape architects had long known, roads provide one of the fundamental means 
through which the NPS could ―frame‖ the national park experience. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the Service conducted roadside cleanup, thinned trees, and ―erased‖ 
old roads all in an effort to give visitors a specific impression of the park. Between 
the end of World War II and the end of the 1960s the NPS relied even more heavily 
upon roads to offer a more expedient park experience.  Doing so, in turn, brought 
about the need for more parking, wider roads, fewer interpretive staff, more roadside 
signage, and the removal of historic structures that constituted roadside ―eye sores.‖  
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Although most hailed Mission 66 as necessary and prudent upon its initiation 
in 1956, the expansionist philosophies it reflected were soon challenged. By the 
conclusion of the program many came to the opinion that Mission 66 symbolized 
much of what was wrong with parks and America. At the heart of rethinking roads in 
national parks lay two interrelated developments: rising scientific awareness of the 
power of roads to transform the natural world, and the wilderness movement‘s 
appreciation for roadless areas.  Together, these two forces complicated the place of 
roads and automobiles within parks themselves. Facing evermore evidence that roads 
were causing significant damage to the park‘s flora and fauna, and facing a 
constituency that increasingly questioned infrastructure expansion as a viable solution 
to growth-related issues, for the first time in its history RMNP was forced to look 
beyond infrastructure expansion as a solution to growing park visitation. 
 
Worlds at War 
 In many ways the Depression stands as a highpoint in the history of RMNP. 
Though a difficult time for millions of Americans, the economic calamity delivered to 
the federal government the power, courage, and public support to expand government 
agencies. During the Depression, RMNP benefited greatly from the four Civilian 
Conservation Corps camps and the hundreds of men they employed. These men, paid 
largely through emergency funds, built additional campgrounds, expanded and 
refined its utility area, planted tens of thousands of bushes and trees, conducted 
roadside cleanup, fought fires, and treated thousands of trees for insect infestation. As 
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the 1930s came to a close and an aggressive Germany pushed its way across Europe, 
however, dark days loomed on the horizon for RMNP. 
 In his monthly report for May, 1940, Superintendent David Canfield correctly 
drew connections between world affairs and park visitation. According to Canfield, 
―[b]y the end of the month it was evident that the continued sensational military 
successes of the German armies against the Allies were having a telling effect on 
tourist travel in this country.‖ Most troubling to Canfield was the cancellation of 
reservations at several large hotels in the region. Letters written to the hotels indicated 
that cancellations where largely because of the uncertainty created by the war in 
Europe.
1
 ―Whether we like it or not,‖ Canfield admitted, ―it must now definitely be 
admitted that the condition of the world at the present time is going to seriously affect 
travel in this country, regardless of whether the United States becomes actively 
involved in the conflict or not.‖2 
Canfield was correct. Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the full 
engagement of the military and industrial forces of the United States, RMNP began 
losing resources on a regular basis. In addition to loss of rangers, clerks, and others to 
the draft, the park was also forced to close its CCC camps during the summer of 
1942.
3
 Reflecting the difficult times was the drop in the number of Americans willing 
and able to travel to the region for pleasure. Whereas 663,819 people in 194,581 
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automobiles shuffled through the park in 1941, only 392,565 people in 109,191 cars 
came in 1942.
4
   
As the war raged on in 1943, the park continued facing shortages of men and 
equipment. In December of 1943, the park was forced to give up its Snogo snowplow, 
which was crucial to keeping open the park‘s roads in winter, to an air base in Rapid 
City, South Dakota. By the summer of 1943, the CCC camps had been stripped of all 
usable equipment by the Army, Navy, and the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
5
 
Reflecting on the difficult year, acting Superintendent George Miller lamented that 
1943 represented ―a period of retrenchment of the administration, protection, 
maintenance and improvement in RMNP.‖ Overall, it was characterized by ―changes 
in personnel, decline in travel, reduced or curtailed work programs and activities.‖6  
Looking forward from 1943, the future of the park looked little better than the 
past two years. Beginning on December 1, 1943, the federal government mandated a 
system of gasoline rationing, thereby causing late season travel to take ―an immediate 
nose dive.‖7 Subsequently, the end-of-the-year tally did show a precipitous drop in 
visitation as only 311,455 visitors in 83,636 cars crossed the gates into the park. In 
addition to losing seven permanent employees in 1943 alone, the park also lost its 
superintendent, David Canfield, who reported for Naval duty in May of that year.
 8
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By the summer of 1944, the park had lost a total of fourteen of twenty-four 
permanent employees and witnessed sizable increase in the number of backlogged 
projects.
9
 More than siphoning off men and machinery, World War II also had a 
negative impact on park budgets. Between 1941 and 1943 alone, RMNP saw its 
operating budget cut from $196,095 to $105,665—a reduction of more than forty-five 
percent.
10
 Although the cuts in manpower, machinery, and money greatly 
circumscribed RMNP‘s ability to meet its management directives, far more difficult 
times lay ahead.  
  
Perils of Popularity 
It is no great secret that following World War II, Americans became buyers of 
stuff par excellence.  During the war years, largely due to the simultaneity of 
rationing, high employment, and relatively high wages, Americans managed to save 
billions of dollars. The end of the war unleashed more than a decade of pent-up 
consumer demand, and in relatively short order Americans bought millions of 
washing machines, television sets, automobiles, houses, and the like.
11
 Concomitant 
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Collectively, the return of American economic prosperity, the increasing 
popularity of the automobile-centered family vacation, and the desire on the part of 
millions of Americans to visit national parks put enormous stress on National Park 
Service and its administered lands. To get some sense of the strain put on the park 
system, a brief look at the visitation record is instructive. In 1935, 7,676,000 
Americans visited a national park or monument. By 1950, however, that number had 
surged to 33,250,000, and by 1955 park visitation exceeded 56,573,000.
13
  
Acting Superintendent of RMNP John Doerr commented that the ―heavy 
increase in travel and visitor use during 1945 have helped focus our attention on the 
probable impact of use that the park will receive following the war. We recognize our 
responsibility in preventing overuse that may result in the permanent impairment of 
park values.‖14 Doerr‘s concern is important for two reasons. First, he rightly read the 
situation and began voicing concerns about the health of the park if high visitation 
coincided with meager budgets, scant park personnel, and a backlog of maintenance.  
Doerr‘s comment was insightful for another reason, too. Here, tucked inside 
pages of statistical data about visitation, weather, and the like that characterize the 
annual reports, his concern that overuse may ―result in the permanent impairment of 
park values‖ stands as the first written expression by a superintendent of RMNP that 
high visitation could actually pose a threat to the park. From its founding in 1915 to 
the close of the war, the desire to facilitate ever-higher visitation predominated. If 
                                               
13
 Conrad Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1980), 261.  
14
 Superintendent‘s Annual Report, 1945. 
 111 
carried to extremes, the logic of continual growth posed serious questions about the 
NPS‘s charge to protect parks unimpaired for future generations, but few were willing 
or able to see it. A year later, the situation looked little better as VJ Day and the 
―lifting of gasoline restrictions in August‖ initiated a swell in visitation. Fighting an 
uphill battle, ―the wartime staff of employees was not able to prevent some damage to 
park facilities and features,‖ lamented Doerr.15  Visitation in February of that year 
eclipsed the previous February‘s visitation by 650 percent.16  
Fiscal year 1947 brought little relief as Superintendent Canfield, returned 
from military service, reported that the ―shortages of funds and personnel‖ 
contributed to the park‘s difficulties.17  What‘s more, complained Canfield, ―working 
class‖ families were increasingly seeking respite from their ―forty hour‖ weeks in 
Rocky Mountain where they expected to enjoy ―splendid‖ illustrated talks, guided 
hikes, and auto caravans. Meeting their expectations, flatly stated Canfield, was not 
possible under ―war year operations.‖18  
Without proper supervision and accommodations, the throngs of ―working 
class‖ vacationers flooding into the park threatened the park‘s already flagging 
infrastructure. Since the park‘s creation, the staff at RMNP had applied considerable 
effort in supplying the campgrounds with sufficient fuel stores to meet campfire 
needs. Doing so not only made folks feel welcome in the park, it prevented them from 
appropriating nearby benches and railings to keep their tent-side fires burning. 
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Lacking sufficient manpower to provide this service during and following the war, 
Canfield was certain that ―unless the campground fuel problem is solved in a quick 
and certain manner, we can expect that the complete demolition of the guard rails and 
tables in the park campgrounds will be completed within a two year period.‖19 In all, 
more than 800,000 people came to the park in some 224,215 cars in 1947 alone. Of 
that number, more than 350,000 visitors traveled up the Trail Ridge Road.
20
  
By 1951 a record 1.33 million people made the trip to RMNP—nearly double 
any previous year‘s number.21 The confluence of widespread economic prosperity, 
rise in consumption of goods and services, and lagging appropriations created a 
serious public relations issue for the NPS.
 
 Not only was firewood scant and roads in 
poor condition, but the volume of visitors traveling daily through the park put public 
toilets and campgrounds in a wretched state. Year by year the staff at Rocky 
Mountain received an increasing flow of letters complaining about various aspects of 
the park.  
Longtime park supporter and historian Bernard Devoto wrote a sort of expose 
on national parks for Harpers Magazine in October of 1953, entitled ―Let‘s Close the 
National Parks.‖22 To Devoto, there were two options: either give the NPS the money 
needed to meet current demands, or close the parks. Outraged, Devoto went so far as 
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to characterize some parks—like Yellowstone and Rocky Mountain—as ―true slum 
districts.‖  It was clear to many that national parks were in great peril.  
Letters from visitors also spoke to the poor conditions in RMNP. Mrs. Veit of 
Corpus Christi, Texas, for example, wrote a passionate letter to Congressman Lyndon 
B. Johnson regarding her family‘s vacation to RMNP in 1957:  
Every summer my family and I go on…camping trips to one of our many 
National Parks. For a number of years the crowded conditions have 
consistently worsened and after this year‘s trip to Rocky Mountain National 
Park in Colorado I feel compelled to write you my opinion about the Parks 
and hope to see some legislation in the near future.  
 
Not only was Veit dissatisfied with the cramped conditions (a sentiment thousands of 
park visitors echoed), but she was also upset by the lack of accommodations available 
in RMNP. The fireplaces in the campgrounds were in poor repair, the ground was 
badly in need of ―leveling off,‖ and the restrooms were deplorable. Veit lamented, 
 
None of these areas have showers which to me seems very primitive for our 
progressive America. Many, many thousands of persons from every state in 
the Union visit these campgrounds every summer and it is time some 
improvements should be made to better the conditions for these thousands of 
middle class American‘s hard-earned vacations. The revenue taken in by the 
Parks comes from us Middle-class vacationers and in my opinion should not 
be turned over to the Treasury for various and sundry uses (especially 
overseas improvements) but belongs to the Parks Department to be used for 




In the space of a single handwritten letter, Veit captures much of the complexity and 
tension that characterized both the National Park Service and RMNP in the years 
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following World War II. Parks were in serious danger of collapsing under the strain 
of postwar demand. Visitors from across the nation urged the NPS to build wider 
roads, increase the number and modernity of restrooms, and construct more 
comfortable camping facilities. In this sense, the democratization of tourism first 
enunciated by Pomeroy and echoed by historians ever sense posed significant 
challenges for the NPS. Furthermore, in RMNP at least, the growing popularity of the 
summer vacation would force them to make difficult decision regarding how they 
presented the park to the public. 
As evinced by letters from park visitors, reports of the National Park Service 
generally, and the management of Rocky Mountain National Park specifically, 
postwar Americans increasingly traded lengthy traditional park vacations—once 
characterized by long hikes and in-depth educational tours— for breezy ―day trips‖ to 
the park. By the end of the 1940s and increasingly throughout the 1950s, millions of 
Americans demanded that parks become places where they could sit comfortably 
behind the wheel of an automobile and glide across the landscape—a behavior that 
the Park Service had promoted and facilitated in RMNP since its founding. Many 
Americans strongly implored the NPS to take action and redesign parks in a way that 
better conformed to needs and desires of a rapidly rising middle class. Under the 
leadership of Conrad Wirth, this is exactly what the National Park Service attempted 
to do through a ten-year development program called Mission 66.
24
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Mission 66  
Facing a daunting task, National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth 
envisioned, planned, and initiated the most ambitious building program in NPS 
history with the hope of protecting the parks from the depredations of hordes of 
adoring tourists.  Presenting Mission 66 only as a response to postwar tourist 
demands fails to capture the complexity, and one might even argue the historic value 
of the program. It was a massive construction project reflective of the ambition and 
optimism of postwar America. But the story is more complicated: Mission 66 also 
reveals  a great deal about the rising tensions surrounding what constituted ―proper‖ 
behavior in (and thereby the deeper meaning of) our national parks. To perhaps a 
majority of Americans—and a powerful cadre of NPS officials—park development 
and widespread use were seen in the late 1940s and 1950s as not only acceptable, but 
necessary for the future of the national park system. This progressive ideology, best 
embodied in the person of NPS Director Conrad Wirth (and directly reflected in the 
letter from Mrs. Veit), played a central role in formulating the Mission 66 program. 
Of equal importance in shaping Mission 66 in Rocky Mountain National Park was the 
decision to use the program to recast this park as primarily a ―day-use‖ area. 
                                                                                                                                      
architecture in national parks. Especially helpful is her chapter regarding the construction of 
three new visitor centers within Rocky Mountain National Park. Although her study is rather 
complete, her interest lies less with RMNP and more with the broader trends within the NPS 
as related to Mission 66 architecture. Sara Allaback, Mission 66 Visitor Centers: The History 
of a Building Type (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Interior, National Park Service, 2000).   
 116 
Together, these two ideas brought significant, though not uncontested, changes in 
how park patrons interacted with and understood the natural world.  
By Wirth‘s reasoning, the Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engineers, 
and other of the NPS‘s institutional cousins generally had much better luck in the 
appropriations games than did the beleaguered Park Service. Though the reasons for 
their relative success were many, Wirth understood that part of it was attributable to 
the fact that they often proposed multi-year, multi-layered programs, which made 
them appealing to a wider range of congressmen, and thus less likely to get trimmed 
from the budget.
25
  Drawing on his most trusted and experienced employees, Wirth 
put together a steering committee and gave them just seven months, until September 
of 1955, to draft a comprehensive, forward-looking plan to save the national parks.
26
  
Over the next seven months the steering committee collected and compiled a 
vast assortment of information from many of the 181 NPS administered lands, and it 
worked diligently to flesh out general trends and needs. By September of 1955, the 
NPS not only had a solid proposal, but also a catchy slogan that they hoped would 
help sell their idea to the public—Mission 66. According to Wirth, the ―Mission‖ 
reflected the sense of duty that NPS employees felt regarding the rebuilding of the 
parks, and the ―66‖ represented the end point of the program—intelligently selected 
to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the National Park Service. On a more 
personal level, it seems clear that Wirth wanted America to know that it was he who 
had saved the National Park system. And there was no better way to chisel his name 
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in NPS history than to have a grand celebration that connected the history of the NPS 
to the reign of Conrad Wirth.  
At the heart of the proposal lay fourteen key points that outlined the NPS 
philosophy and posed solutions to the current crisis. The most important and 
strikingly ideological of the fourteen stated, ―[s]ubstantial and appropriate use of the 
National Park System is the best means by which its basic purpose is realized and is 
the best guarantee of perpetuating the System.‖27 In short, the key to saving the 
―system‖ lay not in curtailing visitation, but facilitating more of it. Under Wirth‘s 
confident leadership, this federal agency was going to organize and present itself to 
Congress and the American people as the most important purveyor of tourism in the 
nation. Other provisions outlined in the initial proposal called for the rebuilding of 
staff quarters, expansion of camping and picnic sites, and wherever possible, the 
elimination of private concessions/in-holdings in parks.  
Amidst this reform, Conrad Wirth ordered the Superintendent of Rocky 
Mountain National Park, James Lloyd, to draft a prospectus outlining the Mission 66 
program for his park. Lloyd, who had served with the NPS for more than thirty years, 
was well-equipped to handle the task. Over the course of his career, he had worked in 
some of the nation‘s most iconic parks, including Yosemite and Grand Canyon. Lloyd 
had held a variety of jobs with the Service, including Ranger, Assistant 
Superintendent, and Park Superintendent. He had also served as the regional chief of 
concessions for NPS region 3 from 1949 to 1950. Lloyd had come to see firsthand the 
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tremendous challenges and changes the NPS experienced before, during, and after 
WW II. His insights, his ability to work well with other interested parties, and his 
own personal philosophy regarding the mission of the NPS aided him in shaping a 




Drawing upon more than three decades of NPS experience, Lloyd began the 
planning phase by asking the staff of RMNP for their insights. Collectively, they 
raised three significant areas of concern—roads and trails, interpretation and 
education, and land acquisition. Perhaps overwhelmed by the challenge at hand, one 
employee candidly admitted, ―By and large, we can see no way in which we can cope 
with the increasing public use of our parks without expecting that the natural 
conditions along developed sites and routes will suffer, and there seems to be little 
which we can do to prevent this.‖ To this employee at least, the NPS now had to 
choose between conserving the natural character of the place and providing for the 
full enjoyment of the same. In his eyes, the answer was clear: ―It might well be that 
we shall have to get into the recreation business on a large scale.‖29  
As the staff of RMNP braced themselves for the peak of the season in June, 
1955, Regional Director Baker visited the park and held a meeting to outline the 
meaning and thrust of Mission 66. Echoing the words of Wirth, Baker stated that 
―substantial visitor enjoyment of the Parks is the best means of protecting them from 
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exploitation or encroachment‖ and that ―proper development is an essential protective 
device in Park use.‖ To Baker, as was the case with Wirth, unprecedented annual 
visitation only posed a problem if the Service was unprepared to handle it. With 
proper staffing, better roads, and a more effective interpretive apparatus, however, 
high visitation offered an opportunity to effectively remake the NPS and its lands. 
Baker made clear that all planning for the Mission 66 process was based on the 
assumption that park visitation would continue to increase. For Rocky Mountain, 
Baker instructed park management to assume that park travel would increase by sixty 
percent in the following decade, which meant an annual visitation of 2.281 million by 
1966. Prior to closing the meeting, James Lloyd encouraged his staff to think 
creatively. For Lloyd at least, the Mission 66 program presented more than an 
opportunity to rebuild the sagging physical plant of the park; it was a chance to ―start 
from scratch in this area. Just as if there were no National Park here. We must think 
ahead,‖ James implored. ―THINK BIG.‖30 
Over the course of the following months, the staff at Rocky Mountain drafted 
a prospectus that adequately addressed the challenges faced. At the core of their 
efforts lay the basic assumption that ―Rocky Mountain National Park is truly an 
outdoor museum with unsurpassed accessibility for the full enjoyment by the public.‖ 
Not only was the park unsurpassed in its accessibility (and would become more so 
through Mission 66), but park management had come to believe that ―the visitor need 
not penetrate far into the mountain vastness of the Park until the feeling of remote, 
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primeval conditions becomes distinctly apparent.‖ The conclusion that ―a visitor to 
the Park may have a truly significant and enjoyable visit in the space of one day‖ had 
replaced nearly a half-decade of the NPS urging the public to explore in some detail 
the hidden natural wealth and spiritual rejuvenating forces of this park. Based on the 
above two assumptions, Lloyd and his team labored to recast RMNP primarily as a 
―day-use‖ area—a place where travelers were encouraged to experience, in the space 
of a single day, the beauty and grandeur of the region.
31
 To Lloyd and others, 
rebuilding the Trial Ridge Road provided a good opportunity to institutionalize this 
―day use‖ philosophy.   
 
Rebuilding Roads 
Superintendent Lloyd witnessed firsthand the changing nature of travel 
through the park following World War Two. Commenting on the phenomenon, Lloyd 
stated that more people were ―making use of their private vehicles and less use of 
their legs.‖ As a whole, Americans were making more ―hurried trips,‖ as the 
―American family continues to boast of how many miles they traveled and how many 
National Parks they entered on their vacation trip.‖32 Hoping to gain a better 
understanding of how exactly postwar Americans interacted with the park, RMNP 
conducted a brief study at one of the park‘s most popular destinations, Bear Lake, in 
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1956. Through a multi-day traffic study, park staff collected information on the 
number of cars entering the lot, the number of riders per car, and the duration of their 
stay. Their study supported the conclusions Lloyd reached the previous year: more 
people were making quick auto-tours of the park than those who partook in more in-
depth investigations beyond their automobiles. According to the study, an average of 
66% of visitors spent less than 30 minutes at the Bear Lake parking lot, while 33.5% 
stayed longer than thirty minutes.
33
 Armed with such information, rebuilding the 
park‘s roads in a manner that better facilitated a smooth and rapid flow of traffic 
became one of the central components of Mission 66 in RMNP.  
In the fall of 1957, landscape architects and engineers began the process of 
laying out plans for a new and improved Trial Ridge Road and for more efficient 
entrance stations. Keeping with Mission 66‘s emphasis on maximizing visitation, 
managers of RMNP called for the construction of new parking areas at the Forest 
Canyon Overlook, Lower Tundra Curves, Little Rock Cut, Rock Cabins, and in 
Horseshoe Park.
 34
 By July of 1959, these parking lots were nearly complete as was 
the work of rebuilding, reshaping, and realigning portions of the Fall River Road at a 
total cost of some $60,000. Two additional parking areas were also built in Phantom 
Valley during the 1957 season, and further parking created at Aspenglen 
Campground. Under Mission 66, crews also set about the work of rebuilding many of 
the park‘s entrance stations to better accommodate the flow of increased traffic. In  
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addition to rebuilding and improving the High Drive entrance road, crews refashioned 
the Beaver Meadows entrance station, which was 50% complete by the winter of 
1959. 
Not content to simply expand parking facilities and streamline entrance 
stations, managers of RMNP also called for the reconstruction of the Deer Ridge 
cutoff road, which provided a connection between the Beaver Meadows and Fall 
River entrance stations. Siegrist Construction of Denver was awarded the contract and 
began preliminary work in January of 1963. In all, the project called for improving a 
 
 
Director and RMNP staff reviewing Bear Lake Cutoff Proposals, 1958. 




3.9 mile stretch of the road at a cost of some $570,000.
35
 By October of 1963 the 
project was nearing completion as evermore automobiles traveled through the park.
36
  
  In addition to finding suitable parking, park patrons also required access to 
public restrooms. To meet the requirements of its visitors, RMNP also expanded and 
rebuilt a number of ―comfort stations‖ across the park. In Glacier Basin, the NPS 
installed a new sewer system, septic tanks, and diversion box to service three new 
comfort stations.
37
 The NPS also contracted the construction of an additional two 
comfort stations at the Stillwater Campground in 1957. The total cost of the projects 
amounted to more than $45,000.
38
 Anticipating increasing visitation, the NPS also 
installed six new comfort stations at the Moraine Park Campground at a cost of some 
$66,000 in 1963, and expanded and rebuilt the campground‘s roads.39  
Not only did Lloyd desire to transform park roads into modern thoroughfares 
replete with wide shoulders and plenty of parking; but also he and his staff saw the 
importance in adding numerous picnic spots along the roadside. The addition of 
turnouts and picnic spots both reflected and reinforced the growing trend in day trips 
through the park. According to Lloyd, only ―two developed [picnic] locations with a 
capacity of 12 parties each‖ existed in the park in the mid 1950s, and many more 
were needed to accommodate the ―large numbers of picnickers‖ who were asking for 
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places to ―spread their lunches along the roadside and adjacent to trails.‖40 Already by 
1963 the NPS had added eight additional picnic areas containing a total of 140 
individual sites.  
By 1963, with the bulk of the Mission 66 improvements completed, RMNP 
must have viewed their accomplishments with a sense of pride. In addition to adding 
two new miles of roadway and reconstructing three more (at a cost of more than 
$200,000), they had also added 594 additional parking spaces (cost $198,000) with 
plans to add 181 more. Moreover, they had upgraded and reconstructed five miles of 
roads within campgrounds and built an additional 2.5 miles of trails. In their efforts to 
accommodate more overnight visitors, they had built an additional 410 camping sites, 
making a total of 887 overnight designated spaces. Hoping to deal with larger groups 
of tourists, the NPS had built two new campfire circle/amphitheaters, capable of 
seating a total of 600 persons at a time. The newly fashioned RMNP boasted a total of 
seven campfire circles and amphitheaters, with a total seating capacity of more than 
1700.
41
  By 1966, the NPS had allocated more than $5,196,000 for road construction 
within the park, a sum that represents a little more than the half of the total 
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Reinterpreting Nature 
 Revamping the park‘s roads to better accommodate larger crowds meant that 
the NPS would have to make difficult decisions regarding other aspects of park 
management. One area that increased visitation significantly impacted was RMNP‘s 
interpretative and educational apparatus. ―Interpretation‖ had always been near the 
heart of the National Park Service mission. NPS directors, superintendents, and the 
general staff all realized that nothing was more effective in endearing the NPS to 
Americans than a strong and personal interpretive program. Scores of letters from 
around the country abound in NPS files congratulating the Service on the work that 
rangers and naturalists were doing in educating and enlightening the public.  
By the mid 1950s, however, the park found itself increasingly unable to make 
such strong, personal connections with the public. Not only were there too few park 
employees to regularly take visitors on guided day hikes, but fewer and fewer people 
were interested in such activities, choosing instead to not wander far from parking 
lots and Packards. According to James Lloyd, the park‘s trails ―receive much greater 
use for a short distance from the nearby parking lots, but in the high, back country, 
only the stout hearted hiker is to be found.‖43 Although the raw percentage of 
―interpretive contacts‖ had risen from just 7.7 percent in 1934 to 13.8 percent in 
1955, the number of travelers who had no contact whatsoever with staff had jumped 
from 337,363 to an overwhelming 1,250,806 during the same time. Although park 
visitation had increased by hundreds of thousands, about the same number of people 
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chose either half or full day guided tours as in previous decades. In short, too many 
people were moving through the park without being exposed to the NPS ―message.‖44  
To an agency historically self-conscious about its image—and always striving to 
make clear to the public the importance of their role in safeguarding national 
treasures—something had to be done.                                                          
To the management at RMNP, the solution seemed clear: revise the 
interpretive program to better meet the needs of those traveling through the park in 
their cars. Accomplishing this meant reducing the number of staff dedicated to 
personally guided tours, planting a large number of interpretive signs and information 
stations across the park, and making a more concerted effort to ―contact‖ travelers at 
entrances. Through each of the above, the function and character of RMNP was 
knowingly and willing transformed from a personal landscape where travelers came 
to know park staff and learned directly from other human beings, to a less personal 
one that lent itself more easily to the demands of commercial tourism.  
In 1955, facing increased demands and a thin staff, James Lloyd decided to 
cut drastically the number of guided tours and hikes. Given their popularity, it comes 
as no surprise that the reduction upset a great many of the park‘s travelers, not the 
least of which was Bill Ladd of the Louisville Times Courier. Ladd had been a 
longtime patron of RMNP and had always appreciated and enjoyed the personal and 
extensive contact with rangers and naturalists. While visiting the park in the summer 
of 1956, however, Ladd was shocked to find that park officials had drastically 




reduced the availability of guided nature hikes. Ladd was so upset, in fact, that he 
traveled to park headquarters to discuss the matter with Superintendent Lloyd. During 
their discussion, Lloyd informed Ladd that ―the former interpretive program was 
unrealistic in that it was tailored to the long-term visitor while the average visit was a 
day and a half and a huge percentage of visitors simply drive through the park and 
had no contact with the interpretive program at all.‖ As Ladd‘s demeanor mellowed, 
Lloyd observed that ―while a ranger-naturalist was taking 75 people on a ¾ day hike 
on the Fern-Odessa trail, 1,000 visitors were going through the park with no contact 
with the interpretive service.‖ After hearing Lloyd out, Ladd conceded that the 
Superintendent had a point, but wanted to make clear that the park management was 
making a big mistake. As Ladd saw it, the ―hiking party led by a ranger-naturalist is 
made up of the people who are most valuable to the park system and the park service. 
These are the people already fired with a desire to learn something about the park, its 
animals, flowers, trees, geology and place in the natural picture.‖45 These were the 
people, Ladd argued, that would become future conservationists and ―battle‖ for the 
NPS in the ―crises which are always coming in the park service program.‖ Most 
regrettable to Ladd was plopping down highly trained and capable scientists at 
―information stations‖ for the ―gang of stampeding tourists who eat breakfast at 
Loveland, throw their lunch papers off the Rock Cut and have an early dinner at Hot 
Sulphur Springs.‖46 To Ladd, the park was best served not by having such personnel 
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hand out flyers at the gates, but rather employing them to lead educational tours 
through the park.  
When faced with the decision to maintain the personal service and ―small 
town‖ atmosphere that once characterized the park (one in which Ladd argued—
maybe correctly—led to more engaged visitors and thereby greater grassroots 
support), or to rebuild the park into a place where a maximum number of visitors had 
at least some contact with the park‘s ―interpretive mission,‖ James Lloyd chose the 
latter. The demands of skyrocketing visitation were also reflected, so very subtly, in 
the number of interpretive stations and placards sprinkled around the park.  
Over the course of Mission 66, park staff constructed eight new 
―information/orientation‖ stations around the park. Placed at entrances and major 
scenic overlooks, these stations were intended to offer in-depth interpretation of key 
aspects of the park, including the processes of glaciation and the interaction of plant 
and animal communities. An additional thirty-two placards (smaller in stature and 
less thorough in explanation than information stations) were similarly scattered across 
the park to further help visitors properly understand and interpret what they were 
seeing.
47
 If geographer John Stilgoe is correct, the abundance of signage along any 
given roadside stands as a sort of barometer of the human interaction taking place 
along it. Stilgoe holds that roads with few signs either reflect that most travelers have 
an intimate knowledge of a place (hence no need for direction), or that travelers are 
willing, and welcome, to ask locals for direction. On the other hand, roads with ample 
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or excessive signage speak both to general unfamiliarity with a place, and a lack of 
opportunity to ask others for direction. In Rocky Mountain, both of the latter appear 
to be the case. Read this way, the proliferation of signage across Rocky Mountain 
does indicate that the parkscape was in the process of becoming less personal and 
more amenable to an expedient individual experience.
48
  
Perhaps the most visible effort on the part of the NPS to increase ―interpretive 
contacts‖ was the construction of three new visitor centers. According to Conrad 
Wirth, the older museum-like structures that parks (like Rocky Mountain) had used 
were no longer serving the needs of the NPS. In an attempt to stimulate more interest 
and use, the NPS endeavored to replace the outmoded museums with modern visitor 
centers in which a tourist could find clean restrooms, interpretive exhibits, rest areas, 
curio shops, and food services.
49
 Reflective of this broader NPS trend, RMNP 
eventually planned and built three new visitor centers—one located near the Beaver 






 The decision to transform Rocky Mountain into a day-use facility through 
Mission 66 had one final significant consequence. Ever since the park‘s creation, a 
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handful of privately owned lodges and guest ranches had provided homely—if not 
luxurious—places for tourists to stay within the park. While staying at the Sprague 
Ranch or the Stead‘s Guest Ranch, vacationers could ride horses, while away rainy 
afternoons under the protection of open porches, or discuss with fellow travelers the 
day‘s events while sitting beside a crackling fire. As tourists cast a lazy gaze from the 
cozy porch at Stead‘s or Sprague‘s, they likely saw any one of dozens of small cabins 
and other rustic buildings that dotted the landscape. Lodges and cabins both 
constituted an honest, if not entirely intentional, admission that this park had a deep 
natural history that was inseparable from its human history. Beginning in the early 
1930s and accelerating rapidly under Mission 66, however, reflections of the park‘s 
human history were removed in an attempt to create an image and experience within 
the park not complicated by human history. 
 In 1931, under the leadership of Roger Toll, RMNP began a decades-long 
program to purchase private in-holdings within the park.
51
 Initially the Depression, 
and later the onset of WW II, hamstrung these efforts. The cash infusion Mission 66 
brought, however, allowed Rocky Mountain to redouble its efforts and purchase a 
large percentage of the remaining privately owned property within the park. 
According to the ―Master Plan for the Preservation and Use of Rocky Mountain 
National Park Mission 66 Edition,‖ the first listed guideline for administrative 
direction under Mission 66 was to ―restore to their original condition any natural 
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features that have been disturbed by man.‖52 As such, removal of most human 
structures within the park received top priority.  
In one sense, park officials‘ desire to consolidate NPS holdings is 
understandable. Administering a patchwork of private and public land had long been 
a tricky—and often less than successful—balancing act. Much of the land purchased 
under Mission 66 was bought to prevent owners from launching development 
programs that conflicted with the NPS mission and philosophy. In other cases, RMNP 
acquired additional acreage to expand winter range within the park for its growing elk 
herd, as was the case when the park purchased portions of Moraine Park in 1962. 
Through the land acquisition program, however, RMNP also sought to 
purchase all remaining privately-owned cabins. Many of these had been long 
abandoned, their graying walls sagging under the weight of collapsing roofs and 
heavy winter snows. Others were used seasonally and still in good repair. The desire 
on the part of NPS officials to buy such properties raises the question of why? If it 
was evident that either no commercial development was proposed or had taken place, 
why spend the hundreds of thousands of dollars to acquire such properties?  
The answer is clearly reflected in a land acquisition report completed in 1956. 
This report, which offers a complete list of all property the NPS intended to purchase 
in the park, was presented in tabular form, broken into eight categories, including 
priority, name of owner, tract number, description, explanation, method of 
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acquisition, acreage, and cost. Under the column dedicated to ―explanation,‖ a long 
list of ―cabins‖ were slated for purchase because they were ―an eye-sore along 
Moraine Park Road,‖ or they ―spoil[ed] scenic view from Bear Lake Road,‖ or 
―spoiled scenic view from Moraine Park Road,‖ or ―spoil[ed] scenic view from Trail 
Ridge Road.‖ In all, some $422,800 was set aside to purchase and destroy these ―eye-




To Lloyd and others, such obvious reminders of human history complicated 
and detracted from the park ―experience.‖ Here again, the ubiquitous statement that 
RMNP was best understood as a ―natural museum‖ is instructive. In their natural 
museum, anything that reflected a human past or present became an ―eye-sore,‖ 
needing to be destroyed. In the words of Lloyd himself, ―an increased sense of the 
wilderness character will accompany the elimination of manmade intrusions‖ 
including hotels, lodges, and cabins.‖54  To the management of RMNP at least, there 
existed a distinct line between nature and culture. It is ironic that the cabins 
constituted eye-sores, but the roads dotted with signage from which such views were 
sullied, did not.  
The land acquisition program was also intended to bring to an end, wherever 
feasible, the existence of private concessionaires within the park. Here again, the 
reasons for such purchases were many, but by and large, Lloyd‘s desire to transform 
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Rocky Mountain into a ―day-use‖ park was a driving force. The previously mentioned 
works of Buchholtz and Musselmen do a laudable job in outlining the details of how 
and when the NPS bought and then destroyed the Stead‘s Guest Ranch, Moraine 
Lodge, Sprague‘s Inn, and countless others, so these points need no further 
elaboration. Needless to say, each of the above had operated in the park for some time 
(Sprague‘s Ranch was an offshoot of the Sprague family homestead of the 1870s) and 
enjoyed a loyal and devoted following. As news spread that these and other overnight 
facilities would be bought and destroyed, longtime patrons rose up in protest. Their 
letters show yet again that the NPS, through its Mission 66 program, was making a 
conscious effort to reform how park visitors interacted with the park itself—an effort 
that did not go uncontested.  
Howard Beale, Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, wrote a 
passionate letter that clearly captures the above process. On the surface, Beale was 
angry because he had been staying at the Sprague Ranch intermittently since 1914, 
and was distraught to hear that it was to be closed by 1958. But his letter offers more 
than a simple complaint about the closing of a guest ranch. Beale also speaks directly, 
though perhaps unknowingly, to the shift in clientele to which the NPS was catering. 
To Beale, there were ―two kinds of people using Rocky Mountain National Park. You 
have the people, thousands of them, who crowd the many auto camps and motels and 
rooming houses that have made the big Thompson Canyon hideous and which have 
made Estes Park Village…loathsome.‖ And there were others who ―walk on the 
trails, or ride horses on the trails, or sit in isolated, unspoiled spots like the porch of 
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the old Moraine Park Lodge…and quietly enjoy the beauty. These are the people who 
climb mountains, these are the people who genuinely enjoy the wildness of the 
place.‖55  Beale then stated that ―these are the people that the National Park Service 
now wishes to drive out by tearing down the lodges in the Park itself.‖ To Beale, 
these lodges did not mar the landscape as the NPS contended, but rather ―fit into‖ it.56 
Beale, and likely the ―thousands‖ he claimed to speak for, were casualties of Rocky 
Mountain‘s attempt to create an a-historical landscape, a place void of the 




Upon its conclusion, few could claim that Mission 66 did not bring significant 
change to Rocky Mountain National Park. Through the program, the NPS built and 
rebuilt roads and expanded parking facilities in their attempt to welcome more 
tourists to into the park system. In this basic sense, Mission 66 was a complete 
success. Headed by bureaucrats like Conrad Wirth, the NPS obtained an incredible 
amount of capital to bolster its infrastructure, meet current visitation demands, and 
anticipate future growth. Although the program did much to improve the sagging 
physical plant of the park, its architects failed to anticipate the consequences of the 
program‘s success.  
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By refining roads and enhancing parking structures, picnic sites, and roadside 
interpretive exhibits, the NPS took part in a pattern of management decisions that 
reached all the way back to the early days of the Service. Although there was little 
doubt by the middle of the 1950s that Americans ―loved‖ their national parks, Conrad 
Wirth wagered that the NPS could never have too much public favor. Rather that 
running the risk of turning away patrons, Wirth and the NPS followed a longstanding 
NPS tradition that held that the best way to protect the lands administered by the Park 
Service was to encourage—not retard—use.  
 There were, however, two significant problems with pursuing this 
management direction. First, facilitating visitation via the construction and 
maintenance of an automobile-centered parkscape only brought more tourists, and 
within less than fifteen years the NPS again faced a situation similar in kind, if not in 
scale, to that which they encountered following World War II. The second problem, 
which stemmed in part from the development of the first, was widespread and 
significant environmental change brought about within the park by the construction 
and presence of roads, and the cars and humans they delivered through the park.   
 As crews expanded roads and parking lots in RMNP during Mission 66, 
changes were already underway that greatly complicated the management of the park. 
Among those forces was the five-year research program of Beatrice Willard.  
Although scientific studies of various aspects of the park had been conducted as early 
as the 1930s, they were relatively few and far between. Moreover, none of them 
addressed specifically the impacts of visitors themselves upon the park itself.  
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 Willard, who was a plant ecologist specializing in alpine plant ecology, 
worked in the United States and Europe and earned a contract with the NPS to study 
the variety of ecological impacts people had upon the places they trod. Her final 
report, ―Effects of Visitors on Natural Ecosystems In Rocky Mountain National 
Park,‖ comprises more than four hundred pages of data and analysis and offers a 
wonderful window into the park just past mid-century. Making Willard‘s report even 
more valuable is the fact that she was able to witness first-hand many of the 
environmental consequences of Mission 66 as several of her study areas coincided 
with locations recently expanded and enhanced through the rebuilding effort.  
 Willard carefully selected a range of study plots including locations along 
Trail Ridge Road at the Rock Cut, Little Rock Cut, Forest Canyon Overlook, and 
Iceberg Lake, in addition to Bear Lake, and the system of trails that connected it to 
Nymph and Dream Lakes. She then set about compiling quantitative data on the 
various plants found at each. To accomplish this, she relied heavily upon the use of 
the ―quadrate method,‖ which entailed constructing a grid on location, and then 
counting and classifying the plants within the grid.
57
 She also examined historic park 
photos, as well as those she took while in the field, to ascertain degrees and types of 
environmental change over both long and short term intervals.
58
   
 Willard also drafted a scale of ―visitor use impact‖ to quantify environmental 
change. Under degree one vegetation evidenced impact, but no visual effects were yet 
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apparent. Under the second degree, vegetation was affected and growth normal, but 
vitality reduced. Degree three correlated with altered vegetation, little or no 
blooming, and portions of the soil‘s humus layer exposed and eroding. Progressing up 
the scale, degree four represented areas where the vegetation was largely gone, and 
the humus layer was exposed and eroding. According to her scale, the fifth and most 




Armed with modern scientific methods, her camera, plant keys, and a means 
to measure environmental change, Willard conducted primary investigations 
throughout the 1958-1959 season. Although she tempered her conclusions with the 
fact that they were based on only one year‘s observation, she held firm that ―with the 
construction of Trail Ridge Road began the significant impact of visitors on the alpine 
tundra, for never before had such large numbers of people had ready access to these 
eight miles of tundra region.‖ Moreover, she found that visitor impact was ―most 
pronounced on the tundra immediately adjacent to designated parking areas at Rock 
Cut, Iceberg Lake, and Fall River Pass, and in 1958, the Forest Canyon Overlook.‖60 
Willard was the first to convey in an official report that the construction of roads 
through Rocky Mountain held the potential to bring about significant environmental 
change. Four additional years of fieldwork buttressed this basic conclusion.  
Being an expert in alpine plant ecology, the opportunity to study the variety of 
ecosystems along Trail Ridge Road was no doubt exciting to Willard. Not only did 
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―Trail Ridge [support] most of the types of ecosystems that occur in the alpine tundra 
of the Front Range,‖ including seventeen distinct types, Willard found that many of 
them had  ―received little or no visitor use‖ and were  arguably ―less altered by man‘s 
activities than any other tundra in the central Rockies.‖61 Standing in stark opposition 
to such ―pristine‖ units, Willard quickly found that Trail Ridge also contained areas 
where the construction and maintenance of the road and its many parking lots had 
swiftly brought about significant environmental change. Those areas that ―received 
heavy visitor use have been drastically altered,‖ a process that could ―begin within 
hours after an area becomes exposed to heavy use,‖ with ―significant changes be[ing] 
produced within less than a week.‖62 To a person as well-versed in the fragile nature 
of tundra ecosystems, the rapid destruction of areas that took ―[h]undreds and 
possibly thousands of years‖ to develop ―soil with a thick humus layer, such as in the 
Kobresia meadow originally found at Rock Cut‖ was of great concern.63  
 In harsh environments like those found along much of Trail Ridge Road, deep 
snow, ice, bracing winds, intense sun, and a short growing season combine to make 
the existence of plant life difficult. Over thousands of years, however, a variety of 
natural processes produced a rich layer of soil (humus) and duff (top level detritus) to 
the point where plant life could grow. Over time, plant communities extended over 
much of the tundra, forming a thin plate of armor over the soil. When the system 
operates as it should, the plants are generally able to hold fast to the soil below and  
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protect it against the erosional forces of wind and water. When the top layer of life is 
disturbed and a ―chink‖ in the armor develops, however, erosion and deterioration of 
the ecosystem can be rapid.  
Spanning her five year study, Willard found time and again that the most 
significant and lasting visitor wrought changes were tied directly to upsetting the 
plant and soil dynamics described above.
64
 For example, if an area received enough 
foot traffic, especially during spring runoff when the plants of the tundra are most 
vulnerable, plants could be trampled to the point of death. Over a short period of time, 
dead plants could allow erosional forces and the processes of ecological 
transformation begin. The removal of rocks, either unintentionally by kicking, or 





Degree five visitor impact at the Rock Cut. 




intentionally by rock ―collectors,‖ often had the same effect. Once a rock was moved 
or removed water, wind, and heaving frost could quickly wheedle its way through the 
tundra‘s topsoil.65 ―Thus,‖ concluded Willard, ―trampling and other visitor activities, 
together with natural environmental forces interact to bring about the continued 
erosion of areas laid bare by removal of rocks.‖66  
Not far into her first research season, Willard found at the Rock Cut alone a 
host of ecological transformations underway. The area, which was made accessible 
by the construction of a parking lot, reflected widespread environmental change. 
Specifically, Willard found an overall reduction in vegetative cover, amount of 
upright growth and size of flowers, seed production, permanent damage to plant 
bodies, as well as compaction and erosion of the topsoil, changes in soil moisture and 
temperature, and changes in ecological processes, such as plant succession. No doubt 
wincing at the rapid despoliation of a fragile ecosystem, Willard also found that 
humans—not animals—were responsible for making informal trails around the Rock 
Cut, thereby extending and deepening the scope of change.
67
 
 Although her observations at the Rock Cut provided valuable insight into the 
relationship between roads, humans, and environmental change, her findings at the 
Forest Canyon Overlook were arguably more significant. Whereas the Rock Cut and 
Fall River Pass parking areas had been in operation for years, thus enabling Willard 
the opportunity to measure the impacts of visitors compounded over time, 
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construction of the Forest Canyon Overlook was part of the Mission 66 program and 
completed in 1957. Although the Overlook had been open the year prior, it received 
very little use and thus was essentially intact when Willard began her study. In 
essence, the Forest Canyon Overlook site gave Willard the opportunity to measure, in 
real time, the impacts of opening a new parking facility within the park. By mid-July, 
just two weeks following the opening of Trail Ridge for the 1958 season, Willard 
reported that ―two distinct paths had formed on the previously undisturbed vegetation 
immediately adjacent to the parking space; one led directly south and was the more 
distinct, the other led to the west and eventually to the knoll.‖68  
 As she found consistently throughout the park, the relationship between 
visitor impact and various ecosystems depended upon a variety of factors. In places 
like the Overlook where a boulder-strewn landscape restricted and ―channeled‖ 
visitor use, the rate and intensity of informal trail development accelerated.
69
 Another 
factor mediating human-induced ecological change was distance from roads and 
parking lots. According to Willard‘s first year of fieldwork, the ―amount of damage to 
plants decreased proportionately with the distance from the edge of the parking 
space.‖70  
 The formation of informal trails was a perennial concern in the park, and 
RMNP staff undertook a variety of means to control them. Perhaps the most common 
approach involved putting in place a properly constructed trail consisting of a  
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hardened surface and countermeasures to curtail erosion. Hoping to control the 
movement of people between the parking lot and Forest Canyon Overlook, for 
example, the NPS built a blacktopped trail in 1958. The path did not cut directly from 
the parking lot to the Overlook, but rather provided a sweeping path to the scenic 
location. In less that one week‘s time, reported an exasperated Willard, a ―path 
developed as a shortcut across the loop in the blacktop.‖71   
Not surprisingly, Willard found ecological change at the Fall River Pass 
similar to that along Trail Ridge Road. According to her first year‘s report, the ―south 
and east of the parking area is conspicuous in the lack of vegetation except adjacent 





Informal trail and blacktopped trail at Forest Canyon Overlook. 
(Photo by  Beatrice Willard, 1958) 
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to the larger boulders.‖ Whereas trampling at the Forest Canyon Overlook had just 
begun, the area adjacent to Fall River Pass revealed ―the ultimate effects of trampling 
over a long period of time and with a larger number of visitors concentrated in a 
relatively small area.‖72 Through her scientific analysis, Willard concluded that 
upwards of 80% of the Fall River Pass study area demonstrated a visitor impact 
degree of 5 (the most severe on her scale), while 10% stood at a degree of 4, 5% 
degree of 3, and the rest falling in categories 1 and 2.
73
    
Willard‘s first year of fieldwork yielded a great deal of information on a range 
of park ecosystems, but she was careful to point out that further study was needed to 
determine with a greater degree of certainty the relationship between visitor use and 
ecological change. To accomplish this, Willard conducted a series of traffic studies in 
the park during the following year‘s field season. According to her observations, a 
large percentage of people stopped along Trail Ridge Road to admire the scenery, 
take in the cool mountain air, and stretch their legs. In all, Willard found that 33% of 
all cars in a given day stopped at Forest Canyon Overlook, and some 340 people 
exited their cars and walked around. At the Rock Cut, 38% of all cars stopped with 
some 455 people moving beyond their automobiles. Lastly, at the Fall River Pass, 
nearly half of all cars (46%) stopped, and some 513 passengers ambled around.
74
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 To better ascertain the correlation between visitor use and ecological change, 
Willard constructed one ―exclosure‖ at the Forest Canyon site and one at the Rock 
Cut in 1959.  Essentially, exclosures were areas of varying dimensions (both 100 
square feet) fenced off from the public. Inside the exclosures, Willard was able to 
study ―ecological rebound‖ in the absence of human traffic. Many of the exclosures 
also provided her with a baseline against which she could compare and measure 
change.
75
 Further, each exclosure contained a range of visitor impact degrees, ranging 
from degrees five to one.
76
   
 By the end of the season, Willard concluded that ―with the exception of the 
cushion plants…all species in the area of the exclosure were observed to respond 
positively to the release from impact.‖ In all, the ―only species that were totally 
eliminated by the action of visitor impact were the soil lichen.‖77 Although it bode 
well that the majority of the plants rebounded rather quickly following release from 
foot traffic and disturbance, the failure of the cushion plants to do so was troubling. 
For within these tundra ecosystems, the cushion plants played a critical role in 
thwarting erosion.
78
 With the cushion plants damaged and or dead, some of the 
topsoil was ―removed by the ecological process of attrition set in motion by trampling 
and augmented by the wind, water, and needle ice.‖ Over time, found Willard, 
―[t]rampling continued to loosen the soil surface exposed by damage of the cushion, 
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giving the wind ready access to the soil surface. The net result was that up to one inch 
of soil had been removed from some microsites by the end of the 1958 season.‖79  
 To the average visitor, the loss of cushion plants might have been visible, but 
few would have guessed at the ecological transformation such a loss brings about. 
When an area knit together by a ground patch of cushion plants loses the protection 
those plants provide, a cascade of ecological changes follows. For example, once a 
cushion plant is removed, the process of soil erosion begins almost immediately. In 
relatively short order, the ―duff‖ layer (essentially that layer comprised of 
decomposed or decomposing organic material) begins to erode. In a seasonally dry 
environment like the tundra along Trail Ridge Road, duff plays a critical role in ―the 
maintenance of a favorable water balance‖ in dry ―sites which have little source of 
water in summer other than melting water from late spring snows and the frequent, 
but light, summer showers.‖80 As the duff washes and blows away, so too does the 
soil‘s humus layer, further impairing its ability to support plant life.81 ―Therefore,‖ 
concluded Willard, the ―loss of any portion of the duff and humus from the ecosystem 
alters environment factors of vital importance to the major vegetation components of 
the plants.‖82 Over time, as the soil‘s ability to retain moisture declines, its average 
seasonal temperature increases, and a ―favorable environment for colonization by 
other plants‖ is created.83 After two years of extensive survey, Willard concluded that  
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the nature of the processes set in motion by visitor impact in tundra ecosystems are 
complex, having a multiplicity of interacting factors operating in them. Three of the 
more prominent processes are attrition and crushing of plants, reduction of the 
vegetative cover, and erosion of topsoil as vegetation cover decreases.‖84  
By the close of the 1960-61 season Willard had studied some 95% of the 
tundra adjacent to Trail Ridge Road.
85
 Trends of the previous two years continued, 
including the formation and persistence of informal trails, and the trampling of fragile 
plants. Of growing concern during the 1960-61 season, however, were the taking of 
souvenirs by visitors. The most popular mementos collected along Trail Ridge Road 
included flowers and rocks, both of which did considerable—if widely 
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unappreciated—damage to the tundra. The picking of flowers, which occurred with 
such regularity that Willard set up a study to quantify how many flowers were picked 
during a given day, not only stripped the roadside of much of its seasonal beauty, but 
it also greatly impaired those plants ability to reproduce, thereby feeding into the 
cycle of groundcover loss and erosion.
86
 
 The collecting of rocks by visitors also came at a significant environmental 
cost. According to Willard, the ―collecting of rocks continued in sizable and 
significant quantities‖ around the Rock Cut in 1960-61, left behind numerous holes 
that were noted and followed throughout the summer. By season‘s end, Willard 
firmly concluded that ―[t]his activity reduces natural tundra to impact degree 4-5 
immediately‖ as the fragile tundra undersoil is exposed to the forces of erosion.87  
As evidence mounted linking roads, visitors, and ecological change at older 
established roadside stops like the Rock Cut and Fall River Pass, Willard grew 
alarmed at the rapid transformation of locations opened through Mission 66 building 
programs. In addition to the Forest Canyon Overlook mentioned previously, RMNP 
also built a parking lot at the Little Rock Cut in 1957. As was the case at the 
Overlook, a high volume of foot traffic, the collecting of rocks and flowers, and the 
forces of wind, water, and ice wrecked havoc upon the fragile tundra.  
By the end of the 1960-61 season, Willard sadly concluded that ―[a]t the rate 
of damage observed during the last three summers since the parking area was 
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constructed, it will only be a few more years before the major portion of the 
vegetation in the northeast end of this area is reduced to degree 4 and 5.‖88  
 Once damage had occurred, recovery was far more complicated than simple 
reseeding efforts. Although Willard‘s first year‘s report optimistically found that 
plants rebounded remarkable well once protected from foot traffic, she discovered in 
1960-61 the difficulties inherent in re-colonizing denuded areas with native plants. 
For example, previous studies conducted at Niwot Ridge, Colorado (the closest 
comparable location to Trail Ridge) demonstrated that reseeding success rates 
averaged about 88%. In each of the enclosures at the Forest Canyon Overlook, 
however, reseeding efforts yielded only a 48% survival rate—a number significantly 
lower than Willard had hoped for. Such a low success rate meant, among other things, 
that reestablishing native vegetation once it was lost was very difficult, if not 
impossible, over relatively short periods of time.
89
 The longer the tundra remained 
open to the effects of visitors, the more difficult it would be to restore it to something 
approaching its natural condition. 
 Revealing the irony of roads in natural places, Willard concluded at the end of 
the season that the ―tundra adjacent to places where visitors stop is showing 
considerable alteration and semi-permanent damage; especially where the use had 
extended over a number of years. Therefore, most of the tundra which visitors see 
close up cannot be considered natural and undisturbed by man.‖90 Ironically, the 
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extension of roads into places of amazing natural beauty brought about enough 
environmental change that many aspects of that natural world could no longer be 
classified as natural. In a national park like Rocky Mountain, a place created and 
managed as a ―natural museum,‖ much of the nature that visitors witnessed and 
experienced was, in fact, a byproduct of their presence and not solely a reflection of a 
―naturally‖ functioning environment.91  
 After four seasons of extensive research in the park, Willard set forth a spate 
of recommendations in her report for the 1961-62 season. In addition to channeling 
―visitor activity in such a way that they will not be invited to walk on the tundra,‖ she 
also implored the NPS to ―[a]nticipate the patterns of snow accumulation in areas of 
development and provide for snow removal where needed, so visitors will not have to 
walk on the tundra to detour snow banks.‖92 Moreover, advised Willard, the Old Fall 
River Road leading up to Fall River Pass should be converted into a horse trail, and 
the NPS should ―[r]efuse all proposals concerned with reconstruction of this road, on 
the basis of the irreparable damage to the ecosystems and glacial features of the 
valley that would result.‖93 Willard also advised the NPS to disseminate her findings 
to all people involved in park management and ―[e]mploy a plant ecologist with 
intimate knowledge of the Park to participate in decisions on new developments and 
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to maintain a constant survey of the entire park.‖94 In an effort to reach those having 
the most impact upon the tundra—the daily visitor—Willard crafted a pamphlet 




The work of Beatrice Willard is remarkable in many regards. The fact that 
Rocky Mountain National Park agreed to fund the project reflects a degree of 
institutional self-reflection not generally present in the earlier years of the park. 
Willard‘s study and conclusions also stand as a reflection of the changing nature of 
environmental thought following World War II. Well before the first Earth Day, 
Beatrice Willard and many of her colleagues were part of a fundamental shift in how 
millions of Americans understood the natural world and the human place within it.
96
 
Challenging more than a century of environmental thought predicated upon the 
ideology of the ―greatest good,‖ Willard questioned through rational and scientific 
means how Rocky Mountain National Park was managed. Although visitor 
satisfaction continued to play a significant role in shaping policy, the decision-making 
process was increasingly becoming a matter of public debate as concerns over 
environmental health and sustainability became part of the management dynamic.  
 
 
                                               
94
 Ibid., vi.  
95
 Ibid.   
96
 For a comprehensive look at the changing nature of environmental thought in the postwar 
era see Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the 
United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
 151 
Beyond Mission 66 
Another significant step in the process of self-reflection and evaluation RMNP 
underwent during the sixties is captured in a 1969 report entitled, ―A Study to 
Develop Criteria for Determining the Carrying Capacity of Areas Within the National 
Park System.‖97 Coauthored by a team of scholars from Colorado State University, 
this report offered an early attempt to balance the social, biological, economical, and 
ecological aspects of park management. Recognizing that ―absolute preservation is 
not possible if any volume of use is permitted and certain losses must be accepted as a 
matter of course,‖ the authors reasoned that the fundamental charge of the NPS was 




Finding a level of ―equilibrium‖ between visitor use and park health, however, 
was no simple task. At the heart of the matter was the fact that the  
satisfactions and enjoyment that use of a natural area can provide for many 
people must be weighed against the losses suffered by the biota as a 
consequence of use and development, the subsequent loss of satisfaction from 
the visit for some persons, and the visitor stress and discomfort which 




In other words, the management problem lay on a spectrum. At one end of it lay 
complete ecological integrity and zero visitation, and at the opposite end of the 
spectrum lay complete visitor use and the literal consumption of the park‘s natural 
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resources by its patrons. The National Park Service, reasoned the scholars, had a 
mandate to establish a rational and practical balance between those two poles.  
But the matter was even more complicated than that, as no agreement upon 
who should define how much use and or degradation was acceptable, existed. In 
grappling with this question, the scholars asked, ―Whose values should be accepted in 
defining carrying capacity—those of the Park Service, or those of the public? And if 
concern is to be given to a public viewpoint, which public, for the parks serve more 
than one public.‖100 Bear Lake served as a good example. According to their findings, 
Bear Lake attracted a large percentage of all park visitors. ―With luck,‖ they opined, a 
visitor is able to find a place to park but on busy days cars parked illegally along the 
roadside were a common occurrence.
101
 In a strictly numerical sense, the carrying 
capacity of Bear Lake was a direct function of available parking. 
If, however, carrying capacity sought to balance tourists and ecological 
integrity, the above calculation was unabashedly one-sided. Here, the scholars opined 
that although the parking lot was not a ―visual affront to some visitors,‖ those who 
sought ―unspoiled, little-frequented‖ alpine lakes should go elsewhere. Along Bear 
Lake‘s shore, the scholars found excessive wear evident in exposed tree roots and 
denuded soil. From an aesthetic point of view,  ―[t]he freshness of the area [was] 
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 If carrying capacity was determined strictly from this aesthetic point of view, 
Bear Lake had far exceeded it.
103
  
 Further complicating matters was the fact that different visitors chose different 
methods of experiencing the park. Although the vast majority of tourists reported that 
sightseeing was their primary objective, how visitors chose to see the sights varied 
widely. In managing a landscape for its visual appeal, the rate of speed, depth and 
field of vision and general setting were all factors that determined the emotional 
appeal of a given landscape—facts of which landscape architects had long been 
aware.
104
 ―While all may be moving much of the time,‖ found the researchers, ―it is 
one thing to see the park through the windshield of a vehicle moving at a rate of 35 
miles per hour and seeing it along the identical route from a bicycle or on foot at a 
much slower rate of movement.‖105 The differences in how one experienced the park, 
in turn, meant that ―the same user is likely to demand a higher standard of landscape 
and environmental quality when he is hiking than when he is riding though a natural 
area in an automobile.‖106  
 After reasoning through the complex set of variables involved in determining 
carrying capacity, including social, economic, aesthetic, and ecological components, 
the team put forth its recommendations. The team  recommended that park managers 
craft a definition of carrying capacity as the point at which ―[t]he capacity of an area 
                                               
102
 Ibid., 2-3.    
103
 Ibid., 3.   
104




 Ibid., 24.   
 154 
in terms of man-days (or man hours per day) of recreation use that can be tolerated 
without irreversible deterioration of the physical environment,‖ and then managing 
just shy of that point.
107
 Doing so, they contended, would protect the park‘s natural 
systems from irreversible harm, while maximizing the range of visitor use.  
 The findings of the Burnell et. al. may not sound radical today, but placed in 
their historical context, they marked a significant shift in how RMNP was 
conceptualizing its mission. Just three years following the completion of Mission 66, 
a program that overwhelmingly valued visitor use over anything approaching 
sustainable environmental practices, the NPS began to recognize that previous 
management solutions to longstanding park problems were no longer tenable.  
 As researchers were making painfully clear to park management just how 
difficult future park management was going to be, other shifts were afoot that further 
complicated management of the park. At the forefront of this process was the 
wilderness movement, which Paul Hirt analyzes in Driven Wild. According to Hirt, 
the wilderness movement was born first and foremost in response to the proliferation 
of roads and automobiles in natural places. Between the 1930s and the passage of the 
Wilderness Act in 1964, evermore Americans came to value the existence of vast 
expanses of territory where human impacts were imperceptible. The successful 
culmination of the movement as embodied in the Act clearly reflects its anti-road 
heritage. Under the Wilderness Act, cars and roads were strictly forbidden. Although 
the legislation did not deal specifically with National Parks, the Director of the NPS 
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called upon national parks to conduct studies to determine how much, if any, land 
contained within the system was suitable for wilderness designation. 
 Following the orders of the Director of the National Park Service, Rocky 
Mountain National Park Superintendent Roger Contor and his staff identified five 
units ―totaling 238,000 acres, or approximately 91 percent of the Park as suitable for 
inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System.‖108 The five areas included 
87,700 acres of the Mummy Range, 9500 acres of the eastern slopes of the 
Neversummer Range, 4300 acres between Fall River and Trail Ridge Road, 138,000 
acres south of Trial Ridge, and 2,200 acres in the southwest corner of the park.
109
  
 The first hearing on the issue reflects the tension in American society 
regarding the extension of roads in national parks. Some citizens and groups 
interested in park management in terms of ecological health and diversity supported 
wilderness designation, while others more closely aligned with the tourist industry 
opposed it. The Estes Park Chamber of Commerce (EPCC), which had a direct 
economic stake in the day-to-day operation of RMNP, represented well the opinions 
and attitudes of those opposed to wilderness designation. Speaking on behalf of the 
Chamber, Ron Railand stated bluntly, 
The fact that the Park has the authority to maintain, protect, and preserve the land 
within the perimeters of the Park, and the fact that the past Park Administrations 
have both preserved and actually improved upon the natural scenic beauties 
therein has caused many to wonder if we need to include 91 percent of Rocky 
Mountain National Park in the Wilderness Preservation System. There are 
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presently fewer horses and concessionaires in Rocky Mountain National Park now 




In the estimation of the EPCC, the NPS had done enough to protect the ecological 
integrity of the park, and little else needed to be done. Furthermore, continued 
Railand, ―[b]y Park statistics, a very small percentage of those using Rocky actually 
use present wilderness land…therefore, the Chamber wholeheartedly endorses a 
reduction in the lands being proposed as wilderness.‖111 The Chamber‘s opposition to 
wilderness designation stemmed not from an ideological opposition to what 
wilderness areas were, but rather from a fear that the good of the many who use the 
park‘s roads and built environment was being subverted for the pleasure of a small 
contingent of patrons.  
William Van Horn from High Country Stables also opposed wilderness 
designation, but for more specific economic reasons. According to Van Horn, 
wilderness designation violated RMNP‘s organic act because wilderness did not 
provide for freest use and recreational opportunity of the park.
112
 ―In fact,‖ concluded 
Van Horn, ―putting 91 percent of the park into wilderness would prohibit the Park 
Service from providing the needs of the public for which it was established.‖113 At the 
heart of Van Horn‘s concern was the fear that designating so much of RMNP as 
wilderness would curtail his ability to make a living running his livery operations in 
and around the park. 
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Whereas Van Horn, Railand and others vehemently opposed wilderness 
designation, there were many present at the hearing that supported the plan. For 
example, Raoul Bates of the National Parks and Conservation Association moved 
well beyond the NPS‘s proposals. To Bates, the best course of action included the 
closure of Fall River Road to all but mass transit and the obliteration of the road 
through Moraine Park.
114
 In calling for the removal of roads and the implementation 
of mass transit in the park, Bates‘s testimony belied much of what the EPCC and 
others found objectionable about wilderness designation. If the NPS and its 
supporters had their way, massive tracts of the park would henceforth be closed to 
roads and driving. To those with a direct economic stake in Rocky Mountain National 
Park and its reputation as a ―driving park,‖ wilderness designation represented a 
dangerous first step in challenging that reputation.  
Although Rocky Mountain National Park never received the wilderness 
designation it sought, the wilderness debate of 1974 spoke directly to shifts in how 
millions of Americans viewed the natural world and our relationship with it. When 
faced with crises of overuse and degradation as Beatrice Willard indicated, and fully 
cognizant of the complicated process of managing in a sustainable fashion, the NPS 
could no longer pursue the unabashedly expansionist response of previous decades.  
But still more visitors came to Rocky Mountain National Park, which begged 
the question of how they could be best accommodated. Between 1967 and 1978 
visitation rose from an estimated 2 million to over 3 million, an increase of more than 
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one third in barely more than a decade. Reeling from the increase, the RMNP initiated 
a shuttle system to deliver visitors to Bear Lake in 1978.
115
 By 1980, the new shuttle 
route, which made stops at the Moraine Park and Glacier Basin campgrounds before 
arriving at Bear Lake, moved more than 154,000 people through the park. An 




Although the new shuttle system brought about a marked decrease in the 
number of automobiles crawling across the park, the system was far from perfect. 
Perhaps the most vexing problem it brought about was an exaggerated use of Bear 
Lake itself. Hoping to find a more effective system that reduced the strain on Bear 
Lake, the NPS hired a Denver firm in 1979 to investigate alternatives.
117
 At the first 
public meeting on the issue, the study team put forth three management possibilities, 
including no action, dispersed visitor use, and concentrated visitor use.  
Under the dispersed visitor use plan, ―visitors to the Park would be channeled 
away from the popular use areas of Bear and Sprague Lakes and encouraged to 
explore the less-populated areas of Glacier Creek Basin.‖  The plan also called for an 
expanded shuttle system that ―would originate with a primary staging area of the west 
side of Estes Park and connect with a secondary shuttle staging areas within park 
boundaries.‖ The new bus system would ―stop frequently along Bear Lake road, 
allowing passengers to disembark and move throughout the Park on a more individual 
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basis than is currently practiced.‖ A less popular alternative—the concentrated use 
proposal—called for the funneling of visitors toward Bear and Sprague Lakes in the 
hopes of lightening the burden on other locales across the park.
 118
  
 After further study, the NPS decided upon a mixed approach to the problem of 
congestion along the Bear Lake corridor. Rather than limiting the total number of 
persons who could visit the locale on a given day, as some had argued for, the NPS 
instead sought to ―design areas to withstand large numbers of visitors‖ and to 
encourage visitors to use areas that were less popular.
119
 Accordingly, the plan called 
for a shuttle to make stops at the Park headquarters, Moraine Park Visitor Center, 
Tuxedo Park, Hallowell Park, the Glacier Basin Shuttle area, and three other stops 
along the Bear Lake Road before ending at Bear Lake.
120
 In all, the new, expanded 
transportation system was to cost an more than 3.5 million dollars, including  
$552,000 for the construction of a new staging area at the Beaver Meadows entrance, 
and shelters and benches along the route.
121
  
 The NPS also proposed construction of an additional five hundred parking 
spaces at the primary shuttle area, an expansion from 5 to 30 spaces at the Tuxedo 
Park area, 45 to 100 spaces at Sprague Lake, and an expansion from 10 to 20 spots at 
the Bierstadt Trailhead. Meanwhile, the number of parking spots at Bear Lake was 
reduced from 200 to 150, and the number of turnouts between Moraine Park and Bear 










Lake reduced from 133 to 100.
122
 Although the plan represented a massive 540 net 
gain in parking, the vast majority of those spaces were to be built at the very margins 
of the park. Inside the park, and revealing the thrust of the dispersed use plan, the 
park essentially re-allocated parking away from Bear Lake toward less popular 
destinations, and reduced the number of turnouts along the corridor by about 25%.
123
  
 Although not a perfect solution to overcrowding, congested roads, and taxed 
ecosystems, public transportation has reduced the number of automobiles traveling 
the Bear Lake corridor. Between 1987 and 2006, for example, a total of 3,661,942 
people rode the Bear Lake Loop, while 342,233 rode the Moraine Park loop. If park 
studies on passengers per car holds true at about four persons per car, the shuttle 
system had reduced the number of cars on the road over the past twenty years in the 
neighborhood of one million.  
Although the NPS has taken more steps since 1978 to address in a more 
sustainable way matters of traffic and congestion across the park, scientific study 
continue to indicate that roads and automobiles have served, and continue to serve, as 
active and significant mechanisms of environmental change. For example, during the 
2003 and 2004 seasons, Barbara Keller and Louis Bender, two researchers from the 
New Mexico Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit, studied the impact of 
traffic upon one of RMNP‘s most iconic animals—bighorn sheep. Rocky Mountain 
National Park is home to four bands of bighorn sheep, one of which lives in the area 
around the mineral lick at the Sheep Lakes. Hoping to ―interpret relations among 






bighorn sheep crossing behavior and the degree of disturbance at Sheep lakes,‖ the 
team conducted traffic counts and gathered statistical data on how many times the 
sheep tried and failed to cross the road in their attempts to access the mineral lick.
124
  
The location of the study was important for two reasons. First, the mineral lick 
at Sheep Lake is segregated from the bighorn‘s natural habitat by Fall River Road, 
which ―receives heavy recreational traffic use during the summer months, and an 
interpretive kiosk and parking lot located adjacent to Sheep Lakes may create 
additional disturbance for bighorn sheep attempting to use Sheep Lakes.‖125 Sheep 
Lake and its mineral lick are also significant in that ―Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep, 
especially pregnant or lactating ewes, seek out mineral licks from early to late 
summer to help balance the metabolic costs associated with lactation and/or replenish 
bone mineral reserves.‖126 In other words, bighorn sheep have a physiological need 
for what the Sheep Lake provides, but must cross a busy park road to access it.   
 Making matters more complicated, ample evidence exists demonstrating that 
bighorn sheep are ―particularly sensitive to disturbance and frequently avoid areas of 
high disturbance, including road corridors, water sources, and mineral licks.‖127 
Given the situation, the researchers were concerned that ―high levels of disturbance-
induced stress can cause physiological reactions in bighorn sheep in addition to 
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behavioral reactions; physiological reactions include increase heart rate, depleted 
energy reserves, adrenal gland enlargement, and increased susceptibility to 
disease.‖128 Upon the conclusion of their study, the team found ―that human and road-
related disturbance at Sheep Lakes is negatively affecting bighorn sheep use of the 
mineral site. Because use of Sheep Lakes may be important for bighorn sheep, 
especially for lamb production and survival, the negative influences of disturbance at 




As nearly all park histories point out, Mission 66 was a massive rebuilding 
program engineered to at once meet postwar demand and reassert the importance of 
parks and the NPS in the hearts and minds of Americans. Although this interpretation 
is correct, it fails to address the deeper questions of how, if at all, Mission 66 reflects 
a major transformation in how tourists experienced national parks. Driven in large 
part by the democratization of tourism in the postwar era, Mission 66 was predicated 
on the idea that the only way to save the park system was to facilitate greater use. To 
Director Wirth, who was perennially concerned with budget appropriations, high 
visitation provided the best means to sustain a high level of public, and thereby 
political, support. This philosophy greatly impacted the more specific Mission 66 
program in Rocky Mountain National Park. To Superintendent James Lloyd, the most 




 Ibid., 2. 
 163 
practical way to sustain maximum travel without greatly harming the park‘s natural 
beauty was to make it primarily a ―day-use‖ park. Together, these two concepts—
maximum visitation and day-use—greatly reshaped the character of RMNP. Whether 
one looks at the building of roads and picnic spots, the use of interpretive signs and 
visitor centers, or the elimination of private holdings within the park, it is clear that 
Mission 66 worked to recast the park experience, making it at once less personal and 
more expedient. 
The growth of annual visitation, something the NPS planned and hoped for, 
continued to pose problems in the decades following Mission 66. Unlike previous 
management eras, however the NPS faced a much different political and social 
geography during and after Mission 66 than it had in previous decades. The need to 
accommodate evermore visitors has persisted, but the NPS has found it increasingly 
difficult to simply expand infrastructure to meet those demands. At the heart of this 
difficulty lay mounting evidence that the previous management approach to moving 
people through the park was destabilizing and, in some cases, destroying the very 
resources the NPS sought to protect. Coincidentally, fundamental shifts in how 
Americans understood the natural world were also well underway that further 
complicated Wirth‘s approach to park management. The co-evolution of these two 
trends meant that the NPS had to seek options beyond infrastructure expansion to 
accommodate tourists.  
According to a transportation study conducted in 2000, the park currently 
receives more than three million visitors per year, with growth rates of 33% expected 
 164 
during the summer months by 2020. Even more ominous, as year round recreation in 
and around the park continues to gain popularity the study predicted a growth in 
overall park visitation of some 45% by 2020. In raw numbers, that equates to 4.9 
million annual visitors by that year.
130
 Although RMNP has undertaken several 
expensive projects to ameliorate the impact of high traffic volume upon the park 
itself, growing visitation will continue to pose management problems in the future. 
For generations, the NPS built national parks to attract the driving public in order to 
bolster visitation and ensure the future survival of their agency and the lands they 
administered. In RMNP at least, this strategy has worked exactly as hoped. However, 
the mantra of continued growth has created a catch-22 as much of the plant and 
animal life protected within the national park was negatively impacted through the 
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Chapter Four 








Wicker creels bursting at the seams, stringers of fish pulled taut between the 
proud hands of an angler, trout ordered by size and laid thoughtfully upon the 
summer‘s green grass: these are all images that were part and parcel of the fishing 
heritage of early Colorado. Such scenes were memorialized in photos and tucked 
away in shoe boxes and photo albums, later to provide entertainment and reflection 
on a winter day too cold to fish.
1
  
Beyond the obvious story of a successful day with rod in hand, these images 
also tell a deeper, and perhaps more significant story. The image above, featuring at 
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least 16 individual trout, tells us something about the relationship between a 
fisherman and his quarry. The photo, we must remember, was staged. We can assume 
first that this day was an exceptionally successful one. We also can at least infer that 
simply catching the fish was not enough. The fisherman was compelled to keep some 
or perhaps all of the fish he (or she) caught, and memorialize them in this photo.  
This photo also speaks to an ecological revolution playing out in the state‘s 
waters well before the turn of the century. Due to the fact that the picture is not in 
color, it is difficult to ascertain with much certainty the type of trout spilling from the 
creel. Although it is possible that they are rainbow trout (Salmo mykiss), a fish 
introduced first from the waters of California, they may also be greenback cutthroat 
(Oncorhynchus clarki stomias) or Colorado River cutthroat (Oncorhynchus clarki 
pleuriticus). What is fairly certain, however, is that the fish perched atop the wicker 
basket—the one above all others—is an eastern brook trout (Salvelinus fontinalis). 
The spot pattern on the fish‘s side and the white tipped fin on his underside tell us as 
much. And as the name implies, the brook trout is no native of Colorado.  
Historians have paid increasing attention to the development and management 
of aquatic resources. The literature regarding waters that hold (or held) robust 
populations of palatable species have received by far the most attention from 
scholars, and for good reason. The human appetite for salmon, sardines, anchovies, 
crab, oysters, lobster, and other water-dwelling creatures has played an important role 
in the development of coastal and inland communities, spurred the growth and 
maturation of industrial fishing techniques, fostered the establishment of laws, 
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regulations, and governing bodies to manage such resources, and oftentimes led to the 
decimation of the resource itself.  
 A good deal of the scholarship pertaining to fisheries views them as a type of 
―commons.‖ The term, which received a great deal of attention following the 1968 
publication of Garrett Hardin‘s essay entitled ―The Tragedy of the Commons,‖ is 
often used as short-hand to refer to a situation in which a resource is shared by many 
users, and owned by none. According to Hardin‘s essay, under such circumstances 
there is no mechanism to mediate the individual‘s tendency to maximize the resource 
because the costs of resource exploitation are not paid by the individual user, but are 
distributed to the group of users.  In situations where a commons exists, Hardin 
argued, ―[r]uin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best
 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.‖2 
 One of the most useful and insightful applications of Hardin‘s delineation of 
the concept came with the 1986 publication of Arthur McEvoy‘s The Fisherman’s 
Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries 1850-1980.
3
 Although 
McEvoy is quick to distance his work from the simple mechanistic process laid forth 
in Hardin‘s essay, the end result of California fisheries management is essentially the 
same—the once plentiful salmon, anchovy, and other fishes become less and less so. 
Although the narrative trajectory follows Hardin‘s tragedy model, the processes 
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through which the fishery was degraded differs in significant ways from Hardin‘s 
pastoral example. 
 More than a simple moral tale in which resource users unabashedly pursued 
their own pecuniary interest (though that theme does run throughout the work), 
McEvoy demonstrates that the causes for the fishery‘s decline are much more 
complex. At the core of the process lay the interactions between regulations and 
regulatory agencies, technological development, scientific understanding, the biology 
of the fish themselves, as well as the ecosystems of which they are a part. Although 
McEvoy demonstrates a range of factors contributing to the decline of the fisheries, 
the most significant was the development of industrial harvesting techniques and the 
growth of ever-widening markets for the ocean‘s bounty. Regulation intended to 
protect the resource from the ravages of rapid industrial development did come about, 
but infighting and organizational self-interest hamstrung such efforts until the 
resource was of almost no value. Only once the resource was significantly depleted 
and relatively little at stake was this ―commons‖ more intently regulated.4  
 Also interested in the history of aquatic resource management is Joseph 
Taylor.
5
 Whereas McEvoy was primarily interested in the development of regulation 
on the high seas, Taylor‘s Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the 
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Northwest Fisheries Crisis takes more interest in the management and 
mismanagement of salmon in the rivers of the Pacific Northwest. The stated aim of 
Taylor‘s book is to demonstrate that the ―history of the salmon crisis is far more 
complicated than most stories admit,‖ and to show that ―the preferred political and 
technological strategies have perpetuated, rather than resolved, problems.‖6 Taylor 
also demonstrates that the sometimes precipitous declining salmon runs do not 
amount to events, but rather are the culmination of long, contested, and complicated 
processes that entail ecological, institutional, cultural, and economic components.  
Setting Taylor‘s work apart from McEvoy‘s is his interest in fish culture as a 
tool employed to allow uninhibited resource harvest while attempting to mediate the 
environmental costs.  According to Taylor, this approach to the fisheries problem in 
the Pacific Northwest was rooted firmly in the ascendancy of science generally, and 
fish culture specifically. On this point, Taylor demonstrates the many ways that fish 
culture—as opposed to more stringent regulation—promised a politically palatable 
solution to the problem of declining fisheries.  In the end, Taylor‘s work reminds us 
of the dangers involved in adopting a mechanistic view of nature, and of assuming 
that expedient political and technological solutions can provide effective management 
for complex environmental problems.  
Reflecting the influences of both Richard White and McEvoy, Taylor urges 
readers to adopt a bit of the geographer‘s perspective and understand rivers as spaces 
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with specific—and often contested—social meaning.7 Understanding rivers thus, 
argues Taylor, ―helps us to envision complex cultural and material relationships 
people have developed toward salmon and salmon environments.‖8 More specifically, 
Taylor demonstrates—much as White does through his Organic Machine and 
McEvoy does through The Fishermen’s Problem—that race, ethnicity, and economic 
culture are all factors that significantly shape how resource users define themselves in 
relationship to the resource, and how they come to define what constitutes proper 
resource use.  
Scholars like McEvoy, Taylor, White and many others have done a great deal 
to deepen our understanding of the historical development of fisheries resources in 
the United States. Perhaps more than anything else, their work sheds valuable light 
upon the development of industrial resource extraction, and the political and 
technological attempts to ameliorate the effects of that development.  So what, if 
anything, can be added to our body of knowledge about fisheries management by 
investigating the waters in and around Rocky Mountain National Park? 
Much of the value to be found in the study of national parks stems from the 
fact that their creation reflects a process through which a particular place is given 
unique social meaning. Regardless of the particular reasons a park is founded—and 
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they are as many as there are parks—every western national park was created at least 
in part to exclude the widespread industrial development of the resources that lie 
therein. The very act of creating a national park delineates in specific detail what sort 
of activities are welcomed within that space and which are not. The general exclusion 
of activities such as mining, timber cutting, hunting, and commercial fishing within 
parks provides historians with an opportunity to investigate those aspects of resource 
use not tied to commercial resource extraction. In this sense, parks represent a sort of 
laboratory where the number of historical variables are controlled through the 
creation of the park itself.  
From an ecological point of view, the story of fisheries management in and 
around what would become RMNP is one of decline and degradation. What sets it 
apart from those studies previously mentioned, however, is the fact that even before 
that establishment of the park—and certainly afterward—widespread commercial 
exploitation of the fisheries resources did not exist. Yet, native fish were driven to the 
brink of extinction, and the structure and function of aquatic communities were 
greatly altered. But if the cause of such transformations was not predominantly a 
function of commercial fishing, dam building, or agriculture as is often the case, to 
what do we attribute this environmental change? The answer—though complicated—
stems primarily from the development of tourism in Colorado and its ability to greatly 
alter those landscapes where it predominates.   
Well before the dawn of the twentieth century, local and regional boosters, 
railroad companies, and eventually the National Park Service all advertised and 
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promised great trout fishing along the Front Range and in the Rocky Mountains. In 
relatively short order the advertising campaign showed signs of success as evermore 
fishermen plied Colorado waters. As more people traveled to Colorado to fish, 
concern over diminishing angler success grew, prompting many to look for solutions.  
Not willing or able to strictly regulate daily catches, but still hoping to continue 
growing tourism across the state, the state of Colorado, Estes Park residents, and the 
National Park Service turned almost exclusively toward technical solutions to 
fisheries decline that contained significant social, political, and economic 
components.  
Their embrace of science was understandable. Fish culture, which had been 
growing in popularity and prestige in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
offered an appealing solution. If interested parties could hatch and rear a high volume 
of fish annually, rivers, streams, and lakes would teem with fish and continue to draw 
hopeful fishermen. To those involved in the early history of fisheries management in 
and around RMNP the problem was a simple one of supply and demand. 
Understanding the situation thus, a range of organizations and agencies planted 
billions of nonnative species attractive to fishermen including the rainbow trout, 
brown trout (Salmo trutta), and brook trout.  
The embrace of science in growing fish for ―stocking‖ or ―planting‖—terms 
that reveal much about how managers viewed fish—created as many problems as it 
did solutions, though contemporaries did not yet have the scientific understanding to 
realize it at the time. More than planting fish that were easy to rear and ones that 
 173 
anglers prized, managers unknowingly stocked fish that held a variety of competitive 
advantages over the native greenback cutthroat trout. Within a few decades, the once 
plentiful greenback was losing ground in the streams and lakes across the state as 
brook trout and others became more common.  
 
Oncorhynchus clarki stomias 
 An estimated 100 million years ago the predecessor of the cutthroat began 
developing into the family Salmonidae. Some 40 million years ago during the Eocene 
that family diverged into three subfamilies including ―Coregoninai (whitefishes), 
Thymillinae (graylings), and Salmoninae (trouts, salmon, and chars.)‖9 These three 
subfamilies continued to evolve through climate and geologic transformations, 
resulting in part in the modern day cutthroat trout, which is comprised of eleven 
subspecies.
10
 According to prevailing scientific theory, the evolution of cutthroat 
subspecies was largely a function of isolated populations of cutthroat inhabiting 
distinct aquatic environments  
 The present-day state of Colorado encompasses a vast range of cutthroat 
habitat and was home to at least four different native cutthroat subspecies, including 
the Colorado River, the now extinct yellowfin (Salmo clarki macdonaldi), Rio 
Grande (Salmo clarki virginalis), and the greenback. Each of these fish, having 
evolved in different environments, vary in color, size, average number of gill rakers, 
                                               
9
 Patrick C. Trotter, Cutthroat: Native Trout of the West (Boulder: Colorado Associated 
Press, 1987), 21.  
10
 Ibid., 17. See also chapter 2, ―Cutthroat Evolution and Prehistoric Distribution.‖ 
 174 
pyloric caeca (fingerlike appendages of the intestine), and scale counts. Of the four 
cutthroats listed above, the greenback alone lurked in the eddies and ripples of the 




Although casual observation may not reveal it, trout are a territorial animal. 
According to fisheries biologists the social unit of trout is a ―hierarchy with 
infrequent subordinate revolt,‖ meaning that the most dominant fish gains access to 
that portion of a stream that is food rich, while less dominant ones vie for control of 
less productive sections. On occasion, subordinate fish take part in ―agonistic 
behavior‖ that is intended to root a high-ranking fish from its position. This behavior 
generally falls into two categories, and seems to be understood by trout regardless of 
subspecies. In some cases, the upstart fish will employ a ―frontal threat display,‖ 
which entails approaching an adversary from the front, with ―dorsal fin flat, all other 
fins fully extended, mouth opened, and the bottom of the mouth pushed downward.‖12 
In other cases, a fish might rely upon a ―lateral threat display,‖ in which it exposes its 
side, ―stretches out its body and assumes a rigid pose…with all fins, including the 
dorsal, fully extended.‖13 Of the two tactics, scientists believe that the frontal display 
is the more aggressive of the two, as it ―more often than not ends in an attack the 
threatening fish moving in to nip or chase its opponent.‖14 The reward for successful 
posturing and chasing is access to the foods greenbacks prefer, including adult 
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Hymenoptera (ants, bees, and wasps) and Diptera (flies), and other terrestrial and 
aquatic invertebrates like stone and caddis flies.
15
  
 In most cases, greenbacks spawn in the spring when water temperatures reach 
5-8C. Since greenback spawning is tied directly to water temperature, and since so 
much of their historic range within Colorado Rockies includes both high and mid-
elevation waters, spawning times vary widely according to location. In warm lower 
waters, for example, greenback populations may spawn as early as April, while others 
do not spawn until mid-July.
16
 As the fish begin sensing the coming of the spawn, 
male fish jockey for breeding position, (well before the actual arrival of females), 
near those places where females tend to spawn. As the adult breeding male fish fight 
for access to the spawning location, the female fish turn onto their sides over gravel 
and sand and flutter in place to prepare the spawning bed (called a redd) with their 
tails. Once the redd is in order, ―through some mechanism of male supremacy and 
female decision, one dominant male will move in alongside the female over the 
redd.‖17 At this time, the fish partake in a ―dramatic dance in unison‖ as the female 
releases her eggs and the male his milt (sperm). Following this remarkable display, 
the female covers the eggs and often remains in place, guarding her redd from other 
fish for several days.
18
  
 Following successful fertilization and hatching, the lifecycle of the greenback 
begins anew, with the smallest fish working day and night to become larger, more 
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dominant ones. Depending on water conditions, within a couple of years greenbacks 
reach sexual maturity, and the process begins again. Unlike other subspecies of 
cutthroat, the greenbacks do not attain a large size, with one and two pound fish 
common.
19
 The life cycle of the greenback played out year after year for millennia 
prior to the arrival of white Americans.  
 
Angling for Anglers  
As early as the 1860s, writers in a variety of publications recognized and 
amplified the great fishing to be found in the present-day state of Colorado. Their 
words offer an entertaining blend of fact and boosterism so common in frontier 
writing of the 19
th
 century. Eager to draw settlers in their bid for statehood, 
newspapers often ran stories that spoke of the unlimited natural bounty the territory 
offered. In addition to lauding the great agricultural or mineral opportunities of the 
state-to-be—both of which played upon the hopes and anxieties of an American 
populace interested in fee-simple titles and throbbing veins of gold—such papers also 
tapped into the roots of the nascent tourist industry. Take, for example, an article in 
the Rocky Mountain News penned in 1868. According to the author, ―[t]routing was 
never better than at present, it being an easy task to take with a hook, from thirty to 
fifty pounds a day from almost any stream in this neighborhood. The fish are also 
especially large and fat, varying from three quarters of a pound to three pounds 
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each.‖20 Just two years prior to the state‘s founding, another writer claimed to have 
wandered throughout the Rocky Mountains where he had ―never seen such an 
abundance of fine trout in any of the mountain streams, as in the Grand river and its 
branches.‖ In some locations, the author boasted, like Troublesome Creek, ―one could 
catch with a hook two hundred to three hundred pounds of fine trout in a single 
day.‖21   
Word of such wonderful catches spread quickly, and soon those with the 
means and desire to fish in the territory were making the trip. Fall River, located in 
present-day Rocky Mountain National Park, was an especially popular destination. 
According to one eye-witness who visited the region in 1874, ―Fall River has its full 
share of tourists,‖ with an estimated two hundred crossing into Middle Park ―so far 
this season.‖ Beyond great fishing and striking scenery, Estes Park also had the power 
to impart to ―young ladies a golden bloom upon their cheeks‖ from ―a bit of captured 
sunshine that they can‘t catch in the east.‖22 
Perhaps attracted by stories of great fishing—or thoughts of golden-cheeked 
ladies blooming in the summer sun—C.F. Orvis (founder of one of the longest-lived 
producers of fly fishing accoutrements) made the trip to Estes Park in 1875. Although 
Orvis recalled encountering many tourists along Fall River and in Horseshoe Park, 
the waters were not yet ―fished out.‖ In fact, recounted Orvis, the ―trout struck and I 
landed them so fast that the sport began to be monotonous.‖ He had filled his creel by 
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noon. Later, Orvis encountered his companion who had filled a sixteen-pound lard 
can with his catches and carried an additional ―dozen upon a stick.‖23                   
While fishing tourists gathered streamside in search of the plentiful trout for 
sport, others were catching fish for other reasons. In Middle Park, for instance, fear 
that the sucker (likely Catostomus platyrhynchus) was sucking up trout eggs during 
the spawn prompted writers of Forest and Stream to boast that the ―pest is being 
rapidly stamped out.‖ To eradicate the unwanted species, the article recounted that 
fishermen were ―seining in the late fall and early spring, when [suckers] congregate in 
deep holes, and can be scooped out, sometimes by the ton.‖ Ridding the streams of 
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Common scene reflecting bountiful catch.  
(Courtesy of the Denver Public Library, circa 1910) 
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Colorado of a fish that allegedly threatened the state‘s valuable population of trout 
also offered participants the opportunity to make a little extra money. Once removed 
from the region‘s lakes and streams, the fish were ―marketable in the mining camps at 
from ten to twenty-five cents per pound.‖ Careful to allay fears that such activity 
would also result in the capture of trout, the author added that ―[s]eining, netting, or 
trapping trout is prohibited by law, but a trout can seldom be caught when seining for 
suckers.‖24 
Streams teeming with trout were valuable to the state‘s economy for other 
reasons as well. The ―beautiful speckled trout,‖ wrote the Rocky Mountain News, 
―should be recognized as contributing its share to the welfare of the state, not only in 
drawing the Eastern sportsman hither, but for its love for the country‘s pest,‖ the 
grasshopper. Trout, argued the Rocky Mountain News, ate a substantial number of 
grasshoppers each year, and thereby contributed to the health of the state‘s farming 
sector. Accordingly, the paper was most alarmed that ―hundreds of thousands of trout 
have been sold in the Denver market alone, during this year, bringing but a few 
hundred dollars at most to the fishermen, and removing ‗hospitable graves‘ from 
millions of grasshoppers to come.‖ Turning to Eastern states that enjoyed a longer 
angling tradition, the paper advised Colorado to look to their experiences of rapid fish 
depopulation as a warning of things to come in the state.
25
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 Although fishing clubs in northeastern states had already showed signs of 
moving away from fishing practices firmly rooted in the capture and retention of as 
many fish as possible, nothing of the kind yet existed in Colorado.
26
 Rather, well into 
the twentieth century a fishermen‘s success or failure on a given day was often judged 
entirely by the number and size of fish he caught. Encouraging, reinforcing, and 
reflecting this tradition, some resorts in and around Estes Park offered prizes to 
patrons for catching the most fish. During the summer of 1882, for example, 
Sprague‘s Ranch held a competition for most fish caught in a single day.  One man 
reportedly caught 160 trout, while the winner of the contest, Rev. George L. Spinning 
of Cleveland, Ohio, won by catching 197 trout. For his efforts, Reverend Spinning 
returned to Cleveland with the assurance that he was indeed a great fisherman as well 
as with a ―leather medal, beautifully painted and artistically designed by Miss Crissie 
of St. Louis.‖27  
By one estimate, during the summer season as many as one thousand trout 
were removed daily from Fall River, the Big Thompson, and other waters around 
Estes Park. Given that catches of forty or fifty fish a day were commonly reported 
(and depicted), and given that several accounts exist that mention that there were 
―many people scattered through the park‖ and that ―camps are to be found on all the 
trout streams,‖ a loss of a thousand fish per day does not seem an entirely inflated 
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 Such high catch rates led many to fear that the waters in the region would 
soon be ―fished out,‖ and thus compel the traveling angler to seek more pristine 
waters to practice his art. To prevent the depletion of the state‘s fish stock and the 
loss of tourist revenue, the state and several local individuals looked to the artificial 
propagation of fish as the answer.  
 
Colonizing Colorado’s Waters 
The development of artificial fish propagation in Colorado was part of a 
broader national embrace of fish culture during the same period.  According to Joseph 
Taylor, the development of fish culture in the United States came ―in response to 
declining fisheries in the eastern United States,‖ where industrialization and 
agriculture ―had driven many Atlantic salmon and shad runs into sharp decline or 
extinction during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.‖29 Responding to 
a declining resource base, those with the means and motivation to get involved turned 
to the creation of more fish as the answer.
30
   
Lacking the scientific knowledge and the capital required to make artificial 
propagation successful, interested parties pushed for the creation of a government 
agency to spearhead the movement. In response, Congress established the United 
States Commission on Fish and Fisheries (USFC) in 1871, and ―the federal 
government assumed a more visible policy-making position‖ in the realm of fisheries 
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 Although the USFC was originally created to conduct scientific 
research on fisheries issues, it struggled mightily through its first years. Spencer 
Baird, its first director, desperate to secure a future for his fledgling organization, 
embraced technology generally and fish culture specifically in his bid to protect 
fisheries and promote his organization. As Taylor demonstrates, the tactic worked 
well in making the USFC the leading force in promoting fish culture.
32
  
To establish further the USFC as a valuable tool in the struggle to restore 
failing fish stocks, Baird hired Livingstone Stone as assistant commissioner to 
oversee operations on the Pacific Coast.
33
 For his part, Stone was an active proponent 
of fish culture, and a ―leading authority on salmon propagation.‖34 In addition to 
Stone, the USFC hired others who also embraced fish culture—as opposed to more 
stringent regulation—as the key to fisheries restoration and management. James 
Milner, who was hired to investigate the failing Great Lakes fisheries in 1871 and 
1872, was also a proponent of fish culture. In relatively short order, the rank and file 
of the USFC had come to fully support fish rearing and stocking as the most practical, 
efficient, and expedient means to ―fix‖ failing fisheries around the country.  35  
In response to fears that Colorado would soon lose its valuable reputation as a 
fisherman‘s paradise, the state also embraced the solutions proffered by the USFC 
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and initiated a program of artificial fish propagation (stocking) in 1871. Over the 
course of more than one hundred years, the state and other entities would stock the 
waters of Colorado with billions of fish, a large percentage of which were non-native 
species. While a modern-day environmentalist may cringe at the thought of a 
government agency dedicated almost wholly to the introduction of non-native 
species, contemporaries saw things much differently. Lacking anything like the 
―ecological awareness‖ we have today, those who stocked the waters of Colorado saw 
themselves as taking an active part in improving the state‘s waters through the 
application of science and expertise. More trout, of whatever variety, meant more 
excitement with rod and reel, and that translated nicely into more tourists.  
Pumping trout into the state‘s waters required science, money, and expertise—
all of which the newly formed state was acquiring by the 1880s. In his Biennial 
Report to the State, Colorado Fish Commissioner Wilson Sisty assured readers in 
1880 that although ―there was a time when the successful propagation of fish, by 
artificial means, for the purpose of re-stocking depopulated waters, or waters that 
never contained fish, was questionable,‖ that time had passed. Using state-of-the-art 
techniques, the time was ripe for the ―Centennial State…[to] take advantage of and 
profit by the practical and successful results laid before her by do many fish-farming 
States.
36
 To achieve the desired results, the state required a ―hatching house‖ and a 
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supply of eggs, which were to be procured from ―the East and West in large 
quantities‖ in order to ―plant the young fish throughout the waters of the State.‖37   
 In a few short years, Sisty‘s vision became a reality with the construction of 
the state‘s first hatchery in 1881. By 1886 the ten-year-old state implemented a 
stocking policy that lasted for decades to come. According to Fish Commissioner 
John Pierce, the state gave preference to distributing young trout to ―streams which 
were in the vicinity of the leading places of resort.‖ Of special importance in such 
efforts was Estes Park, which was ―situated on the head waters of both the St. Vrain 
and Big Thompson‖ and was the ―best point from which to stock both these 
magnificent streams.‖  According to the Commissioner‘s recommendations, ―Fifty 
thousand young trout ought to go into this park every year.‖ Revealing the economic 
calculus behind the stocking policy, Piece stated that ―even if every fish planted at 
such points as these is caught each year, it will pay the State to keep on putting them 
in.‖38   
 News of great fishing continued to spread through the 1880s and evermore 
fishermen headed to Colorado to investigate. A Sports Afield article entitled ―Trout 
Fishing in Estes Park‖ contended that no ―point within easy reach from Denver offers 
greater inducements to the fisherman than Estes Park.‖ Here, claimed the author, trout 
―seemed to be everywhere and of all sizes.‖ More than puffing the region‘s angling, 
Sports Afield also unknowingly spoke to the ecological revolution taking place in the 
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waters around Estes Park. As late as the 1870s a fisherman in Fall River or Horseshoe 
Park would expect to catch only greenback cutthroat, called ―natives‖ by 
contemporaries, or the red-horse sucker, a bottom feeding ―trash fish‖ also native to 
the region.  By the 1890s, however, Sports Afield reported that fishermen visiting the 
region could expect to catch ―the mountain trout‖ and ―his Eastern cousin,‖ which 
sported ―red spots and pugnacity that go with them.‖ This pugnacious fish with red 
spots was the brook trout—a nonnative species that government agencies eager to 
keep catches high and tourism strong introduced into Western waters.
39
 In the same 
Sports Afield article, the writer referred to interspecies competition for food raging in 
waters where both brook and native lived, stating that the brook trout was ―present to 
contest with the native for possession of the fictitious food that trailed behind the 
treacherous and almost invisible snell.‖40 Although the writer is referring to 
competition for an artificial lure, it would take no great leap of the imagination to 
conclude that the two species were competing for all food types. And indeed they 
were.  
While no one at the time was aware, the brook trout holds several biological 
advantages over greenbacks. Whereas greenbacks spawn in the spring and early 
summer, brook trout spawn in the fall. In turn, this means that ―young-of-the-year‖ 
(YOY) brook trout have already hatched and begun growing well before most 
greenbacks even emerge from the ova. For trout, especially those inhabiting streams 
and rivers, a fish‘s size is directly tied to its ability to inhabit those portions of the 
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water column where food is the most plentiful and the caloric expenditure of 
maintaining that position minimal. Due to the differentiation in spawning times, more 
YOY brook trout are able to occupy more advantageous stream positions. Underwater 
observation and analysis conducted in RMNP‘s Hidden Valley Creek, for example, 
found that in those instances where greenback inhabited an overlapping section of 
stream with brook trout (in sympatry), greenbacks held stream positions with higher 
focal point velocities, meaning that the current at their snouts exerted more force. 
They also found that in sympatry with brook trout greenback juveniles occupied 
positions further from cover. In the absence of brook trout (called allopatry), 
however, greenback juveniles were able to move to stream locations with lower focal 
point velocities closer to cover.
41
  The higher focal point positions assumed by YOY 
greenback mean that they are forced to exert more energy—i.e. burn more calories—
in order to feed themselves. This disadvantage, in turn, results in ―decreased growth 
and lower overwinter survival for YOY cutthroat trout.‖42 This process, played out 
year after year, pushed greenback cutthroats to the very margins of existence. 
Unaware and unconcerned with the displacement of native fish by non-
natives, Fish Commissioner J.S. Swan confidently claimed in 1898 that as ―a result of 
the restocking of the clear streams of the state, most of such streams are now well 
supplied with trout, and Colorado in consequence has lost nothing of its reputation as 
being the country of beautiful streams from which the expert with the rod, line and fly 
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is always rewarded with a good string of the speckled beauties.‖ There were 
exceptions, however. The ―beautiful White and Bear rivers, in Rio Blanco and Routt 
counties, and some of the tributaries to the head waters of the Grand River‖ had once 
been ―the finest fishing streams in the state,‖ but three decades of unregulated fishing 
had ―depleted them to a large extent.‖ Also to blame in diminishing the quality of 
these fisheries was the distance they lay from railroads and the overall ―difficulty in 
successfully transporting fry to replenish them.‖43   
 The state was not alone in its efforts to maintain quality fisheries across the 
state. Several railroad lines that operated in Colorado also participated in the stocking 
program. Like state officials, the railroads recognized that it was in their business 
interest to promote and protect the growing reputation of Colorado as a great 
―trouting‖ destination. According to Fish Commissioner J.S. Swan, railroads 
transported young fish throughout the state free of charge.
44
 In 1905 alone, Outdoor 
Life estimated that some 3,000,000 more trout had ―been planted in streams along the 
Denver & Rio Grande railroad this year than [were] planted in 1903.‖  According to 
railroad officials, ―The Denver & Rio Grande [was] doing all in its power to keep the 
streams and lakes along its line well stocked with trout.‖ Their stocking efforts, which 
grew annually, gave the Denver & Rio Grande spokesmen confidence that there was 
no cause to worry that the supply of ―fish in the state was decreasing.‖45  
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Also concerned with the negative consequences of over-fishing on the 
region‘s economy, a group of Estes Park citizens drew together under the banner of 
the Estes Park Protective and Improvement Association (EPPIA) in 1895. It is no 
accident that among the organization‘s founders were Estes Park residents whose 
livelihood was based upon tourist revenue, including local resort owner and newly 
elected EPPIA president Abner Sprague. In the broadest terms, the organization was 
dedicated to preventing the ―destruction of the fish in the rivers of the Park, the illegal 
killing of game, and the destruction of the timber by camp fires.‖ Responding to what 
they perceived as a ―mania among parties, to catch the greatest number of trout‖ in a 
single day, the EPPIA sought to implore fishermen to leave the smaller fish in the 
streams so that they might grow large enough to use for food.
46
  
As was the case with the USFC and the state of Colorado, Estes Park residents 
understood the fisheries problem largely as one of limited supply.  The key to 
drawing a steady stream of fishermen toward the budding community lay, at least in 
part, in ensuring a reliable and robust supply of fish. To accomplish this, the EPPIA 
contributed to protecting and enhancing the bounty of the waters around Estes Park 
through the private construction of a private fish hatchery. According to the Estes 
Park Trail, the EPPIA realized that rivers packed with fish ―would be one of the 
greatest advertising features of the Park‖ and thus began drumming up public support 
for the idea.
47
 Raising money for the endeavor posed a challenge to the small 
community, but many local businessmen threw their support behind a project that 
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promised measurable returns.  Through a series of dances, bazaars, and vaudeville 
shows, the EPPIA raised more than nine hundred dollars for the completion of the 
project, and construction began in 1907.
48
  
 Estes Park did not rely solely on its own citizens for the completion of the 
project, however. In a letter penned to the Editor of the Longmont Ledger, local hotel 
man Peter Hondius stated that the original cost of the project had been miscalculated, 
and more funds were needed. In what reads like a veiled threat to the downstream 
community of Longmont, Hondius stated that hatching of the first batch of 500,000 
trout would begin in July, and in a few short years they would have ―the best fishing 
in Colorado, and the best hatchery also.‖ The streams, claimed Hondius, ―will be 
stocked from our hatchery and many of them will find their way down stream, but the 
extent of this will depend somewhat of course, on what support and appreciation is 
manifested from Longmont.‖ It is unclear exactly how Hondius and others planned to 
keep fish stocked in the Big Thompson from heading downstream to Longmont if 
they so chose. Perhaps revealing his desperation, Hondius closed his letter by 
emphatically stating that ―A greater Estes Park is also worth much to Longmont. I 
trust you and Mr. Lester together can get a goodly amount of cash for us. We need it; 
need lots of it, and need it soon.‖  
Responding to Hondius‘s pleas, the Ledger admonished readers that, although 
―residents in the Park and Loveland have subscribed as liberally as could be 
expected…Longmont has yet to subscribe her share.‖ Playing upon the same 
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economic concerns that worked so well in Estes Park, the Ledger assured Longmont 
residents that every ―dollar of the fund collected will be wisely and judiciously 
expended, and all streams in the Park will be open for general fishing.‖ In closing, the 
paper reminded residents that it was in their best economic interests to ―support…a 
plan so practical and beneficial to this section of the country.‖49   
 Completed in 1907, the facility was a ―model of efficiency‖ and had the 
capacity to hatch 500,000 eggs at a time, three times per year. The building and 
equipment needed for the hatchery cost $3,252, of which $2,640 came in the form of 
cash donations, while $712 came in the form of time donated. The EPPIA also raised 
funds and built a ―superintendent‘s cottage‖ on the site to house the person in charge 
of maintaining the facility.
50
 During its first five years of operation, the Estes Park 
Hatchery (EPH) stocked rainbow, brook, and cutthroat (likely Colorado River 
cutthroat and/or Yellowstone cutthroat). Proud of the accomplishments of the local 
organization, the Trail claimed that the EPH was responsible for stocking more than 
six million fish in the vicinity of Estes Park during its first five years in operation. 
Although the number paled in comparison to the estimated eight billion the federal 
government planted nationwide, the addition of millions of fish to the waters 
promised good fishing for even the novice fisherman.
51
  
The Trail was also impressed with the fact that the local hatchery had 
―transported fish from other waters, and even from foreign countries‖ and introduced 
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them to Colorado streams. As was the case with the State of Colorado, the EPH 
planted a large percentage of non-native trout such as brook, rainbow, and brown. 
The reasons for doing so were many, and worthy of discussion.
52
 On one hand, 
obtaining ―native‖ eggs or fry was a difficult endeavor. Still lacking hatcheries in 
Yellowstone and Glacier, both of which would later provide the state of Colorado 
with Yellowstone cutthroat eggs, the state substituted available trout—like the 
rainbow, brook, and brown—for greenbacks. It was also more difficult to raise 
greenbacks in hatcheries than other strains of trout. For instance, the federal fish 
hatchery in Leadville attempted to hatch and raise greenback cutthroat, but found that 
they did not ―adapt well to captive rearing.‖ Making matters worse, many locals 
despised the location of the hatchery‘s spawning traps in the Twin Lakes and used 
dynamite to remove them.
53
 Over time, the availability of other strains of trout 
combined with the difficulty in rearing greenbacks, resulting in a stocking policy that 
favored non-native fish over native ones.  
But more was at work here than planting available fish. In part, those stocking 
the waters of Colorado were responding to the wishes of their clientele. A large 
percentage of those who sojourned in Estes Park came from the northeast, as had 
been the case with Orvis and his companion. The brook trout that the state introduced 
to Colorado waters as early as the 1880s (and that the EPH actively stocked) was fish 
native to northeastern states. The fish was the subject of a body of fly fishing 
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literature that held it in high esteem for its beauty, fighting ability, and willingness to 
―rise to the fly.‖ The rapid decline of brook trout habitat along the eastern seaboard in 
the 19
th
 century prompted stocking efforts to replenish the fish across the East.
54
 
Planting fish Eastern anglers were familiar with and perhaps ―missed‖ into Colorado 
waters solved two problems at once. Brook trout provided Colorado with a rapidly 
breeding, easily reared fish, and one that was also familiar and highly prized by the 
very same anglers the state of Colorado hoped to attract.  
Stocking a variety of desirable trout species also enabled those who stood to 
benefit from the fishing tourist to market their waters as offering a diversity of fishing 
opportunities.  According to the Trail,  
the hatchery in Estes Park was built and operated with spring 
water for the express purpose of pleasing the fishermen who 
come to the mountains to spend the summer. If they have a 
preference for a particular variety of the trout they can find it 
by going to the right location on the stream for it.  
 
If, for instance, a fisherman desired to angle for the much lauded rainbow trout, then 
―the canon (sic) is where he should spend his time, for there is where the rainbow can 
be found.‖ The rainbow, which is a native of the West Coast of California and 
Oregon, was highly prized by fishermen for its tenacity, beauty, and taste. Rainbows, 
boasted the Trail, had been ―introduced into our waters through artificial 
propagation‖ and were readily available throughout the region. If, however, a person 
desired to catch a brook trout, which had ―been transplanted from the New England 
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States‖ to these waters, one would have to head further up the headwaters. Lastly, 
claimed the Trail, if ―the fisherman is looking exclusively for the native, he must go 
still higher up on the streams next to the snow banks for them.‖55  
Of course contemporaries knew very little about the population dynamics of 
the fish they planted, nor did they seem to care. What they sought were waters filled 
with desirable fish and the reputation that goes with such waters. Phrased differently, 
they held a different fishing ethos than many do today—one that valued high volume 
catches of ―game fish,‖ regardless of speciation. The state of Colorado and the EPH 
acted in concert with this ethic. To a populace lacking any real understanding of 
ecology, fish were fish.  
 And the stocking policy worked. The first fish planting from the EPH took 
place in 1907 when 20,000 fish were put into the North Fork of the St. Vrain.
56
 The 
following year the Trail once again carried stories of enormous catches. For example, 
a party consisting of six locals ―caught 215 trout during a one day fish.‖ According to 
the paper, the ―fish were photographed in town, so they apparently kept all, or nearly 
all they caught.‖57 Good fishing continued, and by 1912 ―good fishermen,‖ claimed 
the Trail, ―say that the fishing is better now than before the hatchery was constructed, 
though there are now ten times as many people in the park.‖58 Through the stocking 
efforts of the EPH, residents could ―count on the streams continuing to attract 
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thousands of tourists as well as give sport to as many of our own people as wish.‖59 
By 1911 the EPH was hatching and planting more than a half million fish annually, 




Although the Estes Park Protection and Improvement Association had played 
a leading role in building the EPH and in stocking the area with its fish, the 
Association decided in April of 1912 to turn control of the facility over to the state. 
The initial contract was to run for three years, with the expectation that the contract 
would continue indefinitely. This arrangement allowed members of the EPPIA to 
devote more effort and attention to the national park movement and strengthen their 
hatchery‘s connection to a broader network of state-hatched fish and eggs. 61  Turning 
control of the hatchery over to the state, however, did not mean that citizens of Estes 
Park were losing interest in the stocking of the region‘s waters. The community 
continued to play an active role in fish propagation, primarily through their efforts to 
secure ―sizing ponds‖ around Estes Park and through the donation of time and 
materials to stock the fish raised at the local hatchery.  
 
Fishing for National Parks 
 Following the excitement of the 1915 creation of RMNP, locals, the NPS, and 
officials at the state-run hatchery in Estes Park all worked toward improving and 
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expanding the angling opportunities in the newly created park. For two full decades 
following the park‘s establishment, the philosophy and aims of fisheries management 
remained unchanged; tourist interest and revenue remained the primary motivation 
for stocking, and very few voices of opposition arose to this policy. Through this 
period, a host of groups and individuals stocked ―virgin lakes‖ and redoubled their 
efforts to keep the park‘s waters flush with fish. Although the creation of RMNP did 
not impact the direction of fisheries management in RMNP, it did add weight, 
institutional authority, and pressure to expand the current practices. As was the case 
with the state and the EPPIA, the NPS sought to draw anglers to the park as a means 
to boost visitation and strengthen the park itself. In this sense, the early policy of 
RMNP was a complete success. 
 Rocky Mountain National Park was not alone in its attempts to bolster fish 
populations to attract fishermen. Yellowstone, which the U.S. Fish Commission had 
stocked as early as 1889, operated an egg collection station on Yellowstone Lake, 
which provided eggs and fish for local and regional hatcheries, including the 
Bozeman hatchery and the Estes Park hatchery.
62
 According to historian James 
Pritchard, Yellowstone‘s desire to protect and bolster fish populations eventually led 
to measures to control populations of pelicans in the park, which were thought to 
have been responsible for consuming large quantities of trout and trout eggs.
63
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Although RMNP never attempted to limit non-human fish predation within its 
boundaries, they did enthusiastically pursue fish culture and stocking as means to 
support sport fishing in the park.  
 Historian Richard West Sellars demonstrates that the tendency to rely upon 
fish culture within the National Park Service went well beyond Rocky and 
Yellowstone. According Sellars, the National Park Service ―manipulated fish 
populations‖ more ―extensively than any other wildlife‖ in its effort to build a 
reputation for itself.
64
 To make his point, Sellars recounts the millions of fish planted 
in Yellowstone, Glacier, Mount Rainer, and Yosemite and the fact that each of those 
parks eventually received their own hatcheries.
65
  As Sellars aptly demonstrates, 
however, more was at work here than Park Service attempts to build a stable 
bureaucratic entity.  
In many ways, the stocking program the NPS followed throughout its 
formative years was a result of the makeup and size of the NPS itself. Between the 
creation of the NPS in 1916 and 1931—when science and scientific study would 
develop within the NPS in a more substantive way—the agency was run by men like 
Horace Albright and Stephen Mather whose primary concern was building a strong 
and lasting bureaucracy. As a result, a good deal of their efforts were aimed at 
promotional efforts intended to forge a strong bond between the public and the NPS, 
and not matters related to science or scientific management. In this sense, early 
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directors of the NPS understood stocking as part a larger promotional effort intended 
grow their fledgling agency.  
Additionally, the NPS was especially understaffed during in its early years 
and thus often turned to other agencies and organizations for help managing its 
resources. For example, the NPS relied upon the U.S. Biological Survey in its 
management of fauna within the parks. Not surprisingly, early NPS policies regarding 
fauna reflected to a remarkable degree the philosophies and practices of those that 
they partnered with. In the case of the Biological Survey, the NPS accepted both the 
justifications and methods of predator control that the Biological Survey espoused.  
Likewise, the NPS turned toward experts in the realm of fisheries 
management to provide expertise and fish for parks. According to Sellars, ―game and 
fish commissions in states such as California, Colorado, Washington, and Oregon 
worked closely with the Park Service in managing fish.‖ Reflecting this tendency to 
use outside experts to manage NPS fisheries resources, Horace Albright requested in 
1929 that experts from the Bureau of Fisheries be retained to supervise fish 
management within the parks.
 66
  Allowing experts in the field of ―game 
management‖ from organizations like the Biological Survey and Bureau of Fisheries 
to direct the NPS on policy matters had interesting, if unforeseen consequences. In 
the case of elk and fish management, policy development and implementation often 
reflected the stated aims and philosophies of more ―conservation‖ oriented 
organizations, and not those of the NPS.   
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Following its creation in 1915, RMNP also turned outward for help in 
managing its fisheries. In time, RMNP relied upon the labor and expertise of the 
Bureau of Fisheries, the state-run hatchery at Estes, and local conservation 
organizations. For example, eager to continue pressing the boundaries of fish 
colonization across the park, the NPS cooperated with the EPPIA in planting more 
than 170,000 trout in the park‘s first year of existence.67 The waters stocked included 
the headwaters of the Big Thompson River and several lakes that had been stocked 
previously. In all, the NPS stocked some 45,000 brook trout, 126,000 rainbows, and 
no cutthroat.
68
   
 With each passing year the number of fish planted in the park grew. For 
example, in 1917 the NPS planted some 340,000 brook trout, 30,000 cutthroat (likely 
Colorado River cutthroat).
 69
 By 1918, the Superintendent of RMNP estimated that an 
impressive 1.35 million fish had been stocked since the park‘s creation just three 
years previous.
70
 As stocking proceeded apace, however, growing concern arose 
regarding the common practice of stocking streams and lakes with undersized fry. 
Without proper facilities to rear fish beyond the initial stages of growth, the fry were 
often eaten by larger fish immediately upon stocking. Not surprisingly, NPS officials 
understood the problem as one of supply and demand that stood as a potential threat 
to the park‘s reputation. According to Superintendent Way, the loss of fry ―under the 
present method [was so] great that it is impossible to raise enough fish to supply the 
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demands of the thousands of travelers who turn to trout fishing for rest and 
recreation.‖71 Also of concern was the threat a diminished fishery posed to local 
efforts to entertain and feed travelers with outdoor fish fries, which were ―very 
popular‖ amongst tourists. The fish fries hosted by Howard James of the Elk Horn 
Lodge were epic in their proportions, and according to Superintendent Way, 
―famous.‖  Hoping to safeguard Estes Park tourism from a reputation of poor fishing, 
NPS again benefited greatly from the support and enthusiasm of Estes Park citizens.
72
  
 As early as 1918 the NPS sought solutions to the above problem, the most 
feasible of which was the establishment of ―sizing ponds‖ situated along the park‘s 
streams and lakes. Once built, these ponds would receive fry too small to safely stock 
in the park‘s ―wild waters.‖ Here, the fry would be retained and fed until reaching the 
desired size, at which time they would be released into park waters.  Through this 
process park officials hoped to sustain lower rates of stocking mortality and better 
catches for fishermen.  
The construction and stocking of sizing ponds—as was the case with the 
construction of local and state run hatcheries—reflects a continuation of the ideology 
that drove fish stocking policy. The problem, as managers perceived it, was a 
potential shortage of fish, which if left alone threatened to diminish the region‘s 
tourist appeal. Michael Black, who has researched the management of the Sacramento 
River, calls the ad hoc approach to such problems ―serial management.‖ In the case of 
the Sacramento River, Black argues that those involved in its management have 






historically failed to appreciate the complexity of managing a dynamic resource, and 
have instead relied upon a ―succession of pure technical solutions‖ to what they 
perceived as isolated management problems.
73
 Throughout this first phase of fisheries 
management in RMNP, the same pattern holds true. The most pressing and persistent 
management problem recognized was the looming specter of a shortage of fish. 
Perceiving the situation in this manner prompted managers to seek solutions to the 
single problem of fish scarcity.
74
  
 National Park Service officials and managers at the Estes Park Hatchery were 
not alone in understanding the fisheries problem in the region as rooted in supply. In 
May of 1921, a concerned group of ―Estes Park businessmen‖ organized the Estes 
Park Fish and Game Association to aid the NPS in building a series of sizing ponds. 
According to the Trail, it was a  
well-known fact among our fishermen that many thousands of the fish taken 
from the hatchery are devoured by the larger fish when they are planted in the 
streams and one of the objects of the Fish and Game Association formed in 
the various parts of the state is to provide nursing ponds where these may 
mature to a  size that will enable them to care for themselves when finally 




Sizing ponds, promised the Trail, would result in streams ―swarm[ing] with trout‖ 
and make Estes park the ―paradise of the fishermen of the state.‖76 As was the case 
with original formation of the EPPIA and the construction of the Estes Park Hatchery, 
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the formation of the Estes Park Fish and Game Association reflects an understanding 
on the part of locals that ―fishing must be kept good if we are to maintain our 
standing as a summer resort.‖ The National Park Service was also well aware of the 
importance of good angling opportunities to the Park‘s reputation, and Superintendent 
Way gave his ―hearty support‖ to the plan. 77 
 By the fall of 1921 construction of two sizing ponds began in Moraine Park.
78
 
With the aid of the sizing ponds, the EPFGA hoped to plant as many as 100,000 fish, 
ranging in size from seven to twelve inches in length, into park waters in 1922.
79
  
More than building sizing ponds and stocking the park with fish, the EPFGA also 
worked out an arrangement with the NPS to secure protected spawning grounds. 
Although brook and Yellowstone cutthroat were often readily available to the local 
hatchery, the most ―desirable‖ fish—the rainbow trout—was often more difficult to 
procure. In response, the EPFGA planned to use an undisclosed lake in the park as an 
egg collection station. Accordingly, the organization planted 45,000 rainbows in the 
lake and arranged for NPS ―guards‖ to patrol the lake to prevent fishing. Through 
their efforts the EPFGA hoped to make ―the Park…the finest fishing grounds in the 
west.‖ 80  
 Although the EPFGA was doing ―good work‖ in planting hundreds of 
thousands of fish during the first years of RMNP‘s existence, park Superintendent 
Roger Toll hoped that the NPS could do more to meet the demands of those visiting 
                                               
77
 Estes Park Trail, September 16, 1921. 
78
 Estes Park Trail, September 23, 1921. 
79
 Estes Park Trail, October 14, 1921.  
80
 Ibid.  
 202 
the park. According to Toll, RMNP received some 200,000 visitors annually and 
covered more than 397 square miles, but could only manage to stock less than one 
million fish per year. Eager to continue to grow the visitation of the park, Toll argued 
that the NPS should take steps to ensure that two to three million fish were stocked 
annually. More than stocking the streams and lakes already containing fish, however, 
Toll recommended that the NPS continue the practice of stocking the park‘s fishless 
lakes. Doing so, contended Toll, would add to the area of good fishing in the park and 
distribute fishermen throughout, thereby easing the fishing pressure on streams and 
lakes near Estes Park.
81
 
 Toll‘s point did not fall upon deaf ears. National Park Service Director Arno 
B. Camerer also realized that aside ―from the scenic features fishing undoubtedly 
presents the greatest recreational feature of the national parks to attract visitors, and it 
is therefore a matter in which the national Government is very greatly interested.‖82 
To aid Toll in his bid for more fish, Director Camerer contacted the Bureau of 
Fisheries (BF) and requested additional fish to be shipped to the Estes Park Hatchery. 
Over the following years, the relationship between the two federal agencies worked 
well in securing additional eggs for the EPH. 
In addition to the EPFGA, NPS, and BF, some individuals in Estes Park also 
sought to better the fishing in and around Estes Park through the construction of 
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private hatcheries. For example, in the fall of 1921 Fred Jelsema built his own 
hatchery with the capacity to hatch 50,000 fish to stock his private lakes.
83
 Carl 
Sanbourne also owned and operated a hatchery near Mary‘s Lake.84 The collective 
efforts of those connected to the health and vitality of tourism in Estes Park paralleled 
nicely with the NPS‘s efforts to enhance fishing in the region and bolster visitation.  
  As the infrastructure needed to execute large-scale stocking developed, so too 
did the pace and scope of stocking in the park. In 1925, for example, the NPS 
estimated that the EPFGA had planted more than one million fish in the park, 
including some 60,000 ―Pacific Coast Salmon‖ that had been shipped from a hatchery 
in Oregon and planted in Emerald Lake. It is difficult to discern why the NPS, the 
State Game and Fish Commission, and the EPFGA desired to plant such an exotic 
fish. Perhaps they believed that the novelty of catching salmon would provide an 
additional draw to the park, or perhaps they sought fish that grew larger than brook 
and cutthroat to provide further stimulus to the fishermen. Whatever their reason, 
park officials watched the ―experiment‖ with ―interest.‖85   
 By 1926 the EPFGA had constructed five retaining ponds of a ―semi-
permanent‖ nature and had secured funds for the installation of an ―immense 
permanent sizing pond at a cost of approximately $1,000.00,‖ the expense of which 
would ―be shared half and half by the local association and the State Fish and Game 
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Commissioner.‖86  As demand on fishing resources in the park continued to grow, 
pressure came to bear on local and regional officials to expand the operations of the 
Estes Park hatchery. In December of 1926 Superintendent G.H. Thompson of the 
Estes Park hatchery received two shipments of twenty-five redwood hatching troughs 
each, thereby expanding the hatching capacity of the facility to nearly five million 
fish.
87
 Despite these efforts, however, it seemed to many that the waters in and around 
the park were once again in jeopardy of being over-fished by 1928. The only solution, 
according to many, was the construction of a new and entirely modern hatchery in 
Estes Park.  
 No doubt playing upon the fears of those whose livelihood stemmed from the 
tourist industry, the Estes Park Trail cautioned that  
There was a time when it was the ambition of every man in the state who 
cared for fishing to come to Estes Park for a vacation and a fishing trip. The 
streams were literally swarming with fish eager to take anything that might be 
tossed to them…Fishermen and hunters came each year in increasing numbers 
and the fame of Estes Park spread rapidly. Soon the game had been all but 
exterminated and the fish supply in the streams depleted sadly…About 
twenty-two years ago work was started on the Estes Park fish hatchery that 
has served its day and purpose well. Now the present hatchery has become 
obsolete and does not allow development along modern scientific methods of 
fish culture.  
 
Clearly, the Trail was guilty of underselling the extent to which the current hatchery 
met the needs of the fishing public.  In the world of tourism, however, perception 
reigns supreme. For the host, fear that ―those who love real fishing are going 
elsewhere for their enjoyment of their favorite sport‖ generated substantial local 
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support for the new hatchery. For the tourist, newspaper and magazine articles 
reporting the stocking of millions of fish annually in the park provided valuable 
incentive to visit the park. Drawing upon local pride, the Trail concluded that ―Estes 
Park is right now in the position of seeing other sections of the state become trout 
propagating centers after she pioneered trout culture in the state…Estes Park business 
men are losing large sums from this situation as well as is the state.‖88  
 Just a few months following the publication of the above article, news came 
that Estes Park would receive a new state-of-the-art hatchery, and it seemed that the 
waters of RMNP had once again been spared a future bereft of fish.
89
 Built on the 
same site as the original hatchery, the new one had the capacity to hatch and rear 
about twice as many fish as the old one.
90
 The new facility also boasted eleven new 
retaining ponds for the ―sizing‖ of fish, each made of concrete.91 With the new 
hatchery built, and the streams of the park teeming with newly stocked fish, the Trail 
wrote that ―the roads leading to the mountain trout streams will be swarming with 
automobile loads of fishermen anxious to be the first on the scene when the 1929 
fishing season opens at daybreak tomorrow morning.‖ The first day of the season, 
romanticized the Trail, promised a morning filled with the sounds and smells of 
bacon frying and ―sleepless hordes of anxious fishermen…awaiting the first streaking 
of the Eastern sky.‖92  
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Although the 1930s brought difficult times for the nation, the Depression did 
little to slow stocking efforts in RMNP. As mentioned in Chapter Two, visitation 
during that difficult decade did not follow the exponential growth of the 1920s, but it 
did maintain near record levels for most years of the decade. Although it is not 
possible to ascertain with any degree of certainty the number of visitors who fished in 
the 1930s, all things being constant it is fair to assume that the park did not 
experience increasing demands for their aquatic resources during those same years. 
The completion of the new hatchery, however, did increase the park‘s ability to meet  
the demands of their fishing clientele. In 1930, Superintendent Toll reported that 
―fishing continues to be popular‖ and that an estimated 677,500 fish were planted in 
 
 
                                                                Ranger stocking RMNP lake with bucket.  
(Superintendent‘s Annual Reports, 1936) 
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the park to meet those demands, including 114,500 rainbows, 333,000 brook, and 
230,000 cutthroats, all of which came from the new Estes Park Hatchery.
93
  
Working in conjunction with a variety of local businesses and individuals, the 
NPS also continued to further colonize the park‘s waters previously devoid of fish. 
For example, 30,000 fish were planted in Sky Pond in August of 1930 in the hopes 
that it would become ―the most popular fishing lake in the vicinity in three years.‖94 
By 1932 the NPS boasted that ―each year two or three more of the unstocked lakes 
are added to the list‖ of newly stocked lakes.95 Stocking fishless lakes, although 
perhaps an effective tool in drawing more fishermen to the park and in dispersing 
them throughout, brought with it irreparable ecological change.
96
 In this sense, the 
history of fisheries management in RMNP fits into broader trends across the West. In 
their zeal to colonize park waters and improve fishing, however, park managers like 
Roger Toll took an active role in dramatically transforming the resources they were 
charged with protecting. 
The processes of glaciation responsible for carving many of the vistas so 
admired by tourists were also responsible for creating many mountain lakes, ―most of 
which were separated from downstream fish populations by impassible barriers on 
rivers and streams.‖ As a result of their isolation from the movement of fish, these 
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mountain lakes were ―colonized by a diversity of aquatic species, many of which 
required fishless habitats for their persistence.‖97 Rocky Mountain National Park 
contained several of these lakes, including the breathtaking Skypond, which was 
stocked for the first time in 1930.  
 The introduction of fish into historically fishless water can result in a cascade 
of ecological change. According to aquatic biologists, ―studies have repeatedly 
demonstrated that fish introductions dramatically alter native vertebrate and 
invertebrate communities, often resulting in the extirpation of…amphibians, 
zooplankton, and benthic marcoinvertibrates.‖98 The introduction of fish into 
historically fishless water can be especially detrimental to local and regional 
populations of amphibians. In their study of lentic (still water) sites in the Frank 
Church-River of No Return Wilderness, David Pelliod and Charles Peterson found 
that the presence of trout (Oncorhynchus clarki, O. mykiss, O. m. aguabonita) 
drastically reduced the ―abundance of amphibians at all life stages.‖99 Apparently, 
introduced fish limit amphibian breeding success because female ―amphibians avoid 
laying their eggs‖ in such sites. Furthermore, if egg laying does occur, ―fish prey 
upon the embryonic and larval stages,‖ thereby reducing annual amphibian fecundity. 
The researchers also found that the detrimental effects of fish upon amphibians are 




 Ibid., 276.  
99
 David Pilliod, Charles Peterson, ―Local and Landscape Effects of Introduced Trout on 
Amphibians in Historically Fishless Watersheds,‖ Ecosystems 4, no. 4, (June 2001): 322.  
 209 
amplified in mountain lakes, which often offer ―less habitat structure‖ and shorter 
reproductive seasons for amphibians.
 100
   
 The impact of introduced trout upon fishless waters, however, goes well 
beyond reducing and or eliminating populations of amphibians. Using Bighorn Lake 
in Banff National Park, researchers found a strong correlation between the stocking of 
brook trout (Salvelinus fontinalis) and the elimination of top-tier plankton predators 
such as Heserodiaptomus arcticus and Daphnia middendorffiana. In the absence of 
such predators, other plankton populations explode. Additionally, researchers 
working at Banff‘s Snowflake Lake found that H. arcticus, a predator that often 
―dominates the plankton communities of fishless lakes, preying on rotifers and 
nauplius larvae‖ where quickly extirpated by the introduction of trout.  Following the 
loss of ―H. arcticus, rotifers and small-bodied cyclopoid copepods dominate the 
zooplankton assemblages of alpine lakes.‖101 In both Snowflake and Bighorn Lakes, 
the introduction of trout eliminated one top-tier predator in the world of plankton, but 
in so doing allowed those smaller organisms it preyed on to rapidly increase in 
number, thereby greatly changing the lake‘s plankton population dynamics. 
Stocking fishless lakes can have still other ecological impacts. According to 
the research of Susan Adams, Christopher Frissell, and Bruce Rieman, the 
―introduction of fish into high-elevation lakes can provide a geographic and 
demographic boost to their invasion of stream networks, thereby further endangering 
                                               
100
 Ibid., 323. 
101
 A. S. McNaught, D. W. Schindler, B. R. Parker, et. al., ―Restoration of the Food Web of 
an Alpine Lake Following Fish Stocking‖ Limnology and Oceanography  44, no. 1 (1999): 
127–136.  
 210 
the native stream fauna.‖102 Through their research the scientists found that while 
planting non-native fish at lower elevations can initiate ecological change, the 
consequences of this practice are often geographically limited by upstream barriers 
such as water falls, and the fish‘s apparent unwillingness to move upstream when the 
streambed slope exceeds 17%. When fish are planted in lakes and streams near the  
headwaters, however, brook trout in particular are able to move downstream with 
relative ease, and thereby come to inhabit a greater geographical range.
103
  
Beyond facilitating the wider dispersal of fish, stocking headwaters comes 
with other risks are well. For example, in most instances where stocking occurred in 
lakes and lake-outlet streams, fish grow at a faster rate than when they live in stream  
sections distant from the ―thermal and trophic influences of lakes.‖104 In addition to 
growing fish faster, which better equips them to compete for the food rich portions of 
streams should they decide to migrate, the researchers also found that ―larger brook 
trout appear to be the primary dispersers in streams,‖ meaning that they will be 




It is telling that the NPS literally planted millions of highly efficient predators 
inside the park in the form of trout, all of which wreaked havoc with native fauna, at 
the very same time they sought to exterminate other predators like coyotes and  
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mountain lions. The difference here lies in what was being preyed upon. Trout fed 
upon frogs, salamanders, plankton, and insects, which few if any visitors came 
specifically to the park to see. Over the past one hundred years, at least 81 of 
RMNP‘s historically fishless lakes and ponds were stocked with fish.  
Largely oblivious to the vast changes unleashed by stocking historically 
fishless water, the NPS continued pressing the fish frontier through the early 1930s. 
Working closely with the Bureau of Fisheries (BF) since 1929, the NPS designed and 
refined a stocking schedule to better meet their needs. Under the agreement, the NPS 
benefited from the expertise of the BF, and RMNP required all fishermen to obtain a 
 
 
                                                                Ranger stocking RMNP lake with bucket.  
(Superintendent‘s Annual Reports, 1936) 
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state fishing license. Following the advice of the BF, the NPS planted an estimated 
2.24 million trout in RMNP between 1931 and 1935, nearly all of which came from 
the Estes Park Hatchery. As early as 1932 the new strategy began to show signs of 
success as RMNP officials reported that fishing was now ―better than it has been at 
any time during recent years.‖ 106  
Given the scope of the stocking program through the first half of the 1930s, 
and reports of good fishing in RMNP annual reports, it difficult to explain why local 
businessmen again called for an expansion of the trout rearing capacity of the 
hatchery in 1935. At a meeting of the member of the EPFGA and the Chamber of 
Commerce, a resolution was passed requesting the Secretary of the Interior to 
earmark funds for the construction of a federal hatchery in RMNP. The reasons for 
this course of action were apparently many. On one hand, Glacier and Yellowstone 
national parks both enjoyed ―less travel‖ than RMNP, yet they benefited from 
federally owned hatcheries and sizing ponds. Moreover, claimed the local delegation, 
RMNP was again in danger of over-fishing ―due to constantly greater numbers of 
visitors each year‖ touring the park. 107  
On both counts, however, their argument fell flat. Visitation was not ―spiking‖ 
during the first half of the 1930s, and the hatchery at Estes Park seldom ran at 
capacity. It seems much more likely that locals saw an opportunity to attract some 
much-needed emergency funding to their area and they sought to secure it. Their 
argument was based on the logic of tourism and attempted to play upon fears of lost 
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revenue to obtain what they desired. ―The great importance of fishing in this park has 
been overlooked by national park officials in Washington for many years,‖ contended 
W. A. Gray of the Fish and Game Association, and ―a strong effort will be made to 
bring the seriousness of the situation to the attention of the administration.‖108   
As 1934 came to a close, the EPFGA ramped up its public campaign for a new 
hatchery. According to the Trail, ―With a third of a million visitors in the National 
Park and another third of a million just outside of it, the present system and volume of 
stocking streams and lakes is inadequate.‖ It was ―so inadequate that it would be 
laughable if it were not so dangerous to the reputation of Rocky Mountain National 
Park,‖ quipped the paper. The state hatchery, only five years old at this point, was 
―doing the best it can with present equipment, but its entire output is barely enough to 
take care of the streams near the park.‖109 To strengthen their case, locals prepared 
blueprints and cost estimates for the construction of the new facility in the hopes of 
persuading elected officials of the importance and feasibility of their proposal.
110
  
 Perhaps undercut by NPS reports that the stocking policy begun five years 
earlier was ―beginning to bear results,‖ and that ―[t]his past year has seen better 
fishing than any in the previous ten years,‖ Estes Park never received their much 
desired federal hatchery.
111
 Nonetheless, relief funds for fishing did find their way to 
RMNP. Through the federal government‘s EWC program, RMNP received funds for 
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 Regardless of whether the fishing in RMNP was as good as previous years or 
in peril of being overrun with rod-toting tourists, it is evident that the ecological 
revolution that begun with the first planting of non-native species in the 1870s and 
1880s was fairly complete by the mid-1930s. In addition to the salmon still swimming 
the waters of Emerald Lake, and the scores of lakes and streams previously void of 
fish now teeming with them, park ranger field notes reflect the population imbalance 
existent in the park‘s waters.113 In May of 1936, for example, hundreds of catchable 
fish in a Moraine Park beaver pond were trapped when the Big Thompson changed 
course. In response to the situation, rangers seined the pond and replanted the fish 
into the Big Thompson. Some 701 trout were moved, of which 97% were brook trout, 





Every year tens of thousands of fishermen hike to Sky Pond, Mill‘s Lake, or 
any number of other bodies of water in Rocky Mountain to angle for trout. Standing 
knee deep in frigid alpine water and casting an elk-hair caddis amidst towering peaks 
and grazing elk is a near religious experience for many. And it is an experience that 
we expect from locales like Rocky Mountain National Park. What most fishermen are 
                                               
112
 Superintendent‘s Annual Report, 1936. 
113
 Estes Park Trail, September 30, 1935. 
114
 Melvin Potts, Field Notes, 15 May 1936, Chris Kennedy collection, 18. 
 
 215 
not aware of, however, are the complicated cultural and biological processes that 
spread fish—both native and otherwise—across the park itself.  
Even before the twentieth century, the state of Colorado, various railroads, 
and a host of others touted Colorado as a great fishing destination. Great fishing, they 
all realized, would do much to further the reputation of Colorado (and later Estes 
Park) as a tourist destination that offered a range of exciting outdoor diversions.  All 
working toward the same end, though not necessarily in concert, newspapers like the 
Rocky Mountain News and The Estes Park Trail did much to draw attention to the 
water in and around what would become RMNP.  
Well aware that advertising great fishing without delivering it could have 
negative economic consequences, the state, Estes Park residents, and the National 
Park Service all embraced technology as a means to allow a continuance of growing 
the tourist industry, while allowing fishermen wide latitude in daily harvests. The 
embrace of technical solutions in the form of fish culture, however, led to vast 
environmental change, not the least of which was the near annihilation of the very 
fish that draw anglers to Colorado in the first place. But lacking any real sense of 
ecology or the value of diversity within ecosystems, those involved in this early phase 
of fisheries management prided themselves on doing good work to safeguard 
RMNP‘s waters for generations of fishermen.  
The lack of opposition in the historical record to stocking of non-native fish 
all reflect that the practice was both widely accepted and appreciated. To hold 
contemporaries at fault for failing to manage resources in a way better suited to 
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modern ecological sensibilities is both unfair and unproductive. Rather, we would do 
better to understand that this was a time when fishermen, boosters, and fish culturists 
valued productive waters over diverse ones, and intensive stocking promised the 
abundance they desired.  
Beyond demonstrating the powerful ways that tourism can reshape aquatic 
resources, the history of fishing in RMNP also tells us something about parks as 
socially constructed places. Even before the creation of RMNP in 1915—but certainly 
after that point—the physical space within the park came to bear more and more 
witness to the dominance of tourism in the region. The presence of fish in historically 
fishless waters, the proliferation of non-native fish across the park, numerous sizing 
ponds located inside and adjacent to the park, and the Estes Park hatchery all offer 
physical manifestations of the deeply cultural and economic processes involved in the 
development of tourism.  
As long as visitors, managers, and scientists agreed that attracting anglers 
through intensive stocking was both wise and proper, management conflicts were few 
and far between. As we will see, however, significant challenges lay ahead. In the 
realm of fisheries management, a deepening appreciation for ecology in the early 
1930s would soon challenge the fishing and stocking traditions that had long held 
sway across RMNP. For the first time in the park‘s history, a second and increasingly 
powerful new group of resource users arrived and struggled to define and use the 








They rained down upon the earth and lay scattered about like so many bits of 
wriggling shiny tin. To anyone standing near the missed aerial drop at Lake Ypsilon 
in August 1962, the scene must have been surreal. To the National Park Service, the 
scattering of nearly 3000 hand-hatched, raised, and fed greenback cutthroat trout 
across terra firma was surely a disappointment.
1
 Using a helicopter and bucket on that 
summer day the NPS was struggling to meet an evolving management imperative 
centered firmly upon stocking and rearing almost exclusively the nearly extinct 
greenback cutthroat.  
 For more than six decades a host of interested parties had undertaken to keep 
the waters of the park filled with desirable species of catchable trout. This desire, as 
indicated in the previous chapter, gave shape to the practice of stocking rainbow, 
brown, cutthroat, and brook trout. Intensive stocking of non-native fish did not pose a 
problem as long as the fishing public and NPS remained unconcerned and unaware of 
the ecological consequences of doing so, and the NPS understood its mission as one 
aimed primarily at visitor satisfaction. Beginning in the early 1930s, however, the 
Service began reevaluating the aims and methods of its management of wildlife.  As 
their scientific understanding deepened, they came to see the damage their previous 
stocking policy caused. Faced with increasing evidence that their previous fishery 
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policies conflicted with their broader management directives, the NPS designed and 
implemented a new fisheries policy with the hopes of restoring the park‘s rivers, 
lakes, and streams to something approaching their ―natural condition.‖  
  In important though often unappreciated ways, the proliferation of non-native 
fish within the rivers, lakes, and streams of RMNP also offers opportunity to measure 
and understand something about the relationship between this place and the changing 
social meaning it has been given over time. Geographers often focus on the built 
environment in their analysis, but I argue that we might also use wildlife—such as the 
greenback and brook trout—to the same ends. Although trout are not ―built‖ in the 
same sense as is a house or a bridge, in most cases their presence within the park was 
a product of human desire and ingenuity.  
In addition to relying on fish to trace and evaluate the environmental 
consequences of tourism in a particular locale, we can also use riparian areas to the 
same end. As Nancy Langston demonstrates, riparian areas offer prime examples of 
socially constructed spaces. Viewing lakes and rivers as such allows historians to 
trace the historical relationship between changing environmental ideas and the 
physical world where those ideas play out. In this sense, those spaces within Rocky 
Mountain National Park where fishermen bait their hooks and eat their lunches offer 
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Prior to 1936 the prevailing view regarding waters within the park—one 
shared by railroad companies, local and regional newspapers, local conservation 
organizations, and the National Park Service—was that they were spaces best used to 
bolster tourism and provide recreation. Between 1936 and the present, however, the 
NPS launched a series of scientific studies aimed at understanding the fish within the 
park‘s waters in increasingly scientific terms. As their understanding deepened, 
managers came to see the damage the previous stocking policy caused to the native 
fish of the park. Faced with evidence that the traditional approach of fisheries 
management conflicted with their broader management directives—which were 
simultaneously shifting through the application of scientific inquiry—RMNP moved 
away from ―fishing for tourists‖ and increasingly sought to balance tourist demands 
with something approximating their evolving definition of ―natural conditions.‖3 
Doing so, however, brought about a significant redefinition of what constituted 
proper use of riparian areas.  
Challenging decades of fishing and stocking policy, scientific understanding 
compelled managers to close some waters to fishing (either temporarily or 
permanently), poison popular fishing waters in an effort to restock them with 
protected native species, permanently halt all stocking within the park, and 
institutionalize catch-and-release as a tool to balance limited fish supply with growing 
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fisheries demands. Reflecting how far science had risen in the realm of fisheries 
management within the park, the Estes Park hatchery—the institution that stood at the 
heart of the early phase of fish management in Rocky—stopped supplying fish for the 
park in 1968 and closed down altogether in the 1983. The arrival of ecology reworked 
both the means and ends of preservation as it sought to replace a management 
paradigm dominated by tourism with one driven by science.  
 
Going “Native” 
 As Donald Worster demonstrates, many of the ideological underpinnings of 
the modern concept of ecology were around well before the dawn of the twentieth 
century. That said, ecology as a dynamic and powerful scientific field did not begin to 
take shape until the waning decades of the nineteenth century.
4
 With their deep 
interest in spatial analysis, a penchant for viewing plants as ―social beings,‖ and a 
growing sense of the importance of climate in shaping plant communities, 
geographers like Oscar Drude, Andreas Schimper, and Eugenius Warming, 
―transformed Oecologie from just another neologism to a functioning science with its 
own peculiar hold on reality‖ in the 1890s.5  Of the three, Worster holds that 
Warming was the most significant in the field‘s development, primarily as a 
consequence of his book Plantesamfund, which was published in 1895 and translated 
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into English in 1909.
6
 At the core of this work was his early recognition of the 
―communal life of organisms.‖7 Also central to Warming‘s book and to the 
development of modern field of ecology was the concept of ecological succession, 
meaning that ecological communities ―do not remain always the same, forever 
maintaining a steady state as ordained by some divine power,‖ but are subject to 
diverse forces that bring about change.
8
 Accordingly, ―the ultimate goal of nature…is 
nothing less than the most diverse, stable, well-balanced, self-perpetuating society 
that can be devised to meet the requirements of each habitat.‖9 Under natural 
conditions the essential direction of plant and animals communities was always 
toward ―climax equilibrium.‖10  
 Henry Cowles and Frederic Clements further explored succession and climax 
equilibrium as they too refined the concepts that defined the nascent field.
11
 Although 
men such as Clements, Cowles, Warming and others had done much to establish the 
field of ecology, it took a natural disaster in the form of the Dust Bowl to propel it 
into a prominent position of trust and authority in American society. Reeling from 
towering dust storms, and grasping desperately to understand the forces that delivered 
them to the America‘s heartland, ―conservation began to move toward a more 
inclusive, coordinated, ecological perspective.‖12 Drawing from the work of Warming 
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and  Clements, experts in grasslands ecology argued that the great dust storms were 
the handiwork of man himself and his failure to appreciate the ―genius of the climax 
community of the plains—the unique grass—buffalo biome.‖13 As Worster argues, 
the widespread adoption of Clements‘s climax theory led to the belief that nature 
undisturbed would reach a natural climax state, but where modern humans intervened 
it often would not.
14
 Thus, humans were at once separated from ecological processes 
and came to bear significant responsibility when things within this natural order went 
awry. Within this broader social and scientific milieu, science within the National 
Park Service was also developing. 
 Between the founding of the National Park Service and the dawn of the Great 
Depression science was virtually non-existent within the Service. The reasons for this 
are many, but they stem primarily from the very limited budget of the agency, its 
need and desire to pour resources into promotional efforts to grow itself, and the fact 
that the field of ecology was relatively fresh and practiced only by a handful of 
scientists. Reflecting the lack of commitment to scientific inquiry, the NPS by 1930 
employed only one research scientist, nine wildlife rangers, and six naturalists to 
oversee its seventy-four national parks and monuments.
15
 Moreover, the NPS‘s 
wildlife rangers and naturalists spent the bulk of their time in visitor education and 
resource protection and relatively little time conducting anything approximating 
scientific study.  
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 Science did come to the NPS, but not through institutional initiative. Rather, it 
arrived through the privately-funded research of the ―independently wealthy 
biologist‖ George M. Wright.16 Working in iconic parks like Yosemite, Wright had 
come to the conclusion that the NPS did not know enough about the natural resources 
they sought manage, and also realized that the NPS was reluctant to fund such 
research on its own. Accordingly, he proposed to fund and direct the first in-depth, 
comprehensive scientific investigation into the parks in 1928. Between 1929 and 
1940, scientists like Wright and others ―promoted an ecological awareness in the 
Service and questioned the utilitarian and recreational focus that dominated the 
bureau.‖17 As the NPS came to employ more scientists, the widely accepted aesthetic 
standards for judging park landscapes that dominated so much of the administrations 
of Mather and Albright were challenged by new standards derived from the 
application of ecological principles.  
 Beginning in the summer of 1930, Wright and fellow biologists Joseph Dixon 
and Ben Thompson began their investigations. Concluding in the spring of 1931, the 
research team wrote and soon published Fauna of the National Parks of the United 
States: A Preliminary Survey of Faunal Relations in National Parks, more widely 
known as Fauna No. 1.
18
 At the heart of Fauna No. 1 lay the recognition that ―[t]he 
parks‘ faunas have been extremely sensitive to the influences of civilization‖ and that 
immediate steps needed to be undertaken to better understand and temper the 
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influences of ―civilization‖ upon park resources.19 Reflecting the predominance of 
Clements‘s climax theory, and its placement of humans outside of the ―natural‖ 
function of ecosystems, the authors contended that the parks were valuable in part 
because they represented landscapes that had been rescued ―from the immediate 
dangers of private exploitation‖ where ―climax examples of Nature's scenic 
achievements‖ remained.20 
 Although Dixon, Wright, and Thompson were deeply concerned with the 
introduction of invasive animal species and the marginalization of native ones, they 
made interesting exceptions regarding fishing and fish culture in national parks. 
According to the authors,  
Wild flowers are to be enjoyed in place and the timber in the trees is not to be 
utilized. No animal is hunted, and only the fish is angled from its native 
waters. Fish culture is practiced to prevent depletion and to extend the 
pleasures of the sport to waters not naturally stocked. 
 
 Defending traditional fisheries management, the authors contended that in the case of 
this ―important exception‖ the ―direct benefit to man overrules the disadvantages 
which are incidentally incurred‖ through fish harvest and stocking.21  
The NPS‘s willingness to allow anglers to harvest fish, which was a rare 
exception to their general stance on resource harvest within parks, begs the question 
of why they did so. Historian Lisa Migheto explored the development of animal rights 
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through her Wild Animals and American Environmental Ethics and found that rising 
consensus that animals were sentient beings capable of feeling pain were driving 
force in the historical evolution of animal activism.
22
 Speculating on why Americans 
have not put fish in the same category as other animals, Migheto muses, ―Perhaps 
because fishing has been viewed traditionally as a contemplative activity, it was 
difficult to portray its participants as bloodthirsty savages.‖ She also posits that 
―[f]ishing also failed to inspire strong protest because it involved animals that were 
not attractive in the traditional sense.‖  In this regard, the lack of empathy for the 
plight of fish was a function of the ―humane movement‘s emphasis on the kinship 
between people and animals,‖ which ―encouraged the perception that only humanlike 
creatures deserved moral attention.‖23  
On this point, Thomas Dunlap demonstrates that one of the factors at play in 
developing policies and practices aimed at wildlife conservation was the development 
of a literary genre that ascribed human characteristics, behaviors, and personality to 
wild animals. As animals became anthropomorphized, argues Dunlap, it was a 
relatively short step for many to call for protection of them. Once again, fish did not 
figure prominently in this literary genre, which may also explain why fish were often 
treated differently by those involved in conservation.
24
 The answer to this question 
may also lie in the fact that fish—unlike elk and mountain sheep—are not easily 
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beheld, are often difficult to photograph, and could be replenished annually through 
fish culture. Whatever the reason, the NPS broadly—and Dixon, Wright and 
Thompson specifically—were ambivalent about fishing in national parks.  
This is not to say, however, that the authors of Fauna No. 1 were 
wholehearted supporters of stocking and fishing in parks. Although they did not 
challenge either fishing or stocking, they did argue that at least ―one watershed shall 
be set aside for the preservation of the aquatic biota in its undisturbed primitive state‖ 
within each park. But even here, where there would ―never be any planting of fish or 
fish foods,‖ fishing would be permitted, though under tighter regulation. Further 
reflecting their ambivalence, the authors confided that the ―time is rapidly 
approaching when these would be the only places on the continent where the native 
trout could be seen and studied in their primitive haunts unmodified by human 
interference.‖25  
 Regardless of its equivocation on matters of fisheries management, Fauna No. 
1 represents the very moment that science arrived in a substantive way within the 
NPS. Following its publication, the NPS adopted Fauna No. 1’s recommendation that 
all NPS wildlife management decisions be based upon scientific study.
26
 Also 
reflecting the embrace of science within the NPS was the increased willingness on the 
part of the Service to fund scientific inquiry. For example, in 1931 the NPS agreed to 
fund one half of Wright‘s endeavor, and it assumed full financial responsibility for it 
in 1933. In large part because of Fauna No. 1, the NPS also created its own Wildlife 
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Division in 1933. Headquartered at the University of California, the Wildlife Division 
employed biologists in the pursuit of scientific understanding of NPS resources.
27
 
Lastly, during much of the 1930s, the NPS also used CCC funds and park rangers to 
support the works park biologists. Although historian Richard West Sellars argues 
that the embrace of scientifically-driven management was relatively short-lived, it 




Reflecting the both the importance of Fauna No. 1 and the ascendancy of 
science within the Service, Acting Director of the National Park Service A.E. 
Demaray announced in May of 1936 that the National Park Service would no longer 
stock non-native fish at the expense of native ones. According to the press release,   
Native fish in our national parks and monuments henceforth will be 
safeguarded by policies of conservation similar to those long adhered to by the 
National Park Service in its administration of the fauna and flora of these 
areas…That is to say, natural conditions will not be interfered with by man. 
  
After fifteen years of allowing individual parks the latitude to introduce and stock 
non-native sport fishes, the new NPS policy held that ―scientific study has tended to 
prove that‖ introducing non-native species ―disturb[s] the system and order carefully 
worked out during long periods of time by nature.‖ But, admitted Demaray, 
―heretofore this policy has not been generally applied in the case of fish.‖ 29 
Organizations like the Council of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science had been encouraging a native only stocking policy in National Parks since at 
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least 1921. At that time, however, the NPS was still very much interested in 




 Interpreting the previous fifteen years of fisheries management across all NPS 
administered lands, Demaray stated that in the past if ―it seemed advisable, for the 
sake of better angling [sic] to import species not native to the lakes and streams, this 
was frequently done. Experience has shown, however, that nature makes no 
allowance for good intentions on the part of man,‖ and such a policy had worked to 
disrupt natural systems. The NPS would now largely ―forbid the introduction of 
exotic species of fish into waters which at present contain only native varieties.‖ Just 
as striking was the announcement that ―[e]ven non-game native varieties, reduction of 
which might be considered conducive to better angling, will be left to increase and 
multiply unmolested.‖31  
 Although an important deviation from previous policy, the new directive also 
contained language that allowed the partial continuance of traditional stocking 
programs.  Specifically, stated Demaray, ―in areas where exotic species have proved 
to be best suited to the environment, and of higher value for fishing purposes than the 
native fish, planting of exotics may be continued.‖ In other words, in those waters 
where the damage had been done and ecological systems already reworked, stocking 
of non-natives could continue.  The stocking of such waters, however, was contingent 
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upon approval on a case-by-case basis by the park superintendent and the Director of 
the NPS.
32
 The era of laissez-faire fish management within national parks was 
coming to an end. 
Amidst the era of institutional self-reflection and policy reformation, Merlin 
Potts conducted a preliminary survey of the streams and lakes of RMNP in 1936. 
Overall, Potts found nothing striking in his survey, but his work did confirm that 
cutthroats were not as numerous within the park as were brook, rainbow, and brown 
trout. After conducting his survey, Potts recommended that ―the planting of Cutthroat 
Trout be definitely encouraged in all streams and lakes with the exception of Mill 
Creek, Beaver Brook, Big Thompson River, Hidden Valley Creek, Fall River, 
Bierstadt Lake and Doughnut Lake.‖ In those waters, brook, rainbow, and brown 
trout predominated and seemed better suited to the particular waters.  Knowing that 
obtaining a steady annual supply of eggs and or native fry would be difficult, Potts 
also recommended the construction of a federal hatchery to supply the park with 
native stock.
 33
   
Demaray‘s press release and Potts‘s survey both raised important questions 
about exactly which ―native‖ fish should be stocked in the park. Most believed that 
greenback cutthroat—the only true native trout to the eastern portion of RMNP—was 
extinct by 1931. Therefor, when Potts recommended the stocking of ―native trout‖ he 
was not speaking of greenbacks, but rather about Yellowstone cutthroats, which had 




 Merlin K. Potts, ―A Preliminary Survey of Conditions in Streams and Lakes of Rocky 
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been stocked east of the Continental Divide prior to the 1930s. One could make the 
argument that stocking Yellowstone cutthroat was little different from stocking either 
rainbow or brook trout, as none of them were truly native to the area. Lacking many 
other options, however, RMNP turned to the stocking of non-native cutthroats to meet 
its institutional mandate.  
Just as attitudes within the scientific community and the NPS were shifting in 
favor of ―natural conditions‖ and the restoration and protection of native flora and 
fauna, the Estes Park Trail, which had long trumpeted the stocking of non-native fish 
in the region and had long been a steadfast support of the expansion of those efforts, 
also began to change its tone. For example, in 1938 the Trail claimed that some 95% 
of all ―important fish producing waters [of the park] have been permanently damaged 
by promiscuous introduction of non-native and incompatible species of fish.‖ The 
rainbow and brook trout—both of which had been fashionable species in decades 
past—were now second in comparison to the cutthroat, which was ―larger, in better 
condition‖ and a fish that ―displays a maximum of gameness in battling the hook and 
line.‖ Citing Potts‘s survey, the author continued,  
There are a few small lakes in Rocky Mountain National Park without fish 
life. In keeping with the policy, these lakes will remain in this condition 
providing excellent opportunity for research in connection with undisturbed 
conditions of aquatic biology essential in scientific planning for future fish 
planting and culture. Efforts will also be made to eliminate exotic species of 
fish from Park waters as much as possible. The task is large and naturally will 
take a long period of years, but can be eventually accomplished by the 
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Collectively, the policy shift on the part of the NPS, Merlin Potts‘s study, and the 
above Trail article all speak to significant changes taking place in the fisheries 
management in RMNP. It remained to be seen, however, if the new policy of 
―planting native species in the future‖ would work in de-colonizing the parks‘ waters 
while satisfying the demands of the traveling fisherman.  
 To aid in restoring the park‘s waters to something approximating their natural 
conditions, RMNP instituted a series of lake and stream closures for the 1938 fishing 
season. Among those waters closed were the very popular Bear Lake, Emerald Lake, 
the ponds in Hidden Valley, and portions of the Fall River.
35
 To further restore the 
park‘s waters, the NPS also planted an estimated half million Yellowstone cutthroats, 
which had been shipped the previous spring from Yellowstone National Park and 
hatched at Estes Park, Fort Collins, Denver, and Grand Lake. In all, the fish were 
planted in ―35 lakes and 20 streams in scattered sections of the park‖ by rangers 
assisted by CCC enrollees. Speaking to the new policy, Chief Ranger Herschler 
commented, ―[As] much as possible, the National Park Service is planting only native 
species to remedy an unwelcome situation caused by promiscuous introduction of fish 
foreign to park waters.‖36 
 The closure of specific park waters continued during the 1939 season. Streams 
closed included the ―Hidden Valley Creek between Trail Ridge Road and the 
Horseshoe Deer Ridge Road; Cabin Creek in the Longs Peak district, from its source 
to the Park boundary; Mill Creek from its source to its junction with Glacier Creek.‖ 
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Although Bear Lake and Emerald Lake were both reopened for the season, Spruce 
Lake was closed. RMNP also enforced more stringent regulations than did the state of 
Colorado, limiting fishermen to a maximum of fifteen fish or ten pounds per day, 
while 25 fish or fifteen pounds could be taken from state waters. Moreover, within 
RMNP all fish kept had to be at least seven inches in length, with smaller fish 
―carefully removed from the hook with wet hands and returned to the stream or lake.‖ 
The park also instituted a ban on live bait to ―avoid introduction of undesirable fish 
minnows in Park waters.‖ Use of other live bait, such as earthworms, was permitted.37 
In all, RMNP planted 572,000 Yellowstone cutthroats in 1939.
38
  
By 1941, with the park‘s new stocking program nearly five years old, RMNP 
had planted well over two million Yellowstone cutthroats in the park and was doing 
all it could in pursuance of the NPS directive for native fish stocking.
39
 To measure 
their progress, the Supervisor of Fish Resources from the Fish and Wildlife Service 
David Madsen conducted a brief survey of the park‘s waters in 1940. Despite five 
years of concerted efforts to reclaim the park on behalf of cutthroats, Madsen found 
that the park as a whole continued to suffer from the overpopulation of brook trout, 
especially in beaver ponds located at the headwaters of major streams.
40
 Although 
Madsen was quick to point out that the new policy was ―not old enough to give us 
any definite information as to results,‖ he stated, ―From what information I have been 
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able to gather, most of the lakes in the Park are likewise overstocked [with non-
natives] and the fish are small.‖ 41  
Beyond offering a valuable accounting of the park‘s waters at mid-century 
and a condemnation of stocking of non-natives as ―a serious mistake,‖ Madsen‘s 
report is important for other reasons as well. Between the NPS policy shift of 1936 
and 1941, managers at RMNP continued to frame the fisheries problem within the 
park as directly related to a supply issue. Park managers long witnessed what they 
thought to be a correlation between their stocking programs that favored non-native 
fish and the proliferation of those fish across the park. Lacking any real scientific 
understanding of the processes at work, it was easy for them to conclude that the 
reason brook trout were so common in park waters was a direct function of their 
stocking efforts, and not a result of ecological and biological processes. 
Understanding the situation thus, reversal of the situation and the restoration of native 
fish required little more than a stocking policy that favored native fish over non-
native ones. In this instance, the rise of ecological thinking within the NPS had given 
its managers the sense that their previous policy was flawed, but did not de facto give 
them the scientific and technical knowledge needed to adequately adjust it.   
As managers soon realized, however, the restoration of native fish would 
require far more than a stocking program that favored cutthroats. Between 1938 and 
1941 RMNP planted cutthroats almost exclusively (only two small plantings of 
rainbow trout took place), yet brook trout continued to reign supreme. Madsen was 
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the first to understand that something beyond planting more cutthroats was warranted. 
Specifically, he argued that the current situation would not be corrected until the NPS 
found ―some means of greatly reducing the brook population.‖ 42 Admitting that he 
did not know what factors were specifically responsible for the cutthroat‘s inability to 
compete with brook trout, he urged that ―some person with the proper training and 
background be assigned to a thorough study of the problems which I have here briefly 
described, with a view of giving the necessary information to improve them.‖43 
 Although money and manpower were in short supply during World War II, 
the stocking of cutthroats continued. In 1943, for example, the NPS planted more than 
700,000 eggs and 255,000 fry in the park.
44
 Despite continuance of the policy, 
however, progress was slow at best. Again attempting to ascertain the efficacy of the 
new program, Stillman Wright filed a report on the ―fishery problem‖ in RMNP in 
1944. According to Wright, the ―plan of planting only the Yellowstone Lake trout has 
not produced satisfactory results‖ as some of the park waters had received nothing but 
cutthroats since 1937, yet brook trout were ―excessively abundant‖ and ―cutthroats 
rare.‖45  
 Making matters worse, the successful conclusion of World War II brought a 
period of unparalleled growth in the number of annual visitors to RMNP and greatly 
threatened the park‘s ability to meet the expectations of its fishing clientele. During 
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the postwar era, the NPS faced evermore complaints that fishing across the park was 
poor and more money was needed to conduct ―stream and lake studies upon which to 
base the park‘s fish planting program.‖46 By the early 1950s, the staff at RMNP was 




Going Green  
With budgets still at wartime levels and visitation exceeding the park‘s ability 
to protect itself from adoring nature lovers, the solutions to the management 
difficulties were scant. RMNP had undertaken more intensive stocking of native 
species since 1937, but such efforts failed to re-establish substantial numbers of 
native fish in the park, while cutting deeply into the number of overall fish planted. 
Making matters all the more complicated was an exciting discovery made in 1955 
when Professor Howard Tanner of Colorado State University found what he hoped 
were isolated populations of greenback cutthroat in the waters of Albion Creek near 
Nederland, Colorado.
48
 Following his discovery, Dr. Tanner collected and shipped 
specimen to Dr. Robert Miller, Curator of Fishes at the University of Michigan, for 
identification.
49
 Upon close inspection, Dr. Miller concluded that ―these fish 
represented a kind of cutthroat different from any others we know today, and that 
they may or may not be Salmo clarki stomias,‖ otherwise known as the greenback 
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 In the wake of the discovery, RMNP biologist James E. Cole, RMNP 
Superintendent James Lloyd, and the NPS principle naturalist Gordon Fredine 
requested that a preliminary study of the habitat of greenback in 1957.
51
 The 
objectives of the study included securing additional fish so that positive identification 
could be made, collecting enough to serve as brood stock, and surveying the lakes and 
streams across the park with a ―view toward establishment of sanctuaries in Rocky 
Mountain National Park.‖52 The researchers also conducted extensive surveys across 
the park searching for additional locations that had not been tainted by the 
introduction of non-native species.   
The researchers concluded that the ―Faylene-Fay-Caddis Lake drainage‖ 
provided the best location for stocking greenbacks as it provided ample spawning 
habitat and isolation from downstream non-native fish populations.
53
  They also 
found that the portion of the Big Thompson River running through Forest Canyon 
would be a prime location for the restoration of greenback since it contained a ―series 
of falls and cascades,‖ which provided an ―effective barrier to any upstream 
movement‖ of fish, thereby preventing non-natives below Forest Canyon from 
interfering with the restoration efforts. More significantly, the researchers also found 
―no record of any fish stocking‖ in Forest Canyon, and they doubted whether ―pack 
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horses could be brought down into the drainage for stocking purposes.‖ Hence, they 
came to believe that the ―cutthroat trout present in the streams appear to be native to 
the area.‖54 They subsequently took twelve specimen from Forest Canyon that 
appeared to ―have the characteristics of green-back trout,‖ believing that they would 
provide ―an excellent source of fish for propagation purposes.‖55 Hoping to use the 
suspected greenbacks found in Forest Canyon as brood stock, the research team made 
arrangements for the poisoning of the Fay Lakes drainage in 1958 to remove all fish 
in preparation for stocking of greenbacks in 1959.
56
   
The discovery of what many hoped were greenback trout soon found its way 
into the press. Speaking on the discovery, the Denver Post reported that a ―rare and 
almost extinct species native to Colorado‘s Eastern Slope, the green backs—or what‘s 
left of them—are getting a lot of attention these days.‖ Although the fish were few 
and far between, the paper hoped that ―anglers may some day be pulling them from 
Colorado lakes and streams just as the country‘s early settlers did.‖ According to the 
paper, ―[n]othing better could happen to a fisherman.‖ Although papers like the 
Denver Post were at the forefront of promoting the stocking of non-native fishes in 
decades past, they now held, ―Not only are the green backs fighting trout and good to 
eat, but also they are among the most beautiful fish in the Rocky Mountains.‖57  
 The Denver Post was not alone in pining for the return of the ―natural 
conditions‖ of the state‘s waters. Regional Director of the NPS Howard Baker 
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announced in an address to the Izaak Walton League that ―[m]ore and more the 
science of wildlife management is coming to recognize the potency of Nature as 
opposed to the efforts of man.‖ Whereas earlier the NPS and others had believed 
completely in the power of humans to remake and improve upon nature, Baker 
counseled that ―[s]cientific studies of fish reproduction, for example, show that much 
of our past efforts at being mechanical setting hens and brooders in the fisheries have 
failed miserably as substitutes for the productivity of a sound natural environment.‖  
Admitting the management errors of the past, Baker stated, ―Most of our management 
efforts today are moving in the direction of undoing our mistakes and restoring the 
abundant powers of Nature to the throne.‖58 Doing so, concluded Baker, was ―the best 
assurance we have of a continuing heritage of wildlife for aesthetic enjoyment or for 
the creel or bag.‖59  
Following the report‘s recommendations, and reflecting the sentiments of 
Baker‘s address to the Izaak Walton League, the NPS dedicated the man hours and 
money needed to chemically treat and remove all ―resident‖ fish from the Fay Lakes 
drainage in the summer of 1958. According to research biologist Robert Cope, the 
―operation was successful, and by the spring of 1959 the waters were free of fish and 
had become detoxified.‖60 Once the lakes were devoid of all fish life, the NPS and its 
partners at the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife turned their attention to finding 
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pure strains of greenbacks with which to stock the lakes. Drawing from the 
conclusions of the 1957 report, they selected the Big Thompson River at Forest 
Canyon as the most likely site for pure strains of greenbacks. Accordingly, 
researchers took ―by hook and line, by electric shocking, and by treatment with 
cresol‖ several samples of suspected greenbacks from Forest Canyon. Once captured, 
the fish were carried out of Forest Canyon on horseback, and transferred to the Estes 
Park Hatchery.
61
   
 By August of 1959 the NPS and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries were poised to 
make a run at stocking the alleged greenbacks. Using a helicopter and bucket, crews 
made one drop into Fay Lake in August  and another in early September. In all, well 
over 100 suspected greenback were planted, with no evidence of mortality with either 
drop. The NPS also moved an additional 83 fish by truck to the US Fishery Station in 
Leadville, Colorado to serve as a broodstock for future stocking efforts.
 62
 By 1959 




 Although crews applied considerable time, effort, and resources to 
recolonizing the park with what they thought were pure strains of greenback 
cutthroat, the management of RMNP faced increasing pressure from the public to 
plant more fish, of whatever variety. As early as 1960, the Superintendent of RMNP 
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proposed to Regional Director Howard Baker a stocking plan that placed more 
emphasis on the stocking of non-native fish than had been the practice since 1937. In 
response to his request, Regional Director Baker informed RMNP, ―The entire plan is 
not consonant with present policy. Therefore, you should stock no fish in the park in 
1960 other than those in connection with restoration of the greenback trout.‖64  
 It is certain that the NPS policy shift announced in 1937 posed a hardship for 
RMNP. Obtaining, breeding, and planting cutthroats of any variety had been 
historically difficult. Nevertheless, RMNP had followed the new policy with little 
complaint. The discovery of the suspected strains of greenback in the park, however, 
further circumscribed the type of fish available for stocking by greatly complicating 
exactly what constituted a ―native‖ trout. Given the limited number of suspected 
greenbacks on hand and the delicate and slow process of building a large breeding 
population, it might be years before RMNP could again report the stocking of 
hundreds of thousands of fish as it had in decades prior. Always fearful of attracting 
public ire, RMNP Superintendent Rogers complained to Regional Director Baker, ―It 
is our opinion that considerable adverse comment by Park fishermen will be the 
ultimate result, particularly if fishing efforts are less productive than in the past.‖65 
 Hoping to find a solution to the current fisheries crisis, the NPS turned to the 
expertise of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife for help. During the 1961-62 
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season, aquatic biologist Robert Azevedo undertook a comprehensive study of the 
lakes of Rocky Mountain National Park. In all, Azevedo gathered data on twenty-five 
lakes in the park and made recommendations based on those findings. According to 
Azevedo, original ―native fish fauna of Rocky Mountain National Park [was] limited 
in numbers of species and was restricted in distribution. Although lowland waters 
were originally inhabited by cutthroat trout, suckers, and possibly other species, it is 
believed that fishes were absent from the upland lakes and streams,‖ due to waterfalls 
that presented ―insurmountable barriers to the upstream movement of fishes.‖ 
Echoing the findings of previous investigations, Azevedo also stated that ―[p]ristine 
conditions have been vastly altered by active programs of stocking of non-native 
species and strains of trout in nearly all park waters.‖ The nearly century-long effort 
to stock the waters of Colorado and RMNP with available and popular trout species, 
believed Azevedo, meant that any attempt to ―determine the original composition and 
distribution of the native park fishes‖ would be extremely difficult.66   
 Aside from pointing out the difficulties that lay ahead in repairing and 
managing the aquatic resources of the park, Azevedo revealed other bad news. 
According to his report, Dr. Robert Miller, Curator of Fishes at the University of 
Michigan Museum to whom specimen of suspected greenback trout were sent in 1957 
and 1958, concluded that those fish gathered from Forest Canyon were not salmo 
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 In addition to Dr. Miller‘s conclusions, the NPS had also discovered 
archival records that showed that 160,000 ―cutthroat trout, listed as ‗spotted natives,‘ 
[likely Yellowstone cutthroats] were planted in the upper end of Forest Canyon in 
1922 and that 130,000 were released in 1923.‖ As was common during the early 
1920s, the fish stocked in Forest Canyon were planted by ―the Estes Park Fish and 
Game Association in cooperation with the National Park Service and the Rocky 
Mountain Transportation Company.‖68 In other words, the closing of the Fay Lakes, 
the removal of exotic fish from them, the capture of fish from Forest Canyon, and the 
eventual aerial dumping of those fish were all for naught. Hence, concluded Azevedo, 
―efforts to protect and perpetuate them as such are without valid purpose,‖ and the 
lakes should be reopened to fishing.
69
  
 In addition to the above bad news, Azevedo also advised a new management 
policy regarding the highly popular Bear Lake. Here, the biologist found that ―Bear 
Lake receives heavy use from many types of visitors in addition to anglers,‖ which 
had resulted in badly eroded shorelines.  Although he was hopeful that the ―recently 
paved trail around the lake [would] channelize much of the wear and tear and 
eventually result in an improvement of this eroded condition,‖ he recommended the 
―discouragement or elimination of the anglers from fishing in the lake.‖ Doing so, he 
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argued, would enhance the natural scenery around the lake and allow ―visitors to walk 
on the path in greater safety without danger from flying hooks.‖70  
 The lake and stream surveys, capture of suspected greenbacks, closure of 
popular waters, and the greatly circumscribed stocking program all reflect the specific 
ways in which greater ecological understanding were working to redefine what 
constituted proper use of specific places within the park itself.  Azevedo‘s 
recommendation that Bear Lake be closed to fishing offers a direct example of this 
process. Even before the creation of RMNP, Bear Lake was one of the most popular 
destinations for the fishing tourist. As ecological and scientific understanding 
deepened within the NPS, however, it reshaped how park managers envisioned their 
institutional mandates and thus brought about changes in what sorts of activities were 
allowed in certain spaces. Even though the NPS reported that ―[r]ecreational fishing 
within Rocky Mountain National park continues to be one of the more popular 
attractions to visitors,‖ there was little managers could do to address widespread 
reports that ―harvests and angler-success are quite limited‖ while pursuing a policy 
aimed at restoring park waters with greenbacks.
71
 To gauge the degree to which 
science had gained ascendancy in matters of fish policy, one need look no further 
than the stocking records for the 1961 season. For all of that year, RMNP planted 
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only 41,500 fish—all of which were Yellowstone cutthroat fry—in 16 different lakes, 
a number far below stocking levels common in the 1920s and 1930s.
72
  
Parks as a whole were facing similar difficulties across the country, forcing 
the NPS to look for evermore innovative solutions to their problems. For generations, 
willow creels bursting with fish spoke directly to a fishermen‘s acumen and the 
fecundity of the water itself. As indicated in the previous chapter, catching and 
keeping large numbers of fish required the annual stocking of hundreds of 
thousands—sometimes millions—of fish. By the early 1960s, with ecological 
understanding on the rise, native fish in short supply, and the number of fishermen 
increasing, a new solution was required. At this most critical time, the NPS turned to 
a concept referred to initially as ―fishing for fun.‖  
In a paper presented in 1963 before the National Convention of Trout 
Unlimited in Allenberry, Pennsylvania, NPS naturalist Orthello L. Wallis told 
crowds, ―Fishing-For-Fun is a concept that there is more to fishing than filling one‘s 
creel. It is a philosophy that numerous authors have expressed and that a multitude of 
anglers have enjoyed for many years. Now this concept is being translated into trout 
management plans.‖73 At the heart of ―fishing for fun‖ (more commonly called catch-
and-release) was the belief that a true sportsman did not desire the wanton destruction 
of fish for mere amusement, but rather respected his quarry enough to practice 
angling techniques that ensured the safe return of the fish from whence they came. 
                                               
72
 Ibid., 3.  
73
 Orthello L. Wallis, ―The Challenge of Fishing for Fun,‖ (paper presented at the National 
Convention of Trout, Unlimited, Allenberry PA, 7 September 1963), NADRG 79, Numerical 
Subject Files 1952-1965, Box 15 8ns-079-97-437, ff ―Fish.‖ 
 245 
Such practices included the use of barbless hooks, artificial flies and lures that were 
less likely to be swallowed by fish, and keeping fish submerged while removing 
hooks.
74
 Each of the above, if followed diligently, greatly enhanced the likelihood 
that a fish would survive the trauma of being caught and hence releasing the fish will 
allow it to be caught another day. 
Although the introduction of a catch-and-release policy may have been a 
radical step for the NPS, it was not an entirely new concept. According to Wallis, 
―Writers have long extolled the pleasures of angling amid scenic and placid 
surroundings and not the thrill of the kill alone.‖75 In fact, the concept likely 
originated in the 1870s when writers began calling for the use of barbless hooks, 
which greatly increased the chances of a fish‘s survival after release.76 As the idea of 
fishing for fun spread, regulations designed to encourage the behavior became more 
common, with the Michigan legislature enacting one of the first fly-fishing-only laws 
to protect the Au Sable River.
77
 In 1949, likely responding to the postwar demand for 
recreational fishing, the Pennsylvania Fish Commission adopted the motto, ―Kill 
Less—Catch More!‖78  
 Further reflecting the changing sentiment amongst some fishermen was the 
1948 publication in Sports Afield entitled, ―Want Less Fishing?‖ According to Dr. 
Eschmeyer, the article‘s author, the increased demands fishermen were placing upon 












fish meant that the fish could no longer be caught and kept by a single individual, but 
rather reused or recycled through their return to the water.  Emphatically making his 
point,  Dr. Eschmeyer  claimed, ―We no longer need the meat as the pioneers 
did…we must learn to fish for fun…one way to provide more fishing is to put back 
the fish we catch.‖79  In 1952 the National Park Service and the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service ―cooperated in the establishment of a pioneer Fishing-For-Fun, no-kill 
program in Great Smoky Mountains National Park.‖ Under the new program, which 
built upon regulations already in place that required the use of artificial flies and 
lures, fishermen were also required by law to release the fish they caught.
80
  
 The concept of catch-and-release fishing was attractive to the NPS for many 
reasons. Amidst the difficulties they faced in keeping parks like Rocky stocked with 
adequate numbers of catchable native trout, catch-and-release had the capacity to 
stretch the fish the park did have so that more fishermen could enjoy them. Doing so 
would not only alleviate fishing pressure, but would allow the NPS to keep stocking 
budgets relatively low, while not violating the NPS‘s mission to support native 
species. The NPS was aware, however, that enacting such a fundamental shift in 
fishing regulations also came with a greater chance of upsetting the fishing public so 
long accustomed to keeping that which they caught. Speaking directly to this matter, 
the Assistant Director of Conservation, Interpretation, and Use stated that ―We are 
well aware that progress in this field must be made slowly; too rapid expansion of the 
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program, at this time, could exceed the public acceptance of the concept.‖81 This 
statement is significant in that it reflects the difficulties the NPS faced in redefining—
in very specific ways—how humans behaved in riparian areas within national parks. 
In this instance, the arrival of more ecologically-driven management required a 
fundamental shift in the aims and methods of fishing itself. Moreover, this statement 
reflects the understanding on the part of the NPS that fostering such a shift involved 
more that a simple policy mandate ahead of the acceptance of the concept would 
cause major public relations issues with the public.  
 With ecological appreciation on the rise, fundamental shifts occurring in 
recreational fishing, increased excitement about the possibility of bringing the 
greenbacks back from the brink of extinction, and NPS mandates that heavily favored 
native species, RMNP abandoned completely stocking as a tool to support sport 
fishing in 1968. From July of that year to the present, RMNP did not stock a single 
non-native fish.  The era of fishing for tourists had effectively come to an end as 
science and scientific concern came to dominate the ends and means of how the 
spaces along rivers, streams, and lakes were used within the park.  
Although RMNP abandoned stocking in 1968, they continued searching for 
―pure‖ strains of greenback trout in the following years.  By 1973 it seemed likely 
that they had found two pockets of greenbacks still swimming the waters of the 
Eastern Slope of Colorado—one in Como Creek and one in South Fork, Cache La 
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Poudre River. These two streams, both part of the South Platte River drainage, held 
what scientists believed to be an estimated 2,000 pure greenbacks inhabiting an 
estimated 4.6 kilometers of stream.
82
 Following the passage of the Endangered 
Species Act in 1973, the greenback trout was officially listed as endangered and 
afforded all the legal protections of the law.
83
 In the hopes of restoring the 
endangered species, fisheries researchers chemically treated Hidden Valley Creek in 
RMNP to remove the brook trout that dominated the stream in the hopes of restoring 
it with the greenbacks. The first planting of the greenbacks in Hidden Valley took 
place in 1973.
84
 Further hoping to establish stable and naturally reproducing 
populations of greenbacks, the NPS and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service removed all 
brook trout from Bear Lake and restocked it with greenbacks in 1975.
85
  
The 1977 season brought more developments for the restoration of the 
greenbacks. In addition to completing the first comprehensive greenback trout 
recovery plan, researchers also located another likely pure population of greenback 
trout in 2.8 kilometers of Cascade Creek. To give them a wider range of tools to aid 
in the restoration of the greenbacks, including the introduction of angling for non-
greenbacks, the trout recovery team recommended the ―down listing‖ of greenback 
from endangered to threatened. Their reason for doing so was simple. If listed as 
endangered, no angling could take place in water that contained greenbacks as part of 
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the legal protection that prevents the ―taking‖ of endangered species. If listed as 
threatened, however, the legal protections against taking would be somewhat relaxed 
and limited fishing could take place in waters containing greenbacks. As the NPS had 
hoped, the greenback was listed as a threatened species in 1978.
86
 By 1981 an 
estimated 630 greenback ―sub-adults‖ and more than 16,000 fry had been produced 




With several projects under way, the restoration team and its partners in 
Bozeman had finally bred enough greenbacks to allow for stocking at a rate of 1,000 
fry per hectare, a level high enough to open many of the areas to limited fishing. 
Beginning in 1982, RMNP implemented the very first season of catch-and-release 
fishing in many of the park‘s waters that contained the precious greenback. Driven 
both by the desire to allow angling opportunities in the park and the desire to protect 
greenbacks from invasive species like the brook trout, the NPS designed its catch-
and-release program to achieve both. Specifically, in waters like Hidden Valley 
Creek, RMNP allowed angling with artificial flies and lures but required that 
fishermen release all greenback caught, while encouraging them to keep all brook 
trout. This catch-and-release/catch and kill policy is still in effect for most of the 
waters in the park today.  
Reflecting the changing nature of fisheries management in and around RMNP, 
the Estes Park Hatchery, which had been badly damaged by the floods that ripped 
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through Estes Park in July of 1982, was finally slated for closure in January of 1983. 
The Colorado State Division of Wildlife planned to replace the old Estes Park 
Hatchery with a larger capacity facility located closer to Denver. Although many in 
Estes Park were concerned that the closure of the EPH would negatively impact 
tourism in the town, it was clear to many that the facility was no longer needed.
88
  
The closure of the hatchery bears witness to the vastly changed nature of 
fisheries management in RMNP. When the facility was originally built, it was truly a 
local endeavor. Although the state soon assumed control of the hatchery, it remained 
a largely local affair as the citizens of Estes Park contributed their time, money, and 
energy to stocking the waters in and around RMNP. This high level of community 
involvement was much welcomed by the newly established NPS. In fact, for the first 
twenty years of RMNP regional and national NPS officials had relatively little input 
into the species, numbers, and locations of fish stocked in the park. It was not until 
1936 that the NPS regional and national management began taking a more active role 
in what individual parks were stocking. From that point on, the operations at the EPH 
grew evermore irrelevant as scientists both within and without the NPS began 
assuming a more central role in fisheries management.  
With the hatchery closed and greenback restoration well underway, RMNP 
continued to expand its catch-and-release policy across the park. Between 1988 and 
1994, for example, thirteen lakes and streams across the park that contained stable 
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populations of greenback and allowed catch-and-release fishing.
89
 The marriage of 
catch-and-release angling for greenbacks and catch-and-kill for brook trout and other 
species, however, has produced mixed results. Beginning in the 1960s fishing for fun 
captured the moral high ground in persuading fishermen to release fish so that they 
may be enjoyed another day. Although this new fisherman‘s ethic was slow to find its 
way into RMNP fishing regulations, it had done so by 1982. In ways that the NPS did 
not anticipate, however, fishermen have not reserved catch-and-release only for 
greenbacks. In 1982-83, for example, anglers reported having released in the 
neighborhood of sixty percent of all brook trout caught. A similar survey for 1984-85 
reflected that fishermen released anywhere from 45-100% of all brook trout caught. 
Additionally, it was estimated that as many as seven percent of all greenbacks caught 
were kept by mistake.
90
  If the catch-and-release program did not work exactly as 
managers had hoped, it nonetheless offered one tool essential to RMNP fisheries 
management today. 
Just as important as finding, breeding, and stocking greenbacks was the 
sometimes difficult and tedious process of educating the public about the importance 
of restoration efforts and the value of the native fish. Beginning in the early 1990s, 
the greenback restoration team began to work more closely with conservation groups 
such as Colorado Trout Unlimited. Doing so allowed for ―increased educational 
opportunities‖ through Trout Unlimited publications and meetings. The restoration 
team also began reaching out to local schools and members of Trout Unlimited to 
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make the greenback the state fish. In 1994 the state‘s previous ―official‖ fish, the 
rainbow trout, was ousted by the greenback trout.
91
  
Fisheries management within RMNP continues to evolve. Most recently, 
graduate student Jessica Metcalf has used DNA analysis to determine—once and for 
all—which fish populations in the park are greenbacks and which are not. Her 
research found that of the nine populations of cutthroat managed within RMNP as 
pure strains of greenback, five are actually hybridized populations. Although 
disappointing news for those involved in restoration efforts, Metcalf‘s findings fit into 
a much broader historical pattern within the park in which the development and 
refinement of scientific knowledge and techniques challenge previous management 
strategies and complicate both the ends and means of preservation.   
 
Conclusion 
The brook trout that now swim the waters of Sky Pond and the greenbacks 
that populate Bear Lake both offer an opportunity to understand the connections 
between the cultural dimensions of tourism, and its very real and powerful 
connections to the material world. Their presence also allows us to witness firsthand 
how the arrival of science within the NPS changed how they envisioned what 
constituted proper management, and how that redefinition brought important changes 
to the park‘s fauna and how humans interacted with it. The persistence of brook trout  
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across the park—despite more than six decades of attempting to root them out—also 
speaks to the power of tourism to transform radically the natural world.  
 More than determining which fish belonged in which waters, the arrival of 
science fundamentally challenged how riparian spaces in the park were to be used. 
Even before the twentieth century and continuing at least until the late 1930s, 
fishermen were given free reign over the park‘s riparian areas, and these spaces were  
managed almost wholly for their benefit. Gradually, as science came to play an 
evermore important role in shaping park policy, the use of riparian spaces became 
more complicated as scientists asserted their authority over them. The closure of 
popular waters to fishing, poisoning of lakes and streams to plant protected 
greenbacks, abandonment of stocking altogether, implementation of catch-and-release 
regulations, and the closure of the Estes Park hatchery all serve as examples of this 
process.  
  
              Bumper sticker of greenback trout. 
                            (Reproduced with artist‘s permission) 
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  Many still cross through the gates of the park to fish. But much differentiates 
the fisherman in RMNP in 2008 from one in 1936. For instance, fishermen now travel 
to the park knowing that catches will likely be low, and most of what is caught 
requires prompt return to the waters from whence it came. Fishermen have also come 
to terms with the fact not all of the park‘s waters are open to the sport. But still folks 
do come to fish. Their desire to do so, at least in part, is tied to the flexible genius 
behind those that advertise for tourism. The ―I‘m Back‖ bumper sticker reminds us of 
this. Perhaps more than anything, the sticker speaks to the tourists industry‘s ability to 
sell whatever is at hand. No longer able to sell waters brimming with fish, those 
involved in the tourist industry are now in the business of selling scarcity. Come to 
Rocky Mountain National Park, bring your fly rod, and angle for the nearly extinct 









Elk are as much a part of the iconography of Rocky Mountain National Park 
as Trail Ridge Road, Bear Lake, or flipping an elk hair caddis under the outstretched 
branches of a bank-side willow. For decades families have piled into their cars, 
donned their hiking boots, and pressed binoculars to their faces with the hope of 
seeing one of the park‘s most beloved and recognized animals. If you don‘t believe 
me, take a drive this summer through Moraine Park or over Trail Ridge Road. Not 
only are you likely to see elk in diverse habitats, but you are just as likely to see 
hundreds of ogling tourists pressing toward them, cameras in hand.  
In this sense the proliferation of elk across Estes Park and RMNP has been 
boon for both park and town. Even before the creation of RMNP in 1915, a host of 
people and organizations worked to create an attractive iconography of the park. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, this iconography included the presence of good 
roads and hungry trout. Just as important to that iconography was the opportunity to 
see big, beautiful ―game animals.‖ In much the same way that local and regional 
businesses and the NPS sought to impress upon prospective visitors commodious 
roads and copious trout, they also spent significant time and effort lauding the 
region‘s rich and varied animal life, and for many of the same reasons. 
For the tourist making the much-advertised train ride from Chicago or the 
quick jaunt from Denver, rumors of roadside deer, majestic big-horned sheep, and 
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multitudes of rutting, bugling, sparring elk were indeed great attractions. Realizing 
the close connection between high visitation and ubiquitous game animals, the NPS 
dedicated significant effort to maximizing encounters between visitors and the park‘s 
ungulates. These efforts included an extensive extermination of predatory animals 
such as bobcats, lynx, badger, coyote, and mountain lion, as well as other measures. 
The history of elk in Rocky Mountain between 1915 and 1930 shares much in 
common with the construction of roads and the stocking of fish in the same period. In 
each case, a host of individuals and organizations promoted a specific experience in 
their hopes to draw tourists to the region. This desire, in turn, provided the NPS with 
ample motivation to maximize the number of animals visible within the park. 
Through an active predator reduction program, and a moratorium on hunting within 
the park, the NPS was able to grow its elk population from just a few dozen in 1913 
to several hundred in less than two decade‘s time. In this respect, the wildlife 
management policies worked well in growing NPS visitation and strengthening its 
bureaucratic backbone. By the earliest years of that decade, however, NPS officials 
began linking growing elk herds with visible and significant range degradation.  
Rather than simply demonstrating the many mistakes NPS management made 
as Karl Hess did in his scathing book Rocky Times in Rocky Mountain National Park: 
An Unnatural History, we would do better to understand specifically why the NPS 
made such decisions. To do so, we must come to terms with how and why elk have 
become such an integral part of the Rocky Mountain National Park experience. Such 
an understanding does not exonerate the NPS from its past decisions, but it does 
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allow us to understand why park managers acted as they did. Perhaps most 
importantly, telling a story that draws together public expectations, park management, 
and the ecological community of which elk are a part again reveals the vast power of 
tourism to transform the natural world.   
 
Cervus Elaphus 
 The sound rises on crisp September mornings throughout the Rocky 
Mountains.  It ricochets across canyons, screams through gold splashed aspens, and 
raises gooseflesh on those who hear it. It is an almost otherworldly sound that defies 
written description. It begins with a low, growling and powerful whistle that rises to 
higher and higher octaves, and finishes abruptly.  This bugle, as it is called, is often 
followed by a series of guttural harrumphs. To the human ear, the bugle of the elk 
might be reminiscent of a bagpipe gone bad; to an elk, it is an invitation to make love 
and war, often simultaneously.  
 Elk have roamed the Rocky Mountains for millennia, stretching as far back as 
40,000 years BP.
1
  For much of that time, these animals have been of great interest to 
humans as a source of food, raw materials, and of late, inspiration and entertainment. 
The North American elk is a ruminant, meaning that it has a ―single large stomach 
that is divided into four compartments—the rume, reticulam, omasum and 
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abmasum.‖2 Through a complicated biological and chemical process, elk are able to 
transform grass, forbs, and other vegetal matter into blood, bone, meat and fur. 
Considering the average size of mature elk, often in excess of 1100 pounds for males 
and 600 pounds for females, it should come at no surprise that they require an 
impressive quantity of grass, shrubs, and other leafy matter for sustenance.
3
  
 The feeding habits of elk are flexible, depending on season and available 
forage. Elk can and do select from a range of edible plant species, but often focus on 
those which have the highest caloric benefit as compared to the caloric expenditure of 
eating them.
4
 Prevailing season and the particular elk‘s caloric requirements further 
complicate which foods it will eat and when it will move to a different location. For 
example, a cow supporting a calf through the bountiful summer months will consume 
in the neighborhood of 18 pounds of ―good quality forage‖ per day. Taking into 
consideration the size and structure of their mouths that same cow elk would have to 
dedicate some 13-14 hours per day just in cropping, chewing, and digesting. 
According to dietary studies conducted within RMNP, the majority of park elk‘s diet 
consist of grasses, followed by ―woody shrub species such as willow (Salix spp), with 
aspen (Populus tremuloides) and forbs making up a small portion.‖5  
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In addition to meeting their daily caloric needs, male and female elk spend 
much of their year in the business of reproduction. The cycle begins in August with 
the rut, which often stretches through October. The purpose of the rut, from a purely 
biological point of view, is to select the most fit males for breeding the largest  
number of females. In their effort to build up the largest breeding pool possible, bull 
elk partake in a range of behaviors to demonstrate their virility, including bugling and 
or dominance fights. As it is understood, the bugle is essentially an open invitation to 
other bulls to challenge dominance. In cases where a mature bull is challenged by an 
immature bull, a head-on rush accompanied by a show of teeth and hissing is often 
 
Two bull elk found dead following combat just outside RMNP. 
(Superintendent‘s Annual Report, 1937)  
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enough to drive the adversary from the field. In cases where the challenger is also a 
mature bull, the proceedings look much different.
6
  
 Rather than run the risk of serious bodily harm or the fruitless burning of 
precious calories just before the onset of winter, a harem-tending bull will often first 
resort to a series of postures to drive off a well-matched opponent. Such postures 
might include the thrashing the ground with antlers, the spraying urine, and or loud 
bugling. If these actions fail to dissuade the other party, fighting is likely to ensue. 
Fights vary widely, but they often entail a shoving match with antlers locked. This 
process, which is often played out several times a day, is serious business. On 
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Bull elk found following a deadly duel with another bull in Beaver Meadows.  
(Superintendent‘s Monthly Report, October 1936 ) 
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average, a rutting bull sustains between 30 and 50 wounds per season, some of which 
lead to infection and even death.
7
 The prize for the bugling, pissing, charging and 
fighting is copulation with the females belonging to his harem.  
 During the longest and coldest days of winter a bred cow begins growing a 
new elk, a process that takes in the neighborhood of 255 days.
8
 Around the first of 
June, cows typically give birth to their calves.
9
 The rigors of predation and impending 
seasonal change put a premium on all ungulates‘ ability to grow quickly, and elk are 
no different. At birth the typical calf weighs in the neighborhood of 110 pounds, but 
the fat-and calorie-rich milk from their mothers promotes quick growth and by their 
first spring they typically weigh between 310 and 350 pounds.
10
 
 Such is the life cycle of Cervus Elaphus. Viewed from afar it is a wonderfully 
choreographed movement of animals across time and space: large herds gathering in 
the fall and winter, fighting and making babies; the diffusion of herds in the spring 
accompanied by the birth of calves into the bosom of lush green summer grass; and 
the drawing together in fall to begin the cycle once again. Although they have 
specific caloric reasons to stay in one place and thereby maximize the ratio between 
caloric intake and expenditure, the changing seasons and predation keep herds of elk 
from settling into a specific location. This has the consequence of reducing the 
likelihood that their range will be overgrazed by any given group of elk. In a perfect 
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world, this is how it works.  As we know, however, the world is often less than 
perfect. 
 
Branding a National Park 
 To those in the business of promoting and selling, ―branding‖ refers to efforts 
intended to associate a product with a certain sentiment that might compel a person to 
purchase it. Managers of RMNP have sought to associate their park (i.e., their 
product) with certain images, hopes, and attitudes, including smooth and commodious 
roads, powerful and pristine scenery, and great fishing. In this sense, the history of 
RMNP reflects the broader institutional tendencies within the NPS. From the very 
earliest days of the national park concept in the 1870s through most of the twentieth 
century, the NPS managed many of its resources for the edification of tourists.
 
 
In seeking to broaden the appeal of the park, NPS officials and others worked 
diligently to associate the Rocky Mountain National Park experience with the 
viewing of game animals. In this sense, the history of RMNP is little different than 
Yellowstone, Yosemite or the Grand Canyon.  As originally conceived, national parks 
were to be vast ―living museums‖ where visitors could witness first hand fish, fowl, 
and furred animals in their natural habitat. It was a strategy that worked well for the 
promotion and growth of the national park system. After all, driving across a smooth 
road casting one‘s gaze upon splendid peaks is one thing, but being close enough to 
see, smell and almost touch an elk, deer, or bighorn sheep from that same automobile 
is an altogether different experience. 
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 Not surprisingly, some of the earliest promoters of big game in the area were 
the very same groups that promoted the great fishing and driving in and around Estes 
Park. In the Union Pacific‘s Colorado For the Tourist, for example, the railroad 
promoted the state‘s fecund wildlife through both prose and picture. Given that this 
publication was designed to advertise all of Colorado, and since it was published well 
before the creation of RMNP in 1915, hunting rather than viewing animals was the 
focus. According to the pamphlet, the mountains of Colorado abounded in  
deer, bear, elk and grouse. Bear and grouse may be hunted ad libitum, but the 
elk and deer are protected by statute. Flocks of mountain sheep can be seen, 
but they are protected for the present. For the hardier hunter there are 
mountain lions, bob-cats and wolves, and there is no better sport than an 




Advertising the plentiful opportunities to hunt the wilds of Colorado was an effective 
strategy. As several historians have argued, American men were increasingly 
interested in tapping into masculine activities in a world where the effete seemed to 
be on the rise. The ever-perceptive UP tapped into such concerns for the betterment 
of their bottom line.   
In their 1913 publication Where the Rockies Reign Supreme, which was 
dedicated wholly to the promotion of Estes Park, the Union Pacific continued its 
promotion of wildlife in the region: 
It is but natural that in such a rugged country there should be plenty of game. 
Bear and deer are found within a day‘s tramp, and mountain sheep, which are 
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Again, if one took the word of the UP as gospel, Estes Park promised the same sort of 
hunting and wildlife viewing opportunities as the rest of the Centennial State.  
In their 1924 publication entitled Colorado’s Mountain Playgrounds, the 
Union Pacific continued to promote the region‘s abundant wildlife, but the tone of 
their promotion had changed. Rather thank celebrating the state as a hunter‘s 
paradise, the publication touted it as a ―Sanctuary for Bird and Beast.‖ Within this 
sanctuary, promised the UP,  
forests and streams have many inhabitants now safe from trapper and hunter. 
The beaver has countless dome-shaped tenements in the streams, where he 
may be seen by patient watching. The foremost mountain climber on the 
globe, the bighorn sheep, roams the precipices of the highest peaks. Deer are 
often encountered, but bears are few and rarely seen; marmots, woodchucks, 
rabbits and conies are common.
13
  
                                               
13
 Colorado Mountain Playgrounds (Union Pacific Railroad: 1924), 8-10. 
 
 
Caption read ―Rocky Mountain Sheep are often seen by Park visitors.‖  
                                       (From Rocky Mountain National Park Colorado, circa 1920)  
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The creation of RMNP in 1915, with its emphasis upon seeing rather than shooting 
wildlife, clearly worked its way into the promotion of the region. Regardless if 
viewed from the working end of a rifle or from the backside of a Kodak, corporations 
like the UP were well aware that abundant wildlife along their rails held the promise 
of more patrons, and thus they dedicated significant time, money, and effort 
promoting their presence.   
Reliance upon wildlife to promote the park is also apparent in the Burlington‘s 
publication Colorado: Rocky Mountain National (Estes) Park. According to the 
author, ―Rocky Mountain National Park is a natural home for bear, deer, Rocky 
Mountain Sheep, beaver, and other wild animals, as well as numerous species of 
birds. Under government regulations the wild animal life in the Park is fully 
protected.‖  The publication continues:  
[The] Bighorn or Rocky Mountain sheep, with their circling horns, are seen in 
increasing numbers each year. Frequently they may be approached sufficiently 
near to photograph. To see them jumping from crag to crag, graceful and 
agile, or dropping off a precipice, is a sight long to be remembered. They 
congregate during the summer months on Specimen Mountain, where they 
often may be seen from the trail. 
 
In addition to amplifying wildlife viewing opportunities, the railroad also revealed 
that the ―wildlife‖ had lost some or all of its wariness were humans were concerned. 
To Americans interested in experiencing such animals, the promise of close proximity 
was indeed a powerful lure. This pamphlet was also one of the first to mention the 
park‘s growing elk herd. According to the Burlington, there were ―more than 150 elk, 
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and they are frequently seen.‖ 14 From 
the mid-1920s onward, the mention of 
elk in the region‘s promotional 
literature would become more and 
more common.  
Railroad companies were not 
the only businesses interested in 
promoting the animal life of Estes 
Park. The Elkhorn Lodge, which 
entertained guests as early as 1880, 
made an obvious connection between 
wildlife simply through the selection 
of their moniker.
15
  Beyond naming 
themselves the Elkhorn and festooning their hotel—both inside and out—with 
copious antler sheds and animal heads, their advertisements and brochures also used 
faunal iconography to draw tourists to Estes Park. In a brochure likely printed in the 
late 1910s, the Elkhorn promised that Horseshoe Park was a place where ―mountain 
sheep are becoming so tame that they will allow you to approach within fifty feet and 
take photographs.‖16 In addition to such promises, the Elkhorn also claimed that ―[i]n 
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an effort to reinstate a condition that existed in former times, the State has lately 
turned a band of Elk into the Park, which still roam in the neighboring hills and can 
be frequently seen.‖17  
 Following the dark days of World War II, Edwin Alberts published Rocky 
Mountain National Park, Colorado as part of the Natural History Handbook Series on 
behalf of the National Park Service. The series, which was intended to explain ―the 
natural history of scenic and scientific areas in the National Park System,‖ contains 
valuable information on a wide range of plant and animal life within RMNP. In a 
manner that modern environmental historians would appreciate, Alberts‘s work 
begins with a description of how the forces of gravity, ice and time had chiseled and 
gouged the park‘s many canyons and cirques.  
Following his primer on glaciation, Alberts included a section on ―Hoofed 
Animals.‖ Here, Alberts led off with a discussion of the wapati—or Rocky Mountain 
Elk. After offering a brief summation of the animal‘s breeding and feeding habits, 
Alberts stated that in ―late September, as the mating season begins and the bulls fight 
for possession of the herds, large groups of elk can be seen in such places as 
Horseshoe Park and Beaver Meadows.‖18 Alberts gives the distinct impression that 
Regardless of the season, seeing elk is not a difficult task. In fact, he states that in the 
―summer you may see them along the Trail Ridge Highway, emerging from the forest 
below Fall River Pass or the Rock Cut area…From mid-September until March or 
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April, herds of elk are normally to be seen in Beaver Meadows, Horseshoe Park, and 
the Meadows north of Grand Lake.‖19 Alberts‘s entreaty reveals an interesting and 
telling pattern, and one common to the surveyed promotional literature on elk in 
RMNP.  In the vast majority of the instances where elk are mentioned in the park‘s 
promotional literature, they are mentioned either to be in areas where roads exist, or 
within the proximity of roads themselves.  
The concerted effort to promote the area‘s abundant wildlife makes historical 
sense. To the growing class of Americans with the time, money, and motivation to 
escape more urban settings, the chance to view wildlife was a great attraction. The 
Earl of Dunraven knew this; so too did the members of the Estes Park Improvement 
Association who originally conceived of RMNP as a game preserve. The Union 
Pacific Railroad and the National Park Service were also well aware that an 
abundance of animal life in and around Estes Park—whether for sport or for 
viewing—promised to please the growing number of people annually attracted to the 
Estes Park region. Through their brochures, pamphlets, touring guides, and other 
printed material, these and others linked Rocky Mountain National Park and the 
opportunity to view wildlife. The desire to see wildlife, especially the park‘s 
ungulates, put the NPS in a position to manage those animals in such a way that 
increased the likelihood that a visitor would encounter them. 
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Growing Elk  
 It is impossible to know with certainty when the last elk was shot in the Estes 
Park region, or whether or not elk were indeed completely exterminated as is 
commonly thought. What is known, however, is that the rapid growth of Denver and 
surrounding mining camps in the 1860s and 1870s put tremendous strain on the plant 
and animal life along the Front Range. According to one of the earliest residents of 
Estes Park, Abner Sprauge, the elk ―lasted about three years. They came down from 
their high range just before Christmas, 1875, by the thousands and were met by 
hunters with repeating rifles and four horse teams; hauled to Denver for three or four 
cents per pound. In 1876 fewer came down; in ‘77 very few were seen on [the east] 
side of the divide. In 1878 I killed my last elk, and to get him had to go over Flat Top 
[Mountain].‖20 By the middle of the 1880s, it appears that there were very few, if any, 
elk in the Estes Park region.   
 In park to restock the area with elk, the first of two shipments of elk arrived 
from Yellowstone National Park in 1913. The following year an additional twenty-
five were shipped, bringing the total number of surviving elk in Estes Park to about 
thirty.
21
 According to the Estes Park Trail, ―One of the interesting sights for tourists 
in Estes Park, which will be new even to former visitors, is a herd of about twenty-
five elk, which can be observed any day grazing in what had been rechristened the 
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Stanley Elk park.‖22 The elk, which were ―apparently‖ contented ―with their new 




As early as 1917, park officials reported that ―[c]onditions for wild animals in 
the Park have been excellent. The weather has been exceptionally mild, and the 
abundant feed of the earlier months promises to last well into the fall.‖24 Monthly 
tallies of animals seen supported the optimistic tenor of the report. In November of 
that year, for example, park staff counted a total of ―48 grouse, 19 elk, and 60 
mountain sheep.‖25  Under such favorable conditions, the park‘s elk herd grew 
quickly, much to the pleasure of the NPS. According to their official count, by 1918 
there ―were 5 herd of elk in the park‖ with a total population of about sixty, and they 
were ―increasing rapidly.‖26 To a park eager to attract visitors as quickly as possible, 
herds of multiplying game animals meant nothing but good things.  
By the close of 1918, just three years following the park‘s creation, 
Superintendent L. Claude Way was already keenly aware of the connection between 
visible game animals and increasing visitation. In his 1918 annual report, he stated:  
good days brought many visitors to the park, to see the wild game, the 
numbers seen being exceptionally great. One party counted 82 deer, 41 
mountain sheep, and 27 elk, on the South slope of Deer Mountain, in 
one hour‘s time, while driving along the High Drive Road. No doubt 
there were as many more deer and sheep that they did not see.
27
  






 Superintendent‘s Monthly Report, October, 1917. 
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The superintendent‘s report is intriguing for a couple of reasons. First, it shows that at 
least some park visitors kept a close tally of the wildlife they encountered, perhaps 
revealing a heightened level of interest in seeing such animals. That the 
superintendent included the counts in his report reflects the interest that he and his 
superiors also had in the presence of ample wildlife. Lastly, the superintendent, the 
visitors, or both were impressed with the animals being so close to the road.  
The elk shipped to and released in Estes Park, combined with the already 
existent herds of deer and big horned sheep, gave prospective visitors much to ponder 
in anticipation of a trip to RMNP. From the NPS‘s perspective, however, there was 
one significant problem. Although grey wolves and grizzly bears—both top-tier 
predators of deer, elk, and big horned sheep—had been extirpated prior to the 
establishment of the park, many predators still lurked in the park‘s shadows in search 
of their next meal.
28
 Reflecting the prevailing attitude that any animal that threatened 
the existence of so-called ―game animals‖ was a threat to the mission of the NPS, the 
first superintendent of RMNP reported, ―[T]here are coyotes and mountain lions 
roaming within the Park and if they increase to any extent, will become a detriment to 
the preservation of other animals.‖29  
 To understand fully the role of ―game‖ animals like elk in the early years of 
the National Park Service it is helpful to look to the broader place of such animals in 
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the United States at the turn of the century. According to historian John Reiger, 
―American sportsmen, those who hunted and fished for pleasure rather than 
commerce or necessity, were the real spearhead of conservation.‖30 Through the 
publication of magazines and journals like American Sportsman and Forest and 
Stream, sportsmen found a common voice and were able to create something akin to a 
group identity. Giving structure and a powerful voice to sportsmen were 
organizations such as the Boone and Crockett Club, which Reiger claims was ―the 
first private organization to deal effectively with conservation issues of national 
scope.‖31  
Although Reiger is makes an important point in that sportsmen were an 
important component in the development of conservation, his argument often 
stretches well beyond his evidence, as is the case when he asserts that the sportsman‘s 
concern with game habitat compelled them toward a more holistic approach to 
resource management. In his zeal to prove once and for all that hunters have been 
positive forces of historical change through their contributions to the conservation 
movement, he fails to consider fully the role of hunters as promoters of predator 
eradication. Throughout the twentieth century, few groups of public resource users—
save perhaps ranchers—have so vociferously called for the destruction of predators. 
The reason is straightforward enough. Any animal that preyed upon ―game animals‖ 
threatened a valuable recreational resource and thus should be removed from the 
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 This too, we must remember, is a legacy of the sportsman, one inherited 
by the newly founded National Park Service.  
Although the NPS was created with a mission very different from the Forest 
Service, the Biological Survey, or later the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, their initial 
interpretation of their organic legislation often reflects the philosophies of its sister 
agencies. This is especially true in the realm of ―game management.‖ As historian 
Thomas Dunlap demonstrates, both sportsmen and so-called nature lovers loathed 
predatory animals. The sportsman‘s animus came from his fear that predators 
removed valuable game from the range, while nature lovers loathed predators because 
they saw them as base and cruel. In any case, when the NPS was founded wolves, 
coyotes, and other predators found little sympathy in the United States. As such, it 
should come as no surprise that the NPS held essentially the same attitude toward 
coyotes, wolves, and the like.  
Making matters worse, at least as far as predators were concerned, was the 
fact that the NPS was a small and relatively unstable organization upon its founding. 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, this put the NPS in the position of having to 
turn to outside organizations (both private and public) for assistance in carrying out 
their various programs. In the case of wildlife management, RMNP turned often to 
the help and expertise of the Biological Survey. As originally conceived, the 
Biological Survey was an agency charged with the regulation of hunting and fishing, 
as well as putting in place policies that enhanced both. As a result, the Survey was an 
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early and ardent proponent of predator ―control‖ as part of their broader effort to 
enhance the killing of game animals by sportsmen. The NPS‘s reliance upon 
organizations like the Biological Survey to carry out its mission is reflected at least in 
part in the NPS‘s adoption of similar predator control programs. The major difference 
between the two, however, lay in the motivations for the policy of extermination 
itself. The Survey was able for many decades to promote predator reduction as a 
means to enhance hunting. For the NPS, however, who strictly forbid hunting within 
its administered lands, predator control was pursued largely to promote the population 
growth of ―game animals‖ to please the tourist. 
To encourage the growth of the tiny band of elk, and to protect further the 
populations of deer and big horn sheep already abounding in the park, RMNP began 
an extensive program to exterminate a wide range of ―predatory animals‖ that 
threatened other members of the park‘s faunal community. In their first year of 
predator reduction in 1917, the NPS killed five foxes, at least four coyotes, and seven 
martens.
33
 Far more disconcerting than the presence of marten and fox in the park 
was the skulking, lengthy, and furtive mountain lion. More than any predator that 
remained in the park the mountain lion was directly implicated in a wide range of elk, 
deer, and big horn sheep killings. Although such occurrences are now fairly common 
in a wide range of modern national parks, and ones often welcomed as signs of 
properly functioning ecosystems, such was not the case in the earliest years of the 
NPS. Instead, newspaper articles and NPS monthly and annual reports early treated 
                                               
33
 Superintendent‘s Annual Report, 1917; Superintendent‘s Monthly Report, February, 1917. 
 275 
incidents of predation as homicides wherein the suspect was to be hunted down and 
executed for his crime.
34
  
In 1919 the superintendent of RMNP reported that although the ―[d]eer, elk 
and sheep are coming down from the higher altitudes, and are in very good 
condition,‖ there were ―[m]ore mountain lion …reported this year than ever before,‖ 
compelling him to acquire ―lion dogs‖ and to initiate ―an intensive campaign against 
predatory animals.‖35 Initial attempts to track and kill a mountain lion responsible for 
killing a deer in December of that year failed due to unfavorable weather conditions, 
but the winter of 1919-1920 brought the death of six mountain lions in and adjacent 
to the park, five of which were females.
36
 December of 1920 brought the destruction 
of two more cats, one hunted with dogs, the other caught in a trap.
37
  
Not surprisingly, as populations of big cats and other predators declined, the 
number of ungulates and other animals increased. In the summer of 1920, for 
example, the RMNP superintendent Way reported, 
It has not been uncommon to count 300 head of deer in one day; and the 
increase in the number of these animals has been surprising. Sheep have also 
been seen in large numbers, especially in the neighborhood of Mary‘s Lake, 
fifty head having been counted at one time…Elk herds have also been 
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Year after year, the monthly counts of game animals increased, giving managers clear 
evidence that their predator eradication program was having its desired effect. In the 
same monthly report issued in 1921, park personnel reported that ―[a]ll animal life 
seems to be on the increase, especially elk, which have been seen this fall in larger 
numbers than ever before. 49 elk were seen in one herd, at one time, in Horseshoe 
Park.‖ In nearly the same breath, the report states that ―[e]ight bob cats and one lion 
were killed during the month in territory immediately adjacent to the National Park. 
One lion was shot in the National Park but got away.‖39  
 Anxious to build upon their previous season‘s success, RMNP issued permits 
to five men to trap predators within the park in 1922.
40
 Park staff also hosted 
Predatory Animal Inspector Stanly P. Young and hunter John Crook, both of the U.S. 
Biological Survey, at Rocky Mountain. As superintendent Roger Toll of RMNP 
accompanied the two men through Rocky Mountain, the Estes Park Fish and Game 
Association held a meeting regarding the killing of predators in and around the park. 
According to Toll‘s report, ―Local cooperation was expressed on all sides, and the 
advisability recognized of reducing the predatory animals, which kill a larger number 
of game animals each year.‖ Moreover, claimed the superintendent, ―Mr. Harris, 
Editor of the Trail, gave publicity to the campaign and helped to distribute the 
warning to keep dogs away from the poison‖ that was to be set for the lions.41 After 
setting seventeen poison stations around the park, the NPS killed two coyotes and a 
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bobcat. More importantly, they tracked and killed a mountain lion that they claimed 
was responsible for killing a five-point buck. As reported, the lion was over six feet in 
length and was the mother to three kittens.
42
 
 Knowing what we know now about the crucial relationship between predators 
and prey, the monthly and annual reports read a bit like a bad horror movie. 
Beginning in 1922, after receiving numerous complaints from land owners about 
dammed streams and damaged property, the NPS retained a trapper to capture beaver 
in and around the park. In all, he trapped some forty-six beaver, with the hides 
apparently taken as payment for his services.
43
 Not yet making any apparent 
connections between extensive predator control and booming populations of beaver, 
the NPS forged ahead. In the winter of 1921-1922 they killed a total of six mountain 
lion, twenty bobcats, and various other animals deemed predators. In all, they 
exterminated forty-seven predators from the park in that single year.
44
 Later that 
season, alarmed park personnel reported that the ―Wyoming ground squirrel is getting 
to be a great pest in the Park.‖ Although ―it was not known in this region until a few 
years ago‖ it was ―increasing so rapidly that much destruction [had] been done to 
crops, meadow lands, and gardens.‖ To deal with this development, the biological 
survey (the same organization that was so helpful in ―controlling‖ the park‘s 






 Superintendent‘s Monthly Report, April, 1922. 
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 Although park personnel witnessed the proliferation of unwanted pests like 
the Wyoming ground squirrel, their predator program continued to pay dividends as 
far as big game was concerned. By the fall of 1922, with the elk in the midst of the 
rut, sightings were ―numerous‖ with some herds as large as sixty animals. Of 
arguably more importance was the fact that the elk were now ―very tame, and 
approach to within a short distance of the public road.‖46  
 Believing that the current management practice was working as intended, the 
NPS continued the extermination campaign. In addition to issuing permits to ―several 
hunters last winter to trap predatory animals,‖ the NPS set out poison stations. In all, 
they took four foxes, six bobcats and seven coyotes in 1923.
47
 With numbers of 
predators continuing to diminish, all signs pointed toward higher levels of visitor 
enjoyment as deer, elk, and sheep ―were seen in quite large numbers in portions of the 
park frequented by the automobile visitors.‖48  
 Further reflecting the success of their predator reduction program, 
superintendent Roger Toll excitedly reported in the fall of 1925 that ―[o]ne herd of 
100 elk has been reported counted in Beaver Park. This is the largest reported count 
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ever received at this office.‖49 And as the size of the Rocky Mountain elk herd grew, 
evermore people came specifically to see them. ―The elk,‖ reported the 
superintendent, ―seem to be the greatest attraction, both on account of their 
magnificent appearance and the usual difficulty in finding them.‖50  
 As more people came into contact with the park‘s elk, an important change 
began taking place: the elk began losing their fear of humans. One band of elk in 
particular that traditionally fed in the vicinity around Deer Mountain and Horseshoe 
Park in December, for example, had long been visible to visitors. However, by 1926, 
park personnel reported that although it ―has always been possible to see these elk 
from a distance,‖ the ―present season marks the first year when they could be termed 
all tame.‖  In late November of 1926, a ―group of about 100 of these elk were visited 
by large numbers of Estes Park People, who had no difficulty at all in taking whatever 
photographs they desired from the very short distances of 100 to 200 feet. The elk 
showed not the slightest degree of fear of the visitors.‖51  
 More animals within the park—especially ones lounging roadside—held great 
promise for pleasing and growing throngs of visitors. By 1927, with the park‘s elk 
herd estimated at 200 head, park personnel continued to report the correlation 
between visitation and wildlife viewing.
 52
  In March of that year, superintendent Toll 
reported: ―Never before have such large numbers of deer and elk been seen at points 
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close to the public highways throughout the park. This attraction brings more and 
more visitors from the valley towns for trips along park roads during the winter 
season.‖53  
Reflective both of a successful marketing campaign and the growing number 
of elk in the park, superintendent Edmund B. Rogers stated: 
The popularity of the park elk herd is increasing rapidly. Formerly, people 
were unaware of the presence of elk in the park, but now many people come 
here particularly to see them. Early in the month, the elk began to make 
evening appearances in the lower mountain meadows, and could be seen from 
the Highdrive and Moraine Park cut-off roads. It was a common occurrence to 




The novelty of watching 1100-pound animals stomping, bugling, and thrashing their 
way through the rut was powerful enough to draw visitors to the park on moonlight 
nights, with carloads of visitors seen ―every night‖ in Horseshoe, Moraine, and 
Beaver Parks watching the elk graze and delighting at their nocturnal bugling.
55
   
 With the herd and its popularity growing with every passing season, 1931 
brought controversy and concern over the future of the RMNP elk. At issue was the 
decision on the part of the State of Colorado to open land adjacent to eastern side of 
the park to a late-season elk hunt. The season, which was to run from November 5-10, 
posed a potential threat to the RMNP elk herd if they migrated out of the park in their 
search for winter forage, something they often did through the coldest winter months. 
―If a heavy snow should come about that time,‖ cautioned superintendent Rogers, 
―the whole herd could be exterminated.‖ In their scramble to protect the elk, the Estes 
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Park Game and Fish Association called a meeting voted to petition the State Game 
Commissioner and the County Commissioners to prohibit hunting in the territory that 
had previously been set aside as a game refuge.
56
 In the end, the State Attorney 
General ruled that the new open season did not apply to the game refuge, and the 
now-tame elk of Rocky Mountain were spared a potentially disastrous winter.
57
 To 
nearly everyone it seemed that the future of elk in RMNP was secure.  
 
Conclusion 
From the beginning, those who promoted preservation of the vistas, flora and 
fauna in and around RMNP often had a vested economic or institutional reason for 
doing so. Indeed, the Union Pacific, Elkhorn Lodge, Estes Park Improvement 
Association, and the NPS promoted and protected these animals at least in part—
though I argue significant part—because of pecuniary interest. That is not to say that 
such organizations and their members did not have more altruistic motives, as I am 
certain that they did. In the end, however, the desire to facilitate tourism through the 
promotion and propagation of wildlife unleashed a cascade of unintended 
consequences.  
Well before the creation of the national park, a host of organizations sought to 
amplify the region‘s abundant wildlife to attract visitors. They produced copious 
pamphlets, brochures, photographs and prose in their effort. Following the creation of 
the park, the NPS, who had its own motivations for lauding wildlife in the park, 
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added its voice to the movement. As they touted and as they puffed, however, they 
were unwittingly creating very specific expectations about what a trip to Rocky 
Mountain National Park offered in the way of animal viewing. Not to disappoint their 
patrons, locals and the NPS did all they could to protect ungulates within and near the 
park. These efforts included an extensive predator control program and blocking 
attempts to allow hunting near the park, both of which received widespread local 
support. Prior to the dawn of the ―dirty thirties,‖ all evidence indicated that visitor 
satisfaction and visitation were increasing right alongside the growing herds of elk.  
During the 1930s, however, elk management in the park became evermore 
complex as managers came to witness the consequences of their success in marred, 
scared, and dying aspen groves and stands of willow. Once they realized the damage 
that was occurring, the NPS would take several steps to address the matter, but the 
problem had grown too large and more drastic measures needed. The question 
remained: would the NPS have the institutional strength to pursue management 
policies that threatened to offend those they sought to attract? How the NPS 
answered, and continues to answer, this question shapes the park even to this day.  
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Chapter Seven 




In 1944, shots rang out in Rocky Mountain National Park. During that year 
alone, more than three hundred elk and one hundred deer were killed within the 
confines of this ―living museum.‖ Unlike the occasional poachers of the 1920s or the 
1930s, however, those taking steady aim at some of the park‘s most beloved animals 
were not scofflaws, but rather employees of the National Park Service following 
direct orders of the park superintendent himself.  
For nearly two decades, burgeoning elk herds lounging roadside provided 
countless hours of entertainment and inspiration for visitors. Park rangers and 
superintendents often reported the connection between copious ―game animals‖ and 
pleased patrons. Moratoriums on hunting within the park and predator reduction 
programs were both part of RMNP‘s efforts to grow ungulate populations and park 
visitation. Although such policies seem shortsighted today, we must remember that 
they were made in a time when rigorous scientific study had yet to capture the hearts 
and minds of Americans. As shown in previous chapters, however, science would 
come to the NPS.  
Beginning in other land management agencies in the 1910s, the rising field of 
game management enabled range managers to understand obvious physical signs of 
range degradation in a new light. Likewise, within parks like Yellowstone, biologists 
were busy at work studying ungulate populations and their relationships with 
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predators. These developments, though not initiated in Rocky Mountain, would 
quickly have a significant impact upon how the park itself was administered.  
As early 1931, biologists warned RMNP that there were too many elk in the 
park. Shrinking stands of stream-side willow, marred, scarred and dying aspen, and 
overgrazed meadows told them as much. If left unchecked, scientists cautioned, the 
elk herd would continue to grow and bring about further degradation of the park‘s 
other resources. Addressing the biological side elk management equation was 
relatively simple. Lethal controls (i.e. shooting elk) provided a cost-effective and 
efficient means to remove them from the range. It was the cultural side of the 
management equation, however, that made controlling the park‘s elk herd so very 
difficult. At the heart of the problem lay the fact that the NPS and others had done 
such a fantastic job in linking the RMNP experience to seeing elk. Any effort on the 
part of the NPS to reduce the number of elk in the park ran the risk of raising public 
ire over diminished opportunity to see wildlife. In this ironic way, RMNP had 
become a victim of its own success. 
Between 1931 and 1944, RMNP cast about for solutions that would 
adequately address both the biological and cultural side of this management 
conundrum. They purchased additional land within the park, expanded their staff to 
study elk population dynamics and range carrying capacity, and even came to support 
hunting adjacent to the park in the hopes of stifling the population growth. In the end, 
they were unable to contain the elk population and thus turned to lethal controls in 
1944.  
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Between 1944 and 1962, the NPS heeded scientific advice and sought to 
reduce the elk population through ranger-directed elk killing. Lethal controls showed 
early signs of success, but each time park service rangers pulled their rifles from their 
scabbards and held the crosshairs steadily upon an unsuspecting elk, they did so with 
the utmost awareness of the risks of the operation.  The furtive nature of the killing 
speaks to the potential volatility of the program.  
Even though early reports indicated the ecological success of the culling 
program, public opposition was high. In 1961, RMNP released a long-range 
management plan that called for the redoubling of culling efforts. The plan, combined 
with a much more ambitious one unveiled in Yellowstone, set off a public relations 
firestorm. Facing incredible public pressure, RMNP embraced a new tactic in 1963 to 
which they referred as natural regulation. At the heart of the policy lay the hope that 
hunting adjacent to the park combined with forage scarcity within the park would 
suffice in stifling herd growth.  
Between 1963 and the present, RMNP has vainly employed natural regulation 
to solve its elk population problems. In one respect, the program has more than 
adequately addressed the cultural side of the equation. Perhaps more today than at any 
time in its history, park visitors expect to some of the park‘s estimated 3000 elk. Such 
a robust population, however, also speaks to the policy‘s inability to address the 
ecological side of the equation.  
Beyond drawing connections between public expectations and park 
management, any complete understanding of the history of elk in RMNP must also 
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account for the vast environmental changes that have come as a result of wildlife 
management there. Doing so demonstrates yet again the ability of tourism—and the 
unique set of circumstances it brings with it—to transform the natural world.  
 
Signs of Trouble 
 Well before RMNP recognized that its elk population was exceeding the 
carrying capacity of the range, other land management agencies had already 
experienced first-hand the consequences of unchecked ungulate population growth. 
The starkest cautionary tale came from Arizona‘s Kaibab National Forest. According 
to Susan Flader, when the Grand Canyon National Game Preserve was created in 
1906 it had a deer population of about 4,000. By 1924, the number of mule deer in the 
Kaibab had grown to an alarming 100,000.
1
 This overabundance of deer, in turn, 
brought about wide-spread and appreciable range degradation and resulted in massive 
winter die-offs by mid decade.
2
  
There are many parallels between what unfolded in the Kaibab and what was 
brewing in RMNP. As was the case in RMNP, the deer crisis in the Kaibab was in 
large part a function of predator controls designed specifically to grow game animals. 
In the Kaibab, ―[f]orest officers reported as early as 1918 that the increasing herd was 
beginning to influence the supply of forage, but six successively more urgent 
warnings up to 1924 failed to provide a program for significant reduction.‖ As would 
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be the case in RMNP, biologists and others grew increasingly alarmed that the elk 
population was careening out of control. Yet, as was the case in the Kaibab, RMNP 
was slow to adopt the most effective and immediate solution to the program—lethal 
herd reductions, and for many of the same reasons. 
At the heart of the Forest Service‘s reluctance to take immediate steps to 
remedy the situation lay the fact that the deer of the Kaibab ―were already recognized 
as a national asset, and the Forest Service was fearful the public would react violently 
toward any attempt to reduce the population.‖3 The public sentiment against the 
destruction of game animals was, in turn, rooted in the belief that they were forest 
products that should be used wisely. This was essentially the position championed by 
Aldo Leopold in the 1910s and 1920s. According to Leopold, game animals should 
be protected from predation in much the same way that forest products should be 
protected from fire. Wanton destruction of either ran counter to conservation impulse 
based on the ―wise use‖ principle prevalent during this period.4 Those opposed to 
lethal herd reductions in RMNP would employ the same argument. To sportsmen and 
others, the killing of hundreds of elk within RMNP was a waste of a valuable forest 
resource. As was the case in the Kaibab, widespread public opposition would also 
force RMNP to postpone lethal herd reduction while pursuing other, more publicly 
acceptable solutions.  
In addition to what was unfolding in the Kaibab in the 1920s, the NPS had 
problems of its own brewing in Yellowstone. For decades the NPS had been working 
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to reduce the number of elk there, a fact reflected at least in part in their willingness 
to ship elk to Estes Park in 1913. As was the case in fisheries management, the arrival 
of an ecologically-oriented way of understanding parks began the process of 
redefining the ends and means of wildlife management within them. Specifically, 
between 1929 and 1933 biologists George Wright, Joseph Dixon and Ben Thompson 
conducted ―elk investigations‖ in Yellowstone and other parks and found range 
conditions ―deplorable.‖5 Like the situation that was developing in RMNP, the elk 
crisis in Yellowstone was a function of the NPS‘s tradition of wildlife ―protection‖ as 
opposed to wildlife ―management.‖6 The arrival of ecological understanding, 
however, pushed the NPS from the former to the latter, and in so doing reframed how 
the managed specific species like elk.  
Even before the publication of Fauna No. 1, RMNP staff were beginning to 
understand the park in increasingly ecological terms. When the park was created in 
1915, boundary considerations were driven by the position of private property, and 
perhaps the desire not to include valuable mineral and timber resources. In 1931, 
however, park superintendent Rogers reported that as it was originally created, the 
park failed to include enough winter range to support the growing elk herds.
7
 Placed 
in its historical context, this conclusion speaks to the ways in which ecological 
principles were reframing how managers understood the park. Simply protecting elk 
within the park was not enough. As Rogers and others were beginning to understand, 
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elk were members of broader communities and needed the freedom to move among 
them to survive.  
Additionally, park managers also began to understand that as more elk 
competed for fewer resources, they turned to secondary and tertiary food preferences, 
eating the bark off of aspen and increasing their use of the park‘s willow for food. 
This, in turn, posed significant problems for animals that rely upon those plants for 
survival through the long cold days of winter, such as the park‘s beaver. In this case, 
the winter of 1931 was an especially difficult one for beaver in Rocky Mountain, with 
several found dead in the spring. Whether their deaths were due to lack of water and 
freezing streams, as park staff surmised, or caused by increased competition with 
hungry elk, is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that RMNP staff faced a 
difficult situation in regards to elk management as early as 1931.
8
  
Recognizing this growing problem, the NPS concluded that the ―only solution 
lies in complete control of the Beaver Valley, Horseshoe and Moraine Parks,‖ 
portions of which were still in private ownership. If the above action did not remedy 
the situation, the NPS admitted that it must regulate the ―increase of the herds, based 
on the carrying‖ capacity of the range. Both of these solutions reflect the 
understanding that elk were members of a biotic community and that their presence 
required adequate habitat that was finite—an insight that was not present when the 
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  In response to the above dilemma, the RMNP purchased nearly 4500 acres of 
private land within the Thompson River drainage as well as nearly 8000 additional 
acres in Mill Creek, Beaver Meadows and Horseshoe Park. Privately owned stock had 
grazed much of this land since before the creation of the park, thereby reducing the 
range‘s ability to support elk populations, especially through cold winter months. 
Once under NPS control, grazing came to an end and available elk forage increased.  
According to Rogers, the nearly half-million-dollar expenditure was warranted 
because topographically the land ―belongs in the park, and its addition will greatly 
facilitate and protect road construction and will afford winter range for deer and 
elk.‖10  
 Although the NPS sought to add acreage to the park through the purchase of 
private land, it did not yet have either the will or the backing to pursue the second of 
superintendent Rogers‘s proposals—the application of lethal means to contain elk 
within the carrying capacity of the range. Managers‘ reticence to do so is 
understandable given the growing popularity of elk in the park.
11
 But popularity came 
with as many challenges as it did opportunities. In addition to winter range 
degradation, the NPS also began reporting that visitors were becoming aggressive and 
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careless in their zeal to get closer to the elk. For example, superintendent Edmund 
Rogers reported that the elk were so popular and so tame that it became ―necessary 
during the early part of the month to barricade many old roads and obliterate the 
beginning of new ones where visitors in their cars had been running over the parks 
and meadows in an effort to see, or get closer to, the elk…In reality,‖ admitted the 
superintendent, ―a considerable problem is arising in this connection. It is, of course, 
every visitor‘s desire to get a good picture of, and or get as close as possible to, the 
animals…[but] the small herds were constantly being disturbed by well-meaning 
persons.‖12  
 Although 1933 brought more concerns regarding the ―barking‖ of aspen as 
well as mention of the likelihood of the implementation of control measures to reduce 
the elk, no action was taken in this regard.
13
 But to say that the NPS did nothing, as 
suggested by Karl Hess, is neither fair nor accurate. In addition to purchasing land in 
1932, the NPS had also begun studying the range problem in increasingly scientific 
terms.  Realizing that winter range carrying capacity was the key to elk population 
management, the NPS created twelve fenced enclosures and used comparative 
photographic analysis to study how various plants rebounded once released from the 
rigors of ungulate grazing.
14
  
 By 1935, with nearly all available private land now in the hands of the NPS, 
the park took further steps to address the growing elk crisis. Admitting the limited 
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options, Rogers stated, ―Since further extension of the winter range appears to be 
extremely remote, we are faced with the problem of keeping the number of elk and 
deer within the natural carrying capacity of the range.‖ The superintendent assigned a 
park ranger and a wildlife technician to the project of determining this capacity.  In 
what must have been a difficult admission, the superintendent stated that it appeared 
that ―the most satisfactory way out of the present unstable situation would be to 
artificially reduce the number of elk and deer to the carrying capacity for the available 
range.‖ By 1935, the total elk population within RMNP was estimated at 425.15 
 Between 1935 and the winter of 1943 the NPS made no move to implement 
lethal herd reductions. Not surprisingly, the number of estimated elk in the park grew 
with each passing year. In 1937, for example, there were some 555 elk in the park in 
the winter, and nearly 650 in the summer.
16
 The next year‘s figures showed yet 
another rapid population growth with nearly 800 in residence during the summer and 
675 in the winter.
17
 Although an increasing number of experts agreed that culling the 




Instead, they supported hunting on protected lands outside the park in 1939 
―after numerous ranchers were beginning to complain of elk damage to crops.‖19 By 
1943, the additional purchase of lands within the park, further range study and 
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observation, expanded hunting adjacent to the park, and the cessation of predator 
control operations all failed to stifle the growth of elk within the park. Running short 
on alternatives, the NPS grudgingly turned to lethal herd reductions to address the 
problem. 
 
Binding the Bounty of Nature 
By 1942, concern over the ecological health of the park was mounting. 
Reflective of this concern was a series of studies conducted by biologist Fred Mallery 
Packard. The first of his studies, entitled ―Wildlife and Aspen in Rocky Mountain 
National Park, Colorado,‖ sought to explain the factors impacting the health of aspen 
in the park.
20
 The study concluded that the most significant threat to the park‘s aspen 
population were fungal diseases, ―chief among which is dieback, caused by 
Cytospora chrysosperma,‖ which is introduced into healthy trees by wounds in the 
bark.
21
 Although bark wounds could result from a range of factors, elk were the 
leading culprits. In scraping their antlers on the trees, eating the shoots and leaves, 
and most significantly eating the bark and cambium off the trees, elk exposed aspen 
to the deadly fungus and thereby became significant agents of aspen mortality.
22
 
Although aspen across the park were suffering due to elk overpopulation, the problem 
was most apparent in Beaver Meadows. In one stand of trees, reported Packard, the 
―trunk of every aspen [was] heavily scarred as high as the elk [could] reach, and no 
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branches survive[d] below that height.‖ Just as disconcerting was the discovery that 
―the trees bordering the meadow [were] dead or dying by the hundreds.‖ Under such 
conditions, Packard predicted that it was ―almost certain that in comparatively few 
years all of these aspen will have died, and there is little chance that they will be 
restored.‖23  
In response to mounting scientific evidence like Packard‘s, RMNP staff wrote 
an elk management plan in 1943.
24
  Of most importance within the plan was the 
decision to use lethal force to directly reduce the number of elk wintering in the park. 
After receiving approval from the director of the NPS in 1944, the staff at RMNP 
began an intensive culling campaign. In the span of just two months, the Park Service 
killed a total of 301 elk and 113 deer in RMNP.
25
 Although the culling efforts held 
the promise of solving the population problem, the Assistant Director of the NPS, 
Hillary A. Tolson, ―wrote to the park in 1946, stating that the Director‘s office had a 
‗strong dislike‘ for reduction programs either inside or adjacent to NPS units. 
Accordingly, further reductions were halted until 1949.‖26 
Despite the extensive herd reduction of the 1944 season, scientists continued 
reporting extensive range degradation. For example, Fred Packard conducted research 
on the park‘s deer and elk herd and published his findings in the Journal of 
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 According to Packard, elk within the park were reproducing at 
a rate of 29 percent to 50 percent per annum, which was responsible for the continued 
range degradation.
28
  With the number of elk expanding so rapidly, it is no wonder 
that Packard‘s report echoed the findings of previous investigations. ―In spite of a 
number of natural and artificial checks,‖ stated Packard, ―the elk herd is increasing 
rapidly, and already exceeds the optimum carrying capacity of the winter range.‖29 
Despite the efforts of the NPS throughout the 1930s and the culling campaign of 
1944, Packard found ―serious deterioration‖ of forage plants on the winter range. 30 
In response to such reports, the NPS initiated another intensive culling 
campaign in 1949-1950 that resulted in the ―removal‖ of an additional 340 elk and 
100 deer from the park.
31
 Following the heavy reductions of that season, the NPS 
committed itself to an annual herd reduction with the hope of stabilizing herd 
growth.
32




Although herd control measures continued throughout the 1950s, the number 
of elk killed each year became less and less as some indications pointed toward minor 
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improvements in range conditions.
34
 This was not, however, the only reason that 
annual herd reductions diminished between 1950 and 1959. In his annual report for 
1950, RMNP superintendent David Canfield confided that ―[c]onsiderable public 
relations work was necessary to acquaint the people at large, and especially the 
various sportsmen's organizations, with the need and purpose of the reduction.‖ Close 
cooperation with the Forest Service and the Colorado Game and Fish Department, 
reported the superintendent, ―aided in carrying the reduction to a successful 
conclusion with little opposition.‖35  Although the superintendent reported ―little 
opposition‖ to the program, the record tells a different story. In 1951, for example, 
fewer animals were killed—85 elk and 105 deer—than in previous years and the 
culling efforts were ―carried out over a prolonged period in order to cause less stir 
among the public.‖36 The following year, furthermore, the NPS opted to trap deer 
rather than shoot them to limit ―public outrage.‖ Regardless of the possibility of 
causing ―public outrage,‖ the NPS did kill 89 elk that winter season.37 
Careful to keep hidden the messy process of removing hundreds of thousands 
of pounds of elk from the park, the NPS took several precautions to reduce the 
likelihood of public outcry during the culling process. And for good reason. With 
opposition to culling efforts already high, the NPS could not afford to let little Suzy 
or Jimmy see the park‘s most beloved animal crumple following the crack of a well-
placed shot, especially considering that about one in five elk shot were calves. The 




 Superintendent‘s Annual Report, 1950. 
36
 Superintendent‘s Annual Report, 1951. 
37
 Superintendent‘s Annual Report, 1952. 
 297 
trauma and bad publicity such an incident could produce had the potential to seriously 
tarnish the NPS‘s image. To keep the killing and the visiting as far apart as possible, 
the NPS closed off areas when culling was taking place.  Once the deed had been 
completed, the heaps of animal carcasses were tucked beneath tarp-covered truck 
beds and spirited from the park. According to the park ranger Stanley Brownman, 
every precaution was used to ensure that ―[n]o evidence of the program was exposed 
to park visitors.‖38 
Despite such efforts, the elk reduction programs greatly dismayed many 
visitors. Mrs. R.J. Thornburg was especially upset with the reductions and her 
opposition captures vividly the feelings of many park visitors. Her letter also 
expresses some of the deepest fears of the NPS. According to Thornburg, since ―Mr. 
Public foots the bill‖ for national parks ―maybe he should be considered‖ when 
decisions are made regarding the killing of fauna within them. In a not-so-veiled 
threat to the park, she continued: ―If in hiking around a national park the size of 
Rocky Mt. you can‘t see anything bigger than a squirrel or a cony [the taxpayer] 
might get the idea it wasn‘t worth while to spend so much money for upkeep of the 
area.‖  Not relenting, she contended that  ―[m]any felt this, for we heard lots of 
griping about the paucity of wildlife last summer.‖ Moreover, ―[a] national park 
devoid of the larger species of wildlife isn‘t very inspirational and you can‘t help 
feeling something is wrong.‖ Reaching her boiling point, she blasted, if ―all those 
thousands of acres in Rocky Mt. park won‘t support enough deer so you can see more 
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than six or eight in six weeks of travel on trails and roads, turn it back to the Indians, 
they did a lot better job of managing than that.‖39 
Although Thornburg‘s letter bordered on caustic, she spoke directly to the 
public relations dynamic at work. She was a long-time visitor to the park, coming 
repeatedly since 1940. During the intervening years she came to expect to see ample 
wildlife (primarily deer and elk) throughout the park. To her, at least, the protection 
and proliferation of animal life was how she imagined her tax dollars at work here. 
Her letter also alludes to the fact that many other visitors felt the same: hence her 
claim that ―we heard lots of griping about the paucity of wildlife last summer.‖ As 
was the case with roads and fishing, the NPS and others had taken part in essentially 
training visitors to expect certain things from a park visit, and when those 
expectations were not met, opposition to management practices arose. If such 
opposition was broad and deep enough, political pressure might come to bear on the 
NPS in the form of reduced public support and diminished congressional 
appropriations. The problem from the perspective of elk management, however, was 
that the NPS was increasingly sensitive to other of the park‘s ―natural features‖ and 
working to manage for the health and benefit of a wider range of plants and animals 
than they had in the past—many of which Mrs. Thornburg was apparently not 
interested in seeing. 
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Even though herd reductions raised public hackles, as early as 1954 park 
personnel began reporting that range restoration was ―evident.‖40 By December of 
1954, the superintendent confidently reported, ―All indications point to the fact that 
the once critical winter range of the east slope of RMNP is recovering.‖ More 
specifically, he claimed that ―marked restoration of ground cover has retarded, and in 
places, halted erosion,‖ and that many of the aspen and willow groves which ―seemed 
doomed‖ just a few years prior and that were ―major attractions‖ in drawing visitors 
to the area, were beginning to rebound.
41
 
As the NPS pressed ahead with its reduction efforts, park rangers began to 
notice an interesting trend. The annual shooting of scores of elk throughout the park 
had apparently re-instilled in some of the elk the desire to migrate to safer winter 
range outside of the park.  For example, an elk census conducted on National Forest 
Service land adjacent to the elk‘s winter range revealed an influx of winter elk 
migration coincidental with culling efforts.
42
 This realization prompted some within 
the NPS to begin pondering this as a potential management tool. According to park 
ranger Stanley Brownman, ―Perhaps a feasible plan for the future might consist 
entirely of discriminatory action; that is, to take only a few animals and these to be 
from each herd, for the single purpose of dispersing them‖ out of the park and off of 
the stressed winter range. Doing so, mused Brownman, ―would not only continue the 
present action of preventing accumulation of large herds, but would also serve to 
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accelerate their migration outside the park boundaries‖ where they would not be 
protected from predation—both human and otherwise.43  
To further hasten range recovery, the NPS began drafting the ―Long Range 
Management Plan for the Eastern Rocky Mountain Elk and Deer‖ in 1960.44  
According to the plan, which was released in the fall of 1961, the NPS‘s chief 
objective was to reduce the population of elk and deer on the park‘s winter range to 
levels conducive to the re-growth of forests, shrubs, and grasslands. The plan also 
recognized the detrimental impact that elk were having on beaver and big horned 
sheep within the park, and stated that restoring their populations was also a primary 
goal.
45
 To accomplish the above, the NPS intended to reduce the elk population on 
the winter range to a total of 400 animals
46
 ―as soon as possible,‖ and to initiate a 
more concerted monitoring program to determine future reduction needs.
47
 
The Management Plan was reflective of a broader shift taking place within the 
rank and file of the NPS. For example, prior to the completion of the Management 
Plan, park biologist James Cole wrote to the superintendent of RMNP stating that 
although the ―National Park Service should give Park visitors opportunities to 
observe wildlife,‖ the ―emphasis should be upon wildlife in a normal habitat.‖ Rather 
than promoting an appreciation of abundant wildlife, the NPS should promote 
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―[f]ewer good examples of sleek elk and deer, even though the visitor must expend 
some energy to find them.‖ Only once this was accomplished could the NPS maintain 
―healthy and vigorous plants upon which the condition and existence of all wildlife 
ultimately depends.‖ To Cole, managing for ecological balance, not the proliferation 
of a few key animal species, was their fundamental charge as ―custodians of Park 
wildlife.‖48  The 1961 Management Plan represented a significant—if not easy—step 
in that direction. 
Anticipating public opposition, the Management Plan also called for an active 
public relations campaign to inform the public of the need for the reductions.
49
 To 
accomplish this, the NPS issued a press release in 1961 designed to educate the 
average visitor in the hopes that understanding would lead to support. According to 
the release, the problem of elk overpopulation 
has been the subject of technical studies by National Park wildlife biologists 
for a number of years. The studies have shown that an unhealthy imbalance 
exists between the wildlife and its habitat due principally to the lack of natural 
predators, and the fact that old herd migration routes to winter range areas 





In an attempt to get visitors to understand the connections between the park‘s plant 
and animal communities, the NPS stated that it was ―not only the animals that suffer, 
but plant species on which the deer and elk feed are badly over-browsed and 
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overgrazed…In addition, the loss of this important protective ground cover leads to 
damaging soil erosion.‖51 
If thoughts of soil erosion and overgrazed grass were not enough to win public 
support, the NPS intimated that there was 
no natural remedy for this vicious cycle of imbalance except the cruel one of a 
true famine, which will be avoided at all costs. Should these present 
conditions continue, the plant and animal life of the park will continue to 
suffer irreparable harm.  For these reasons, Rocky Mountain National Park is 
continuing the wildlife management program this winter that was originally 
initiated in the mid-1940s. 
 
To protect the park‘s soil, plants, and the elk themselves, the NPS announced it would 
―remove‖ an estimated 200 elk from ―selected critical food areas.‖ Doubtless hoping 
to assuage visitor angst that the culling efforts would diminish the Rocky Mountain 
National Park experience, the NPS promised that ―[e]very effort will be made to 
prevent interference with visitor opportunities to observe wildlife in a natural and 
appealing setting, and yet encourage migration outside the Park where animals would 
be available to hunters.‖52 
Regardless of their public relations campaign, backlash to the 1961 
Management Plan was fast and fierce, coming from a range of organizations, 
individuals, and government agencies. The most outspoken of the government 
agencies was the Colorado Game and Fish Commission. In the eyes of the Game and 
Fish, the elk of Colorado belonged not to the NPS, but rather to the state of Colorado. 
For their part, the NPS believed that as long as the elk were within the bounds of the 
                                               
51




park itself, they fell under their jurisdiction. Although the two agencies had 
cooperated between 1939 and 1961 in allowing hunting in the game refuge adjacent 
to the park, the Game and Fish was increasingly outraged with Park Service actions 
that brought the destruction of so many elk and deer. To them, the culling of elk and 
deer herds within RMNP by park staff amounted to ―wasteful slaughter.‖ To be clear, 
this agency was not opposed to the idea of culling the herds, but believed that 
reduction should be accomplished through ―limited, controlled public hunting in the 
parks or by trapping and transplanting excess animals,‖ presumably into areas where 
they could then be hunted. The interagency friction is not surprising given that the 
Colorado Game and Fish Commission was the agency primarily in control of 
regulating hunting and fishing within Colorado, and received significant revenue 
from the sale of licenses.
53
 
The Game and Fish Department was not alone in voicing opposition to the 
current plan and in proposing public hunting within the park as a solution. 
Representing a large contingent of outraged hunters, former Forest Service employee 
and wilderness advocate Arthur Carhart wrote an impassioned letter to NPS director 
Conrad Wirth arguing that past efforts to control the elk population had failed. 
Predators, he claimed, had not ―kept the balance‖ in terms of elk population, and 
neither had the NPS‘s hired guns. Asking a rhetorical question, Carhart continued, 
―[W]ho can supply the mandatory removal of the over-load on game ranges? Every 
part of the country has tried the alternatives and come smack, crash into the 
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inescapable fact that the one chance of controlling game herds except ‗nature‘s way‘ 
of starvation and epidemic, is by hunters.‖54 
Although Carhart was outspoken in favor of hunting within the park as a way 
out of the morass, he was not blind to the public relations dynamic at work. In closing 
his letter, he warned the director of the NPS that he would ―catch hell‖ from those 
who refused to open their eyes and minds, but recommended that the proposed public 
hunting could be done ―after season, when parks are generally closed to tourists, and 
to the benefit of every factor and facet in the whole complex business of maintaining 
the ‗park idea.‘‖55 
Carhart was right about one thing—the NPS did ―catch hell‖ following release 
of their plan. According to the Denver Post, ―Seldom has the National Park Service 
taken a worse public beating than it‘s now suffering over the planned program of 
killing elk. Belted with charges of ineptness, stupidity, even of inhumanity, the NPS 
has been pictured as a ghoulish, kill-crazed monster with blood dripping from its 
bureaucratic jowls.‖56 Extensive elk reductions had always been a touchy area for the 
NPS, as evidenced by public complaints from citizens like Mrs. Thornburg. But the 
reductions proposed in the 1961 Management Plan were met with more resistance 
than past programs. Although it is impossible to ascertain exactly why, the resistance 
was likely due to the fact that the elk reductions in Rocky Mountain were to be 
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coincidental with a much more intensive culling campaign in Yellowstone. Just as in 
RMNP, elk populations in Yellowstone had careened out of control in the absence of 
predators, both human and otherwise. But there, the problem was far more grave and 
the solutions far less palatable. While the Management Plan for Rocky Mountain 
prescribed the eventual taking of 400 elk, Yellowstone National Park was gearing up 
to reduce their herd by some 5000.
57
 
As pressure to halt the reductions in RMNP mounted, NPS officials urged the 
managers of RMNP to stay the course. For example, the Regional Director wrote to 
Superintendent Hanks amidst the firestorm. Although he commended the work the 
NPS was doing in trapping elk, they urgently cautioned that park staff make ―all 
efforts necessary to effect your intended reduction of 200 elk this winter.‖ Alluding to 
the ecological and public relations disaster brewing in Yellowstone, the Regional 
Director continued, ―We know you are aware of the consequences in reaching an 
excessive overpopulation of your resident elk herd and wish to avoid at all costs a 
duplication of the intensive operation which has become necessary in Yellowstone.‖58 
By the winter of 1961-1962, RMNP was at a crossroads. On one hand they 
had irrefutable scientific evidence that elk winter range was in dire condition and that 
more than a decade of lethal control was working to ameliorate the situation. On the 
other hand, they faced stiff opposition to future reductions, from both private and 
government corners. Under tremendous pressure, RMNP management attempted to 
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find a solution that would please all parties while still allowing for managing for the 
NPS‘s evolving understanding of ecological health. 
To the relief of many, in early February of 1962 the Rocky Mountain News 
reported that the ―control program for thinning the elk herds of Rocky Mountain 
National Park by execution‖ had been halted‖ after only 58 elk were killed.59 In 
comments to the press, superintendent Allan Hanks revealed the direction that the 
NPS had chosen. Rather than commenting on further herd reductions, Hanks was 
quoted as stating that ―hopes were high that a transplanting program could be carried 
on next year and gave assurances there always will be a surplus of elk in the park.‖60 
In other words, lethal herd reductions were to come to a halt and be replaced by non-
lethal (and far more publicly acceptable) capture, removal, and release of elk. 
Hanks‘s assurance that ―there will always be a surplus of elk in the park‖ spoke to 
visitor concerns that NPS elk reduction program—through whatever means—would 
not diminish the opportunity to behold the majestic wapiti. 
Accordingly, RMNP managers called for ―an accelerated program of live 
trapping and marking animals to facilitate the study of migration habits and 
distribution patterns within the Park and between and on the adjoining Roosevelt 
National Park.‖61 Furthermore, RMNP established a full-time position for a park 
biologist to participate in the studies.
62
 Lastly—and perhaps most importantly—the 
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 Guse, ―Effective Management Program Requirements for Eastern Rocky Mountain Deer 




NPS signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Forest Service and 
the Colorado Game and Fish Commission to undertake cooperative research ―to 
provide factual information to the Colorado Game and Fish Commission so that they 
may be in a better position to set and regulate reasonable seasons and harvest.‖ Doing 
so, they reasoned, was ―in the interests of sound wildlife management and increased 
hunter satisfaction.‖ The NPS‘s willingness to partner with an agency with which 
they had been less than friendly was based largely upon the hope that the partnership 
might eliminate the ―need for ranger-directed reduction programs in the future.‖ The 
question remained, however, exactly how their partnership might precipitate a final 
cessation of lethal herd reduction.
63
 
The answer to that question began emerging through the summer and fall of 
1962. According to biologist Neal Guse, the NPS and Fish and Game Commission 
had long known that a substantial number of RMNP elk migrate out of the park near 
the end of December.  Although the NPS and Fish and Game Commission had 
allowed hunting in the game preserve on the park‘s eastern and northern borders since 
1939, the hunts took place during the traditional hunting season in October, and hence 
well before most RMNP elk migrated out of the park. This was the prime reason, 
surmised Guse, that hunting outside the park had failed year after year to control elk 
populations.
64
 What was needed instead were interagency studies designed to ―gather 
information on elk migration and distribution habits to effect additional harvests 
outside the Park, thus eliminating the annual reduction programs on the winter 
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range.‖65 In other words, if the NPS could obtain accurate and reliable data on the 
annual migration of elk, they might well be able to use licensed hunters outside the 
park to cull the herds for them. To an agency in the throes of a major public relations 
debacle, Guse‘s suggestions were eagerly received. 
Together, the NPS, Forest Service, and the Game and Fish designed and 
executed a research program through 1962 and 1963. To aid them in determining the 
migration patterns of the region‘s elk, they orchestrated a trapping program both 
inside and outside of park boundaries. After the animals were captured, they were 
fitted with ear tags and neckbands, both of which would aid the researchers in 
collecting data. In all the agencies trapped and tagged a total of 94 elk within the 
park, and two beyond its boundaries.
66
 With tagged animals roaming across the 
region, researchers eagerly collected data. 
Overall, the research program provided valuable information on the seasonal 
movements of elk and confirmed Guse‘s suspicion that many elk wintered beyond the 
park‘s boundaries. According to Guse,  
The Park serves as a refuge and provides the bulk of the winter feed. 
However, increasing numbers of elk are migrating to the Forest and 
particularly so when feed is short or when precipitated by persistent inclement 
weather conditions. It is during these latter periods when large numbers leave 
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By their calculation, somewhere between one-half and two-thirds of the summer elk 
population (seventy-five to one hundred elk) left the park following the first 
significant winter storm.
68
 The majority of the elk that wintered east of the Divide, 
where elk overpopulation was the worst, however, did not typically leave the Park 
until January. With this realization, the NPS and State Game and Fish Commission 
orchestrated an additional public hunting season on the land adjacent to the park in 
January and February of 1963.  The NPS then collected data on how many elk were 
killed as a result of the season. In their estimation, hunters had killed as many as five 
hundred of the elk that left the park.
 69
  Deeming the season ―highly successful,‖ Guse 
reported, ―For the first time in approximately 20 years desirable winter elk herd 
numbers were achieved.‖70 
And there it was—a true panacea. If their data was reliable and the experiment 
reproducible, hunting outside the park was an understandably attractive option. Not 
only did the NPS have preliminary evidence that the season could keep park elk 
populations under control, it also meant that the NPS would be able to disassociate 
itself from the unseemly killing of a park icon. This solution also promised to placate 
hunters who bemoaned the ―wasteful killing‖ of game animals by government 
officials, while still providing license revenue for the Colorado Game and Fish 
Commission. Obviously overcome by all of the above, the NPS moved toward the 
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embrace of hunting adjacent to the park as the primary means of elk population 
control. 
Between 1963 and 1992 the NPS has based its elk management upon the 
above model. Despite park manager‘s hopes, the elk population within and around 
RMNP increased dramatically.
71
 The causes of the increase were many, but the 
primary reason lies with the ineffectiveness of hunting outside the park to reach the 
numbers optimistically reported by Guse and his research team. Research conducted 
between 1968 and 1992 found that a decline in the tolerance for sport hunting, 
combined with increasingly limited access to private land for hunting, were the 
primary reasons for the policy‘s failure. As a result, elk harvests adjacent to the park 
never came close to the harvest of 500-600 elk per year required to stabilize elk 
population growth. Between 1968 and 1987, the average elk harvest amounted to 442 
[+/-] 78 per year. Since that time, the average annual harvest has dipped to 302 [+/-] 
36.
72
 Despite the NPS‘s efforts (or perhaps as a direct result of them), the overall 
population of elk within the park has witnessed a three-fold increase since 1968.
73
 
The high water mark came between 1997 and 2001, with an estimated 2800-3500 elk 
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Failures of Natural Regulation 
To understand fully the implications of elk management in RMNP, to grasp 
the connections between managing for the satisfaction of tourists and the natural 
world, we would do well to see the park from the perspective of a willow or a beaver. 
As the modern field of ecology tells us, elk are part of a complex and dynamic matrix 
of plant and animal life. Their lives—the rutting, eating, defecating, calving, 
migrating—are all tied to the health of other plant and animal systems where they 
roam. Even before the dawn of the 20
th
 century, humans had drastically altered the 
relationship between elk and the ecosystems to which they contribute. The 
reintroduction of elk into the Estes Park region, combined with the establishment of 
RMNP, created a unique set of circumstances that tied together human desire and the 
natural world in new ways.  
According to prevailing research, at the root of the elk ―problem‖ in RMNP 
lies two interrelated facts: there are too many elk for the winter range to support, and 
the elk that are in the park are less migratory than they have been in the past, which 
further compounds the problem of overpopulation.
75
  Both of these situations are tied 
directly to human decisions regarding the management of ungulates—specifically 
elk—in and around the park. 
Studies conducted in the 1990s found that there were approximately 1000 elk 
that spent their winter days inside the park pawing through the snow to meet their 
substantial caloric needs. An additional 2000 elk also wintered on land immediately 
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adjacent to the park, wandering the streets, lawns, golf courses and gardens of Estes 
Park searching for edible plants.
76
 The overabundance of elk during the winter 
season, in turn, has a compounding dynamic of its own. Under the best of 
circumstances, the snow-blown days of winter traditionally present forage problems 
for elk, as their preferred food choice—grass—is in shorter supply. When population 
dynamics are out of balance, however, the problem of winter forage is heightened and 
those plants that lie at the outer edges of elk preference are more intensively browsed. 
Over time, the implications for many of the park‘s aspen and willow—not to mention 
those other plants and animals that rely upon them—have been dire.77 
But more is at work here than simply having too many elk in the park. The 
second significant problem—and one that complicates the first—is that the elk in the 
park are less migratory than they would be under more natural conditions. Under 
ideal circumstances the elk within RMNP would migrate between primary summer 
range, including the Kawuneeche Valley and subalpine and alpine areas, and their 
winter range, which lies primarily on the eastern side of the park and in Estes Park.
78
 
The seasonal movement of elk, in turn, would ensure that no single part of their range 
is overgrazed. 
With the vast majority of the park‘s predators long since ―removed,‖ the 
human population adjacent to the park increasing with each passing season, and the 
institution of late elk hunting seasons adjacent to the park, the elk have become less 
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willing to migrate out of the park. According to the NPS, between 10% and 15% of 
all the elk within the park remain on the primary winter range during the summer. As 
more elk spend more time on the winter range within the park, its ability to rebound 
from elk grazing is curtailed, the range of elk food choices decreases, and the elk turn 
increasingly to secondary and tertiary food choices during all seasons.
79
 
One of the plants most directly and negatively impacted by the elk population 
imbalance is the aspen (Populus tremuloides).  Beginning in the early 1930s, 
managers of RMNP began reporting significant ―barking‖ of aspen, and interpreted it 
as growing evidence that the population of elk within the park was not healthy. The 
intensive overgrazing of aspen by elk was evident by the 1960s, as park staff 
commented that the exclosures in Horseshoe Park built in the 1930s stand ―out like an 
oasis surrounded by herbs and grasses. After twenty-five years of protection, thirty-
one aspen stems were growing‖ in the exclosure, and there were none outside of it.80   
As the elk population in the park continued to grow, park biologist David 
Stevens initiated a study in 1968 with the intention of understanding precisely the 
impact of elk herbivory upon the park‘s floral community under the program of 
natural regulation.
81
 His study offers reliable and valuable evidence of the impact of 
elk upon aspen in RMNP. Using analysis of specific transects over a twenty-five year 
period, Stevens found ample evidence that connected elk overpopulation with 
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decreased plant biodiversity in the park and indicated significant negative impact 
upon the park‘s aspen. 
Like many trees, aspen reproduction is largely vegetative, meaning that aspen 
regeneration comes primarily through suckers and not seed. As the number of elk on 
the winter range have increased, and the intensity of elk browsing aspen suckers 
likewise increased, the number of new aspen growing to maturity within the park 
drastically decreased.
82
 According to Stevens‘s research, no ―significant changes 
were found in basal area, density, or average height of aspen trees‖ in the study areas 
between 1968 and 1988. 
83
 This fact was not surprising given that he also found 
marked increases in elk usage within the study areas over the same time period.
84
 
Whereas Stevens relied on transects in his research, William L. Baker, 
Jennifer A. Munroe and Amy E. Hessl relied upon the park‘s exclosures to gather 
information on elk herbivory, and their work produced similarly stark conclusions. 
Not only were aspen populations outside the exclosures declining, as demonstrated by 
―high mortality among established trees, including entire stands that are dead,‖ 
evidence also mounted that reflected a ―low density of live suckers‖ not sufficient to 
regenerate the trees. Perhaps most importantly, the researchers concluded that due to 
overgrazing by elk, ―almost no cohort regeneration‖ had taken place since the 
adoption of natural regulation following 1963.
85
 In other words, those mature aspen 
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within the park were aging, but successive generations of aspen were not in place to 
replace older, dying trees.  
Echoing Stevens‘s work, the researchers pointed to an overabundance of elk, 
contending that over ―the last century, aspen cohorts regenerated only when there 
were fewer than ca 600 elk on the park‘s elk winter range, far fewer than the present 
estimated 1600 head.‖86 According to the most recent assessment by the NPS, the 
―continuation of the high elk densities in Rocky Mountain National Park [will] result 
in the complete loss of aspen trees or, at best, existence in a shrub-like state on core 
winter ranges.‖87 
Aspen, and the many plants and animals that rely upon them, are not the only 
flora put at risk by too many elk in the park. Willow (Salix spp.) have also suffered 
significantly as a result of the booming elk population. Although willow are not a 
primary food choice for elk within the park, absent other preferred grasses, elk will 
turn to them for food.  Park biologist Stevens again found a direct correlation between 
burgeoning elk herds and diminished stands of willow in the park. In the years 
between 1971 and 1992, for example, elk use on meadow transects where willow 
were most common, doubled.
88
 As a result, elk have significantly inhibited riparian 
willow reproduction, as seedling survival has become ―almost non-existent.‖89  
Further, the pressure from elk is so great that few willows ―attain a height greater than 
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the herbaceous layer, which is the layer of non-woody plants such as grasses, forbs, 
and herbs.‖90 
Observations of the exclosures built in and monitored since the 1930s yielded 
similar results. For example, by the early 1960s, less than three full decades following 
their ―release‖ from ungulate grazing, willow covered some 70% of the three 
exclosures in Beaver Meadows and Horseshoe Park. Where they were not protected 
by such exclosures, park biologists concluded that the willow were rapidly 
diminishing.
91
  As a prelude to the damage that was yet to come, park staff concluded 
that although the loss of streamside willow would not ―alter the landscape picture so 
much,‖ it would have a significant and detrimental impact on both elk and beaver.92 
The above process, well underway by the 1930s, greatly accelerated as elk 
populations soared following 1963 and the cessation of lethal herd reductions. 
It is important to bear in mind that the processes at work are not linear, but 
dynamic. The increase in browsing pressure from elk upon willow, and the 
subsequent decline in streamside willow within the park, has in turn significantly 
impacted beaver within the elk range. Beaver, which rely upon willow for both 
building material and food, have declined in number significantly over the past fifty 
years. In part this decline was the direct result of trapping, like that which took place 
in the 1922 season through which forty-six beaver were trapped in and near the park. 
However, competition with elk over a finite and overlapping resource base is a more 








significant factor in beaver decline in RMNP. Although there were ―an estimated 300 
beavers living in Moraine Park alone in 1939, that number had plummeted by more 
than 90% by the dawn of the 21
st
 century.‖93 
Too many elk eating too many willows have had more complicated impacts 
than simply reducing the number of beaver in RMNP—a connection that park staff 
have been cognizant of since at least 1960. For example, the Elk Management Plan 
for 1960-1961 stated, ―Old residents have reported that the extensive grass areas of 
Horsehoe Park were once occupied by willows.‖ The plan also mentions that 
―[h]igher water tables, probably due to beaver dams, were apparently favorable for 
vigorous willow growth.‖ Further scientific research has borne this out.  Specifically, 
the reduction in the number of beaver in the park has had the resultant effect of 
reducing the overall surface water in places like Moraine Park by upwards of 70%.
94
 
The reduction in surface water, specifically the large pools created by beaver dams, 
has further reduced the amount of suitable willow habitat, which has fed directly into 
declining willow fecundity, and thereby accelerated beaver depopulation.
95
 
Elk and beaver, if left to their own devices, are able to establish something 
approaching a working relationship. According to the most recent data released by the 
NPS, under natural conditions (i.e., with intact predator base and far fewer elk), 
beaver would be more abundant, and water levels on the elk winter range would be 
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higher, which would further encourage the ―establishment and growth of willows.‖96 
Rather than engaging in a life and death struggle for a limited resource base as they 
now are, elk and beaver can ―establish a competitive balance in which each species‘ 
willow herbivory does not ultimately exclude each other or annual regeneration of 
montane riparian willow.‖97 Such has not been the case in RMNP, however, for many 
decades. 
Too many elk on the winter range for too long has had other ecological 
ramifications as well. As elk crop, chew and digest some species—like aspen and 
willow—at higher rates than they would under healthier ecological conditions, other 
plant species have increased. For example, areas where elk herbivory increased 
substantially also reflect significant increases in invasive plant species like Timothy 
(Phleum pretense). This plant, which was likely introduced into the park as a food 
stock for cattle, showed an increase of 54% between 1978-88 alone.
98
 Intensive elk 
grazing can also result in upturns in bare ground, soil compaction, increased sediment 
yields in water adjacent to grazed areas, and ―warmer, or drier soil microclimate,‖ 
which can have a direct bearing on plant growth in a given area.
99
 In all of these 
ways, and countless others, the impact of tourism in Rocky Mountain National Park, 
and the management decisions regarding that activity, are reflected on the park‘s 
environment.  
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Hundreds of thousands of people travel to Rocky Mountain National Park 
every year to see elk.  They push their cars through wandering herds of elk and stride 
to within just feet of them in the hopes of capturing a lasting and evocative image that 
commemorates the moment they stood so close to a wild animal. They admire the 
rutting bulls strutting through stands of aspen and calves feeding along the banks of 
the Big Thompson. 
But from another vantage point, the elk that live in RMNP and give untold 
pleasure, amusement, and inspiration to millions every year are perhaps the least 
―natural‖ elk in the state of Colorado. They have become remarkably tolerant of 
humans and their coughing, roaring, honking automobiles; they enjoy lives largely 
free from predation; and they have drastically altered the ecosystems of which they 
are a part. In this sense, the elk of RMNP might be admired less as a product of the 
natural world and more as a manifestation of human desire and artifice.  
The point here is not to chide the NPS for making the decisions it has 
regarding elk management, but rather to understand the reasons such decisions were 
made, as well as the consequences of those decisions. Moving toward the drastic 
reduction of elk in and around the park is no easier today than it was forty years ago.  
The NPS is well aware that ―[e]lk contribute to the economy of the Estes Valley by 
attracting visitors to the park and the Town of Estes Park. Visitors enjoy viewing and 
 320 
photographic elk, especially during the autumn elk rutting season.‖100 In other words, 
folks still expect to see elk in RMNP. In a deeply ironic way, the past forty years of 
elk population increase has only worked to heighten this expectation. Only time will 
tell if the NPS now has the courage, institutional strength, and political will to buck 
public opinion and rein in this monster it played such a central role in creating.     
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 Many people concerned with the demand for resources in ―third world‖ 
countries argue that tourism offers a means to foster economic development in such a 
way that does not decimate local environments. According to Tensie Whelan, 
―Ecotourism, done well, can be a sustainable and relatively simple alternative‖ to 
industrial resource extraction in places like Costa Rica.
1
 Many towns, counties, and 
states in the American West have turned to tourism to augment their economic base 
with the very same hopes.  
 As Pomeroy, Rothman, Hyde, and others have demonstrated, tourism is a 
deeply cultural process that shapes national and regional identity and reshapes local 
and regional economies. Given that tourism is an activity that involves the movement 
of hundreds of millions of people across the world, and given that it involves nearly a 
trillion dollars in economic activity each year in international travel alone, it would 
stand to reason that it would also be a major force in shaping and reshaping local and 
regional environments. Such has been the case in RMNP. Viewing tourism through 
the lens of environmental history offers new and important insights into the material 
consequences of this very cultural process.  
 National parks offer a prime opportunity to study the environmental aspects of 
tourism. Parks represent sanctuaries where bird and beast are afforded a level of 
                                               
1
 Tensie Whelan, ed., Nature Tourism: Managing For the Environment (Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press, 1991), 4.  
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environmental protection not found in other places. Almost without exception, 
national parks restrict mining, the cutting of trees and other intensive extractive 
industries common on land managed by the U.S. Forest Service or the Bureau of 
Land Management. As a result, parks offer islands where the central economic 
activity is neither extractive nor industrial in the traditional sense.  Instead, for more 
than one hundred years people have traveled to great western national parks to cast 
their gaze upon breathtaking vistas, to stand amidst pristine babbling brooks and 
angle for trout, to hear the bugle of a bull elk in rut, or to ascend toward the heavens 
in their automobiles.  
On the surface, each of these activities offers, as Whelan put it, a ―sustainable 
and relatively simple‖ alternative to more invasive economic activities. As 
demonstrated through the preceding chapters, however, managing for each of the 
above has brought vast—in some cases irreversible—environmental change to a place 
designed ostensibly to prevent such changes. As it turns out, managing for tourism in 
places like RMNP is never simple, and in many cases has not proven to be 
sustainable.  
As advertised, Colorado offered respite for over-worked urban brains, a health 
sanctuary for the unwell, unmatched opportunities to experience wildlife, and plenty 
of good fishing too. Well before the creation of RMNP, a host of local, regional, and 
national business interests had dedicated significant time and money to promoting 
these and other aspects of Colorado. In this sense, the creation of RMNP is best 
understood as part of the broader effort amongst Coloradoans to promote their state.  
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Certainly, many who supported the idea of a national park near Estes did so 
out of a genuine desire to protect the natural world for the enjoyment of future 
generations of Americans. As Hyde and others have demonstrated, during the early 
years of the twentieth century, national parks were symbols of national pride and 
founts of national identity. But in the halls of Congress where Rocky Mountain was 
actually created, it was the economic argument that carried the day. Most admitted 
that the proposed park lacked the sort of geological wonders characteristic of national 
parks. What it offered, however, was a prime location that if properly promoted 
would generate substantial revenue for the state.  
At its core, tourism involves the packaging, presenting, and selling of an 
experience.  Compelling Americans and others to leave the comfortable confines of 
their homes, divest themselves of their hard earned savings, and amble ―out West‖ 
requires sophisticated and sustained advertising. As Pomeroy, Rothman, Hyde and 
others have demonstrated, how places like RMNP are presented to the world creates 
certain expectations about what specifically a western experience entails. Whereas 
Rothman and Pomeroy discovered that this process puts westerners in the position of 
―playing West,‖ I find that advertising created very specific and important 
expectations about what the natural West should be. Furthermore, advertisements also 
informed the prospective tourist of what they could and should be doing once they 
arrived. These expectations, in turn, put communities like Estes Park, businesses like 
the Union Pacific Railroad, and government agencies like the National Park Service 
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in a position either to transform the natural world to meet those expectations, or to 
reject them and run the risk of losing patrons.  
In the case of driving, fishing, and wildlife viewing—three tourist activities 
that have been central to the Rocky Mountain National Park experience—the 
National Park Service and others dedicated significant resources to meeting the 
expectations fostered in part through advertising.  To both attract and please the 
traveler, the NPS and others built roads deep into the heart of the Rockies. But roads 
offered more than a mechanism to move people through the park. In the capable 
hands of a landscape architect, roads became powerful tools to shape how tourists 
experienced and understood the park. Not only were roads laid out along routes that 
broke frequently upon striking vistas, the roadside itself was managed to evoke a 
specific range of responses. Perhaps hoping to accentuate the pristine nature of the 
park, the NPS dedicated significant resources to roadside cleanup and the removal of 
historic structures within the park.  
The NPS had real and logical reasons for building wide, smooth, and 
breathtaking roads. Upon its creation, the NPS was not a large or especially powerful 
agency. Furthermore, the Service was created in the wake of the Hetch Hetchy 
controversy that demonstrated to park supporters the need for a strong and unified 
government agency dedicated completely to the protection of parks from 
development. Stephen T. Mather and Horace Albright both understood that for parks 
to survive the pressure of development in the future, they needed to build strong 
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connections to as many Americans as possible. The construction, promotion and 
maintenance of roads in parks like Rocky were part of this effort.  
Tapping into the decades-long tradition of recreational fishing in Colorado, 
RMNP redoubled efforts to keep park waters filled with catchable and desirable 
species of trout. Working closely with local conservation organizations and other 
government agencies, the NPS initiated decades of extensive stocking in almost every 
body of water in the park. Once again, the NPS understood that if properly managed, 
the fishery resources of the park would provide yet another powerful tool in building 
public support—and thereby political longevity—for their agency.  
In a similar fashion, RMNP also sought to use its abundant wildlife, which 
had long been a hallmark of the region, to attract and please tourists. Operating in an 
era that prized ―good‖ game animals over ―bad‖ predators, RMNP initiated an active 
and ultimately effective predator reduction campaign. In less than a decade, game 
animals like deer and elk were on the rise, and all indications pointed to increased 
visitor satisfaction.  
Although the promotion of tourism served as the central policy-making 
determinant through the first fifteen years of RMNP, the arrival of science within the 
NPS in the early 1930s challenged the ends and means of preservation there. 
Scientists transformed the agency from one concerned primarily with how parks 
looked to an organization increasingly concerned with how they functioned. As a 
result of this transformation, the NPS took steps to reverse many of the environmental 
changes they actively sought in previous years, and to balance tourist demands with 
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something approaching their evolving definition of ecological sustainability. In the 
case of RMNP, such efforts included elk reduction campaigns, cessation of fish 
stocking, and eventually the embrace of voluntary mass transit.  
It is tempting to conclude that the history of RMNP can be divided into 
essentially two eras. In the first, which includes the years leading up to 1931, the NPS 
managed almost exclusively for the pleasure of tourists with very little real concern 
for environmental quality. In a sense, this is a correct interpretation of the 
management of RMNP. But to move from this conclusion to a condemnation of the 
NPS for the environmental change their policies brought about is not historically fair 
or accurate. As Richard West Sellars, James Pritchard, Donald Worster and others 
have shown, the NPS—like the rest of the country—did not have the conceptual tools 
required to understand the sorts of ecological changes they brought about. Rather, 
prior to the ascendancy of ecology in the United States, the NPS understood its 
mission as one centered upon protecting evocative scenery and providing 
entertainment and relaxation for visitors. The NPS was not alone in this belief. The 
vast majority of Americans that traveled to parks like Rocky felt the same way.  
Condemning the NPS for its management decisions the first fifteen years of 
RMNP is flawed for another reason as well: the National Park Service, and parks like 
Rocky Mountain, still exist. In a world in which population growth and consumerism 
put tremendous strain on natural resources, the NPS has managed to stay afloat and 
protect—to a fairly remarkable degree—those lands it administers. One could make a 
very good case that although Mather, Albright and others had no real sense of what 
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the intensive use of parks would mean for the natural resources within them, their 
wager that public support was needed to protect parks from future development has 
proven true. It is impossible to know whether we would have the park system today if 
NPS directors had chosen to limit growth, limit access, and limit recreation.   
It is likewise tempting to read the history of RMNP since 1931 as one in 
which scientists have attempted to ―rescue‖ the park from its rapidly increasing 
popularity. Although it is true that scientific research drastically changed and 
challenged how this park was managed, it is not accurate to assume that science has 
had all of the answers, either. Rather, science-centered management did not eclipse 
the need and the desire on the part of the NPS to attract tourists to parks; rather it 
gave them new tools and methodologies to seek some balance between managing for 
tourists and managing for their evolving understanding of ecological health. In this 
sense, national parks have become great classrooms of environmental education and 
understanding. Although not a role originally envisioned by park founders, this 
contribution of national parks to scientific understanding is one of their greatest 
legacies.  
Since the 1930s tourism and science have been in dynamic tension in RMNP. 
In some cases, scientific understanding has brought about policy changes that have 
circumscribed what tourists could do inside the park. Such has been the case with 
fishing in RMNP. Where once all streams and lakes within the park were the 
playgrounds of fishermen and home to untold numbers of non-native fish, many 
waters are now closed to fishing and harbor only greenback trout. 
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A different pattern has developed in terms of elk management within the park. 
Science did shed new light on the damage elk were doing to the park‘s other plant and 
animals members, but balancing between tourist expectations and ecological health 
has been more difficult here than in the realm of fisheries management. In large part, 
the inability of scientific concerns to override recreational ones related to viewing 
wildlife was largely a function of how deeply imbedded elk watching was in the park 
experience, and the fact that the most effective means of removing excess elk from 
the range—lethal reduction—was wildly unpopular. Very few voiced concerns over 
the poisoning of streams and lakes to remove non-native fish, but a chorus of 
discontent erupted each time the park contemplated lethal elk reductions. In time, 
public sentiment against the killing of elk by park rangers forced the NPS to look for 
other solutions. Their embrace of ―natural regulation‖ was largely a function of public 
pressure, and not the implementation of scientific understanding in park policy.  
Scientific understanding has also complicated the construction and 
maintenance of roads in RMNP. Until the 1950s, no superintendent of RMNP ever 
questioned the logic behind building roads to accommodate more visitors, which 
would require more roads. Following the war, however, park visitation skyrocketed 
and parks like Rocky lapsed quickly into disrepair. In an effort to modernize parks 
and make way for future growth, Conrad Wirth initiated Mission 66 to save the parks 
from the people. The unabashedly expansionist bent of Mission 66, however,  
combined with the results of Beatrice Willard‘s research and the wilderness 
movement succeeded in challenging the place of roads in RMNP. By the 1970s the 
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NPS was embracing—if only timidly—alternatives to widespread automobile travel 
through RMNP.  
 In all of these ways, tourism has been an active and important agent of 
environmental change. The millions of non-native fish swimming the streams and 
lakes of Rocky Mountain National Park, the stands of dead and dying aspen, 
prodigious numbers of elk lounging roadside, and countless acres of denuded alpine 
tundra all speak to this fact. Tourism may offer a means for communities, states, and 
nations to step away from traditional resource extraction. But in a strictly 
environmental sense, the embrace of tourism offers as many problems as it does 
solutions. Until we understand more fully tourism‘s power to rework the natural 
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